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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Though ample resources exist,1 one need not extensively research 
endless facts and figures on the social, economic, and cultural losses 
Indians2 have suffered since the triumphant European “discovery” of 
America to understand just how accurate claims of an “American Indian 
Holocaust” may truly be.3  Instead, by simply glancing at the two maps that 
 
 1.  INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) 
[hereinafter MERIAM REPORT] (report detailing the devastating economic, social, and cultural effects 
of the Allotment Era policies); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 22.01–.07 (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (discussing government 
services to address the great need in Indian Country); Jay Winter Nightwolf, Taking a Stand Against 
Poverty in Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 11, 2009, http://indiancountrytoday 
medianetwork.com/ictarchives/2009/09/11/taking-a-stand-against-poverty-in-indian-country-83921. 
 2.  In accordance with the standard terminology of scholarship and federal policy, this 
Comment will use the term “Indian” as opposed to “Native American” or “American Indian.”  See 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §§ 3.01–.04 (providing a detailed discussion of the nuanced 
definition, meaning, and significance of the terms Indian tribe, Indian, and Indian Country). 
 3.  RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A POPULATION 
HISTORY SINCE 1492 (1987) (discussing the effects of the European arrival on Indians and tracing 
Indian populations over the following 500 years).  Thornton observes, 
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appear on the front page of any issue of Indian Country Today, “the most 
widely circulated Native American newspaper,”4 one is instantly confronted 
with a dramatic reality: the first shows the entire United States shaded in red 
and labeled “Indian Country,” while a second map shows that modern-day 
Indian Country has been reduced to minute dots of red scattered across the 
vast land mass.5 
In recognition of the devastation this massive loss of territory wreaked 
on Indians, Congress enacted the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 (IRA)6 to prevent further loss of Indian lands and facilitate 
reconstruction of the Indian land base.7  To this end, the IRA is centered 
around the fee-to-trust program, a process whereby Indian tribes can 
essentially expand their reservations by requesting to have additional land 
placed into trust for their benefit.8  However, the consequent equal and 
opposite reaction is the removal of any such land from state and local 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, while the IRA’s original rationale and goals are 
certainly honorable, today, the fee-to-trust process is the subject of fervent 
opposition as affected communities struggle with the substantial 
consequences of successful trust acquisitions in their area: the loss of tax 
revenue,9 and zoning, planning, and other regulatory control.10 
 
For [Indians] the arrival of the Europeans marked the beginning of a long holocaust, 
although it came not in ovens, as it did for the Jews.  The fires that consumed North 
American Indians were the fevers brought on by newly encountered diseases, the flashes 
of settlers’ and soldiers’ guns, the ravages of “firewater,” the flames of villages and fields 
burned by the scorched-earth policy of vengeful Euro-Americans.  The effects of this 
holocaust of North American Indians, like that of the Jews, was millions of deaths.  In 
fact, the holocaust of the North American tribes was, in a way, even more destructive 
than that of the Jews, since many American Indian peoples became extinct. 
Id. at xv–xvi. 
 4.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.01. 
 5.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.01. 
 6.  Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2006). 
 7.  G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 
45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 578 (2009). 
 8.  See infra Part III (describing the IRA’s statutory framework and the process for transferring 
land into trust). 
 9.  25 U.S.C. § 465 (“[S]uch lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.”). 
 10.  25 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (2005) (“[N]one of the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other 
regulations of any State or political subdivision thereof limiting, zoning or otherwise governing, 
regulating, or controlling the use or development of any real or personal property, including water 
rights, shall be applicable to any such property . . . .”). 
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Whether actual or purely speculative, vehement fear of Indian gaming 
on newly acquired trust land drives much of the controversy surrounding 
proposed trust acquisitions.11  Such fear is appropriate given the rapid 
expansion of tribal gaming across the country;12 horror stories of quiet, rural 
towns transformed by massive gaming operations;13 and documented 
evidence of negative impacts on affected communities.14  Because federal 
law only permits Indian gaming on tribal lands,15 trust status is a necessary 
prerequisite for any property on which a tribe wishes to establish a new 
gaming operation.  Thus, beyond “simply” removing land from state and 
local control, the fee-to-trust process serves as a critical first step in the 
 
 11.  Leah L. Lorber, State Rights, Tribal Sovereignty, and the “White Man’s Firewater”: State 
Prohibition of Gambling on New Indian Lands, 69 IND. L.J. 255, 257–61 (1993). 
 12.   Indian gaming began with Florida’s high-stakes bingo parlors in the 1970s.  Id. at 257.  By 
2002, 201 tribes in 28 states operated tribal gaming facilities.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, E-EV-BIA-0063-2003, FINAL EVALUATION REPORT ON THE PROCESS USED 
TO ASSESS APPLICATIONS TO TAKE LAND INTO TRUST FOR GAMING PURPOSES 1 (2005) [hereinafter 
EVALUATION REPORT].  Such operations have often represented financial windfalls for the operating 
tribe; Indian gaming revenues were $9.8 billion in 1999 and shot up to $26 billion by 2007.  Id.; 
Examining Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Lands for Indian Tribes: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 22 (2009) [hereinafter Examining Executive Authority] 
(statement of Lawrence E. Long, Att’y Gen., South Dakota, Chairman, Conference of Western 
Att’ys Gen). 
 13.  See JEFF BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: HOW A CONTROVERSIAL INDIAN TRIBE ROSE 
TO POWER AND BUILT THE WORLD’S LARGEST CASINO (First Perennial 2001) (telling the story of 
how the quiet farming town of Ledyard, Connecticut was irreversibly transformed when the 
Mashantucket Pequot tribe built the world’s largest casino, Foxwoods).  Some statistics on the two 
largest Indian casino resorts include: 
Foxwoods is the largest casino resort complex in the United States. It is located in 
Connecticut.  It was founded in 1986 as a bingo hall.  Together with the MGM Grand at 
Foxwoods, it is one of the largest casino complexes in the world.  There are several 
restaurants, approximately 1,416 hotel rooms and two golf courses.  40,000 guests visit 
Foxwoods daily. 
 The Mohegan Sun is the second-largest casino in the United States and is 8 miles from 
Foxwoods in the woods of southeastern Connecticut.  It is on 240 acres.  It features the 
12,000-seat capacity Mohegan Sun Arena.  There is also 100,000 square feet of meeting 
and function room space, 1,256 hotel rooms, 364,000 square feet of gaming space, a 
number of restaurants, a golf course, and 130,000 square feet of retail shopping.  In May 
2011, they announced that the casino would be building a new 300 to 500 room hotel.  
Another developer will build and own the new hotel. 
SY 1,400 Acres: Another Foxwoods or Mohegan Sun?, THE SANTA YNEZ VALLEY JOURNAL, Aug. 
18, 2011, http://www.syvjournal.com/archive/9/33/8804/. 
  Residents of California’s rural Santa Ynez Valley are concerned that they could become the 
next Ledyard due to the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians’ recent purchase of and annexation 
efforts for a 1,400 acre parcel.  Rolf Richter, The Time is NOW to Decide Our Valley’s Future: Town 
Hall Meeting, THE SANTA YNEZ VALLEY JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2011, Special Supplement at 2–3. 
 14.  Crime on Land in Federal Trust, THE SANTA YNEZ VALLEY JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2011, 
http://www.syvjournal.com/archive/9/33/8830/ (including links to hundreds of pages of police 
reports for crimes committed at the Chumash Casino and Resort from 1997 to 2011). 
 15.  Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2006). 
WAPLES WHITE TEXT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2013  5:18 PM 
[Vol. 40: 251, 2012] Extreme Rubber-Stamping 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
255 
 
expansion of tribal gaming. 
As with many issues that incite great passion among affected parties, 
objective analysis of the situation loses ground to extreme claims and 
passionate propaganda, exaggerated anecdotes supplant fact-based data, and 
diametrically opposed sides become entrenched in unmoving positions.  
Accordingly, this Comment explores the efficacy of the IRA’s fee-to-trust 
process by analyzing the Notices of Decision the Pacific Region Bureau of 
Indian Affairs has issued on proposed trust acquisitions from 2001 through 
2011.16  Even though the fee-to-trust process includes the opportunity for 
both administrative and judicial appeals, very few Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) fee-to-trust decisions are challenged, and even fewer are reversed.17  
Thus, the initial BIA decisions provide the most meaningful reflection of 
how the regulatory factors are applied in practice, and thereby provide 
insight into the problems with, and appropriate reforms for, the IRA fee-to-
trust process. 
This Comment’s approach can be summarized as follows.  Part II 
describes the historical context that led to the enactment of the IRA and its 
fee-to-trust program by summarizing the evolution of federal Indian policy 
with an emphasis on the history of Indian property rights.18  Part III first 
explains the statutory framework for the IRA’s fee-to-trust process and then 
provides a step-by-step description of how a tribe actually proceeds through 
the fee-to-trust process from application to eventual acceptance or denial of 
the proposed acquisition.19  Part IV summarizes relevant Interior Board of 
Indian Appeals’ (Board) decisions, which provide appellate-level guidance 
for the BIA’s exercise of discretion when making fee-to-trust decisions.20  
Part V begins with a description of the methodology used to analyze and 
quantify the Pacific Region BIA’s Notices of Decision and then discusses 
the empirical results.21  Part VI discusses the impact on affected 
communities of the deficiencies in the fee-to-trust process and suggests 
appropriate measures for reform.22  Part VII concludes.23 
 
 16.  See infra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
authority to make trust land decisions). 
 17.  See infra note 290 (detailing appeals rate). 
 18.  See infra notes 24–80 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 81–109 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra notes 110–73 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See infra notes 174–280 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 281–332 and accompanying text. 
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II.  HISTORY OF INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The foundation of federal Indian law is the tribes’ legal status as 
sovereign nations.  The United States Constitution recognizes this status in 
the Commerce Clause by naming Indian tribes as one of the sovereign 
entities with which Congress has the power to regulate commerce.24  The 
Supreme Court affirmed this status as far back as 1831 when the Marshall 
Court described Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”25  To this 
day, the United States continues to recognize Indian tribes as having 
“inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which [have] never been 
extinguished.”26  It is equally fundamental that this sovereignty is a limited 
one, as the federal government exercises the ultimate authority and control 
over Indian tribes and their territories.  The Marshall Court observed that 
this relationship “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”27  As such, tribal 
property interests are held by “split title” where the United States holds 
“ultimate title” and the tribe retains a title of mere occupancy.28  The 
Marshall Court also re-stated this fundamental characteristic of tribal 
property interests in much more dominant language, asserting that, 
“[Indians] occupy a territory to which [the United States] assert[s] a title 
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when 
their right of possession ceases,” thereby making it absolutely clear that the 
United States has the absolute power to alter—including extinguish—Indian 
title.29  Over the years the United States has done just that: continual 
fluctuations in federal Indian policy have resulted in drastic changes to 
Indian property interests over the last few centuries. 
 
 23.  See infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text. 
 24.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND THE LAW xxv (2008). 
 25.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 26.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978). 
 27.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
 28.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (explaining that the right of 
occupancy means “the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be 
protected . . . in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute 
title to others”).  Indian tribes are “the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim 
to retain possession of it . . . .”  Id. at 574. 
 29.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
1, § 15.03; Rice, supra note 7, at 575. 
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A.  The Removal Era: 1815–184630 
In very general terms, prior to the Removal Era, the United States’ 
principal approach to tribal property rights was to negotiate treaties with 
Indians to acquire sections of their lands, while still allowing them to reside 
in the same general territory.31  However, when tribes began to resist such 
demands, the federal government attempted to completely remove Indians 
from the South and East Coast territories.32  Policies from this era aimed to 
separate tribes and white settlers, primarily by removing Indians to the 
“unsettled” land west of the Mississippi River.33  Treaties from this era gave 
the removed tribes new territories in exchange for relinquishing rights to the 
entirety of their aboriginal land in the east.34  Unfortunately, this era in 
federal Indian policy was characterized by brutality and misery.35  In many 
cases, tribal leaders signed the treaties due to overwhelming forces of 
resignation, military coercion, or fraud, and then the tribes were forcibly 
removed and marched to their new lands by military operation.36 
B.  The Reservation Era: 1871–192837 
Removal of the tribes to land west of the Mississippi River was a 
satisfactory solution until the Civil War ended and settlers began pushing 
further west with relentless energy.38  To accommodate this expansion, the 
 
 30.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03.  There is some complexity of timelines here: the 
Removal Era officially lasted from 1815 to 1846; however, a period that could be generally referred 
to as the Treaty Era operated during these years as well.  See generally id.  Treaties have been a 
fundamental policy approach to relations with Indians since prior to the Revolutionary War, and this 
approach remained central until treaties were officially ended by federal statue in 1871.  25 U.S.C. § 
71 (2006); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §§ 1.02–.03. 
 31.  See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03 (providing a detailed discussion of 
pre-Removal Era treaties). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.; Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7 (1995). 
 34.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03[4][a]; Royster, supra note 33, at 7. 
 35.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03[4][a]. 
 36.  Id.  The forced migration of the Cherokee tribe, the “Trail of Tears,” has become a well-
known symbol of the era’s brutality.  Id.  The march began during the summer of 1838 and extended 
into the winter, with over 4000 Cherokees perishing along the way.  Id.  However, many more tribes 
suffered similarly horrible removals.  See generally GRANT FOREMAN, THE LAST TREK OF THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN (1946). 
 37.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.04. 
 38.  Royster, supra note 33, at 7.  Scholars note that this new wave of expansion was distinctly 
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reservation system39 was developed, whereby the tribes were forced into 
isolation on sections of land—reservations—carved out of aboriginal 
territories.40  The reservation system was designed to protect the tribes from 
extinction, ease hostilities by separating Indians from settlers, and civilize 
the Indians by teaching them agriculture.41  Indian Commissioner Charles 
Mix observed that without “‘distant and extensive sections of country to 
assign [the tribes],’ the reservation system was ‘the only course compatible 
with the obligations of justice and humanity.’”42  While trust terminology 
was not applied to the reservation system at the time, the Supreme Court 
later explained that the reservations were held “in trust” for the Indian 
tribes,43 such that the federal government held fee title and tribes retained 
beneficial ownership.44 
C.  The Allotment and Assimilation Era: 1887–192845 
The Allotment Era was seen as the next logical step from the 
Reservation Era; the goal of civilizing the Indians would be better achieved 
by assimilation into the dominant culture rather than isolation on remote 
reservations.46  To this end, the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) was 
 
intense: 
Powered by more than the technological marvels such as the railroads, the steam engine, 
and the mechanical harvester, the new expansionist policy was also propelled by the “go-
getter” spirit that infused the nation after the war. . . .  A determination to thrust the 
nation westward ruled in Congress and in the boardrooms, towns, and churches.  
Landless Americans from older sections, as well as newer emigrants temporarily settled, 
demanded that seemingly vacant Indian lands be put to work.  There was no place left to 
remove the Indian, and there was little sympathy for the preservation of a way of life that 
left farmlands unturned, coal unmined, and timber uncut.  Policymakers had determined 
that the old hunter way and the new industrial way could not coexist. 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.04. 
 39.  The term “reservation” has a long history of nuanced use in both judicial and statutory 
language.  See generally Rice, supra note 7, at 602–08.  However, it generally describes “any lands 
set aside for tribal use and occupancy whether set aside by treaty, congressional action, or executive 
order, and regardless of whether those lands [are] within the aboriginal territories of the tribe.”  Id. at 
602. 
 40.  Royster, supra note 33, at 7.  As treaty-making had been statutorily discontinued, these 
reservations were now created by executive order or agreements with the tribes and later ratified by 
statute.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03[9]. 
 41.  Royster, supra note 33, at 8. 
 42.  Id. at 7 n.20 (citing 1858 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 92, 94 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 2d ed. 1990)). 
 43.  Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1925) (stating that the United States acts with “the 
powers of a guardian and of a trustee in possession” with regard to tribal property). 
 44.  Royster, supra note 33, at 8.  The split-title trust concept of Indian land rights property 
interests prevails to this day.  See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973). 
 45.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.04. 
 46.  Royster, supra note 33, at 8–9.  In fact, many reservation agreements of the 1850s, 
WAPLES WHITE TEXT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2013  5:18 PM 
[Vol. 40: 251, 2012] Extreme Rubber-Stamping 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
259 
 
enacted in 1887 to break up the Indian reservations.47  Under the Dawes Act, 
Congress replaced communal land ownership by the tribes with private 
ownership by individual Indians.48  The Dawes Act accomplished this 
primarily through allotting 160 acre parcels49 of reservation land to 
individual Indians to be owned in fee and expressly subject to alienation, 
encumbrance, and taxation.50  Once each Indian had been allotted a parcel, 
the remaining reservation land was designated as “surplus” and opened to 
non-Indian settlement.51  This resulted in a massive erosion of the Indian 
land base52 as individual Indians transferred or lost53 their allotted parcels 
and white settlers developed the surplus land.54  Allotment was generally 
 
particularly in Nebraska, Kansas, and the Pacific Northwest, contained provisions that provided for 
allotment of the reservation land.  Id. at 8; see also, e.g., Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., 5 
F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliot).  However, some critics of the 
policy saw it as anything but humanitarian given that its ultimate aim was to terminate the tribal way 
of life, even going so far as to label it “legal cultural genocide.”  Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-
Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 
713, 721 (1986). 
 47.  General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed by Act of June 18, 
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–381 (2006)).  A 1977 congressional 
report found that 118 Indian reservations had been allotted under the Dawes Act, and 44 of these had 
been opened to non-Indian settlement.  Royster, supra note 33, at 9–10 n.33 (citing 1 AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 309 (1977)). 
 48.  Royster, supra note 33, at 10. 
 49.  Amanda D. Hettler, Note, Beyond a Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land-
into-Trust Process of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2011). 
 50.  Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the Dawes Act) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 349 (2006)). 
 51.  Royster, supra note 33, at 13. 
 52.  In 1887, when full-scale allotment began, Indian land holdings totaled approximately 138 
million acres, but by 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ended allotment, Indian land 
had decreased to approximately 48 million acres.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 15.07[1][a] 
n.337.  Of the approximately 90 million acres lost, 27 million acres were individually allotted parcels 
and nearly double, about 60 million, were lost due to the surplus land program.  Royster, supra note 
33, at 13.  Moreover, the land that was lost tended to be the most valuable parcels, such that nearly 
one-half of the remaining Indian-owned lands were desert or semi-arid.  Rice, supra note 7, at 577. 
 53.  Since individually allotted land became subject to alienation, encumbrance, and taxation, 
thousands of Indians were dispossessed of their land by sheriff’s sale for failure to pay taxes or other 
liens, as well as by voluntary or fraudulent sales.  Royster, supra note 33, at 12; see also COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §1.04 (providing a detailed discussion of how Indian land was lost due to 
the Dawes Act). 
 54.  For a discussion of the fee patent system used to transfer reservation land into individual 
Indian ownership and the surplus lands program for opening up reservation land left over once 
individual allotments were parceled out, see Royster, supra note 33, at 10–14. 
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suspended in 1928 after publication of the Meriam Report,55 an Institute for 
Government Research report that detailed the detrimental economic, social, 
and cultural effects of the allotment policy and called for greater respect for 
Indian culture.56 
D.  The Reorganization Era: 1928–194257 
The dramatic picture painted by the Meriam Report helped generate 
public support for a change in federal Indian policy and set the stage for the 
Reorganization Era58—where policymakers shifted their focus to rebuilding 
the Indian land base.59  As a result, the IRA60 was passed in order to prevent 
further loss of Indian lands and provide a process to acquire new lands for 
Indians.61  First, the IRA ended the allotment programs by prohibiting 
further allotment of tribal land62 and giving the Secretary of the Interior 
authority to return remaining surplus lands to tribal ownership.63  However, 
the cornerstone of the IRA was authorization for the Secretary to acquire 
new lands to be placed in trust “for the purpose of providing land for the 
Indians.”64  While the statutory language specifies that the Secretary will 
 
 55.  MERIAM REPORT, supra note 1; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §16.03[2][c]. 
 56.  Royster, supra note 33, at 16.  The report helped generate public support for a change in 
federal Indian policy, but initial efforts to remedy the detrimental effects of the allotment period 
were restricted by the economic hardship of the Great Depression.  Id. at 16 n.81. 
 57.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.05. 
 58.  Royster, supra note 33, at 16. 
 59.  Rice, supra note 7, at 578. 
 60.  Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006).  While the 
Reorganization Era is recognized as spanning the years of 1928 to 1942, the IRA is still in effect 
today.  The controversy surrounding its modern day application is the focal point of this Comment.  
See infra Parts V–VII. 
 61.  Rice, supra note 7, at 578.  The secondary focus of the IRA was to provide statutory 
authority for tribal self-government and self-determination in order to require the Secretary of the 
Interior to recognize and deal with tribal leadership and initiatives.  Id.  As this Comment concerns 
Indian property interests, it will focus on the first objective of the IRA. 
 62.  25 U.S.C. § 461 (“On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian reservation, created or 
set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or 
otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.”). 
 63.  25 U.S.C. § 463.  Section 3 of the IRA authorizes the Secretary “to restore to tribal 
ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian reservation . . . .”  Id.  The Secretary found this 
to mean that he could to restore any unsettled surplus lands within reservation boundaries as of 1934, 
but not surplus lands that had been transferred to settlers for homesteading and other activities.  
Royster, supra note 33, at 17 n.89. 
 64.  25 U.S.C. § 465 (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, 
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, 
or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise 
restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for 
Indians.”).  While the IRA was designed to freeze the allotment program where it stood in 1934 and 
partially repair certain harms the program had inflicted, Congress did not “restore fee patented or 
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both acquire and place the land into trust, the Supreme Court views the 
Secretary’s power as also including the authority to place land into trust at 
the request of tribes or individual Indians who acquire the land themselves.65 
E.  The Termination Era: 1943–196166 
While the political forces behind the Reorganization Era and the IRA 
were powerful, equally strong criticisms of them combined with a post-
World War II revival of pro-assimilation social forces to usher in a new era 
of federal Indian policy, the Termination Era, which focused on terminating 
tribal recognition and fully assimilating Indians into the dominant culture.67  
To this end, Congress and the BIA worked together to gradually and 
systematically terminate the government’s historical “trusteeship 
responsibility” to Indians because “little sympathy for, or interest in, 
preserving a native land base or rebuilding Indian society [remained].”68  
The Termination Era has been characterized as “assimilation with a 
vengeance” because Congress enacted legislation to terminate federal 
recognition of many tribes, liquidate tribal assets—including the land base—
and give the states jurisdiction over Indians.69  For those tribes affected, 
 
homesteaded lands to tribal ownership. . . .  [Thus,] [t]he vast majority of lands that had passed into 
fee during the allotment years remain in fee today . . . .”  Royster, supra note 33, at 17–18.  
 65.  See, e.g., Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 114 (2006). 
 66.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06. 
 67.  Royster, supra note 33, at 18.  Like the forces that drove the inexorable post-Civil War 
expansion and consequent Removal Era policies, similar forces were behind the Termination Era’s 
return to assimilation-oriented policies: 
The Indian was caught, just as at the end of the American Civil War, by a set of post-war 
economic and political forces demanding less government, more independent economic 
opportunities, reduced federal expenditures, and decentralized local and state operations.  
The new global world required long-term planning and long-term solutions to deal with 
rapid change.  And to progressive and ambitious returning veterans, Native Americans 
seemed, once again, a people of the past in a land of the future. 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06. 
 68.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06.  On July 1, 1952, the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution that called for a full investigation into BIA programs in order to design 
legislation aimed at promoting “the earliest practicable termination of all federal supervision and 
control over Indians.”  H.R. REP. NO. 82-2503 (1952). 
 69.  Royster, supra note 33, at 18.  Even tribes whose federal recognition was not terminated 
were subjected to state criminal and civil jurisdiction.  See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975) 
(exploring the impact of Public Law 280, which gave states civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians). 
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“The loss of tribal territory and sovereignty was immediate and complete.”70 
F.  The Self-Determination Era: 1961–Present71 
As national concern for civil rights and increased awareness of the 
challenges faced by ethnic and racial minorities grew during the 1960s,72 
Termination Era policies were largely reversed73 and federal Indian policy 
shifted to focus on “promotion of tribal self-determination, sovereignty, and 
control over Indian country.”74  Rooted in a firm commitment to tribal self-
determination, new policies once again recognized government-to-
government relations between the United States and Indian tribes,75 
supported tribal self-governance,76 and aimed to protect Indian culture.77  
President Johnson ushered in the modern policy era, and his vision of “self-
determination [as] a goal that erases old attitudes of paternalism and 
 
 70.  Royster, supra note 33, at 18.  While the loss of territory and sovereignty of the Termination 
Era was absolute, in comparison to previous eras, the policies were not as sweeping in that they only 
applied to certain tribes.  Id.  In all, 109 tribes were terminated, which affected 11,466 Indians and 
1.3 million acres of tribal land.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06. 
 71. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.07. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id.  The Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, 25 U.S.C. §§ 903–903(f) (2006), which 
repealed an earlier act that terminated the tribe and reinstated all lost rights and privileges, was the 
first piece of legislation to reverse a Termination Era action and thus served as a symbolic reversal 
of the era’s policies.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.07.  Since then, a majority of the 
terminated tribes have been restored.  Id. 
 74.  Royster, supra note 33, at 19. 
 75.  Id.  President Reagan announced: “Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a 
government-to-government basis and to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian tribes.”  
Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983).  Examples of this policy in action are 
the many tribal–state compacts that have been entered into to address issues ranging from criminal 
law to natural resource management.  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 6.05. 
 76.  Royster, supra note 33, at 19.  For example, the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975 allowed tribes to more fully participate in management of health, education, 
economic, and social programs that had previously been controlled exclusively by the BIA.  Pub. L. 
No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).  The Tribal Self 
Governance Act of 1994 is another prime example.  Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 4272 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).  This Act gave various tribes block grants to be used 
according to the tribe’s discretion as opposed to BIA mandates.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 
§ 1.07. 
 77.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.07.  “In the spirit of affirming [the] ‘rich heritage’ 
and ‘enduring spirit’ of native peoples, President Clinton pledged that ‘our first principle must be to 
respect your right to remain who you are and to live the way you wish.’”  Id. (quoting DOCUMENTS 
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 343–45 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000)).  Legislation 
exemplifying this goal is numerous and includes the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 
1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2006), the National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 80q–80q-15 (2006), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006), and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305f (2006). 
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promotes partnership and self-help”78 continues to be a guiding philosophy 
of current Indian policy; each administration since has re-affirmed its 
support for this goal.79  Thus, Justice William C. Canby, Jr. believes “[i]t is 
perhaps possible, that the contending forces in Indian affairs have reached 
some sort of balance, and that no further major policy change of direction 
will occur.  [However, n]othing in the history of federal Indian policy . . . 
justifies confidence in such a conclusion.”80 
III.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Statutory Framework for the Fee-to-Trust Process 
While the Reorganization Era has passed, its primary piece of 
legislation, the IRA,81 remains the cornerstone of current Indian land policy.  
The IRA expressly authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land 
and place it into trust for individual Indians and tribes “for the purpose of 
providing land for Indians.”82  Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
generally interpreted it to allow the Secretary to place fee land that 
 
 78.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.07 (quoting Lyndon Johnson, Special Message to 
Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 336 (Mar. 6, 1968)). 
 79.  See generally AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Vine Deloria, Jr. 
ed., 1985) (chronicling the complex evolution of federal Indian policy).  President Obama recently 
affirmed this position: 
We know that, ultimately, this is not just a matter of legislation, not just a matter of 
policy.  It’s a matter of whether we’re going to live up to our basic values.  It’s a matter 
of upholding an ideal that has always defined who we are as Americans.  E pluribus 
Unum.  Out of many, one.  That’s why we’re here.  That’s what we’re called to do.  And 
I’m confident that if we keep up our efforts, that if we continue to work together, that we 
will live up to the simple motto and we will achieve a brighter future for the First 
Americans and for all Americans. 
ACHIEVING A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR TRIBAL NATIONS, 2011 WHITE HOUSE TRIBAL NATIONS 
CONFERENCE PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2011 
whtnc_report.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT]. 
 80.  WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 33 (4th ed., 2004). 
 81.  Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006). 
 82.  Id. § 465.  The IRA only applies to those tribes that did not opt out of its provisions at the 
time of passage.  Id. § 478.  Thus, the statutory authority for fee-to-trust acquisitions for those tribes 
that opted out of the IRA is found in the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA).  25 U.S.C. 
§§ 2202–2221 (2006).  The ILCA extends the provisions of the IRA to all tribes under federal 
jurisdiction at the time of passage of the IRA, notwithstanding a tribe’s decision to opt out of the 
IRA.  Id. § 2202. 
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individual Indians or tribes have personally acquired into trust.83  The 
implications of trust status will be discussed in more depth in Parts V and 
VI, infra, but a general description is important to understand the 
significance of the IRA.  First, consistent with the ward–guardian 
relationship first promulgated by the Marshall Court in 1831,84 the federal 
government holds ultimate or legal title to the trust land and the tribe holds a 
right to occupy or “beneficial ownership.”85  Even though the United States 
retains ultimate title, the act of placing fee land into trust transforms the land 
into “Indian Country”—a term of art that denotes that the land is now under 
tribal jurisdiction.86  As such, trust land may not be alienated without an act 
of Congress; it is fully exempt from state and local taxes,87 and entirely 
removed from state and local land use regulation.88 
Originally, there were no specific standards for the Secretary to adhere 
to in transferring land into trust because statutorily appropriated funds were 
limited and Indian tribes were generally too impoverished to purchase land, 
so the absence of a governing standard was not an issue.89  However, in large 
part due to the advent of Indian gaming, tribes gained the immediate funds 
and steady future revenue stream to regularly purchase fee land and request 
that the Secretary take it into trust pursuant to the IRA.90  Thus, in 1980, 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 114 (1998); 
Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1978) (“The Secretary may purchase land for an 
individual Indian and hold title to it in trust for him.  There is no prohibition against accomplishing 
the same result indirectly by conveyance of land already owned by an Indian to the United States in 
trust.”). 
 84.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 85.  25 U.S.C. § 465 (“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be taken 
in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is 
acquired . . . .”) (emphasis added); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 115, 117 (1938); 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543, 574, 585 (1823).  The right to occupy is interpreted as 
“full and exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the land.”  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 
§ 15.03. 
 86.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 15.07[1][b]. 
 87.  25 U.S.C. § 465 (“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be 
exempt from State and local taxation.”). 
 88.  25 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (2005) (“[N]one of the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other 
regulations of any State or political subdivision thereof limiting, zoning or otherwise governing, 
regulating, or controlling the use or development of any real or personal property, including water 
rights, shall be applicable to any such property . . . .”); see also City of Lincoln City v. Portland Area 
Dir., 33 IBIA 102, 105–07 (1999) (holding that the BIA does not have to make trust acquisitions 
subject to enforcement of the use proposed in the trust application). 
 89.  Larry E. Scrivner, Acquiring Land Into Trust for Indian Tribes, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 603, 
605 (2003). 
 90.  Id.  In fact, Acting Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Office of Trust Responsibilities, 
Larry Scrivner, commented that, “[t]he advent of Indian gaming has somewhat changed the entire 
look of what is going on in Indian country.”  Id. at 605.  Attorney General for South Dakota 
Lawrence E. Long recently testified before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs about the rise of 
Indian gaming: 
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Congress implemented specific standards, located at 25 C.F.R. § 151 
(Section 151), to govern the process of acquiring fee land and taking it into 
trust for Indian tribes or individual Indians, known as the “fee-to-trust” 
process.91 
Under Section 151, land can be taken into trust for a tribe if the land is 
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or adjacent to it, if the tribe 
already owns an interest in the land, or if the acquisition is “necessary to 
facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian 
housing.”92  Land can be taken into trust for an individual Indian if the land 
is within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or adjacent to it, or the 
land is already in trust or restricted status.93  No formal declaration that land 
is considered an Indian reservation for Section 151 purposes is required;94 
rather, the test is whether the tribe exercises jurisdiction over the land.95 
Section 151 also differentiates between the factors the Secretary must 
consider for on-reservation and off-reservation acquisitions.96  It is important 
to note that for purposes of Section 151, the term reservation includes not 
only current reservation boundaries, but also former reservation boundaries 
where tribal lands have been disestablished or diminished.97  For on-
reservation acquisitions, the Secretary must consider: (1) the statutory 
 
Since 1997, Indian gaming revenues have increased at a rapid rate.  The National Indian 
Gaming Commission reported that net revenues from Indian gaming increased from $8.5 
billion to $26.0 billion from 1998 to 2007.  As a consequence, tribes have significantly 
greater funds available to purchase land, and seek trust status for that land, than was true 
in 1934, when the enabling statute was enacted (25 U.S.C. 465), or even in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s when the first implementing regulations, now set out at 25 C.F.R. Section 
151, were written. 
Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 22. 
 91.  25 C.F.R. § 151 (2005).  The Section 151 factors govern all discretionary fee-to-trust 
acquisitions, which include those made under both IRA and ILCA statutory authority.  Id.  See infra 
Part III for a more detailed discussion of the standards governing the fee-to-trust process. 
 92.  25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a). 
 93.  Id. § 151.3(b). 
 94.  E.g., Aitkin Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 47 IBIA 99, 106 (2008); see also, e.g., 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991); United 
States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648–49 (1978). 
 95.  See Aitkin Cnty., 47 IBIA at 106–07. 
 96.  “On-reservation” is interpreted to mean within or contiguous to the exterior boundaries of a 
tribe’s reservation.  Shawano Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 IBIA 62, 76 (2011).  
“Contiguous” for purposes of Section 151 requires that the acquired land must, at a minimum, touch 
reservation land.  Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nw. Reg’l Dir., 47 IBIA 187, 205–06 (2008). 
 97.  Shawano Cnty., 53 IBIA at 67. 
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authority for the acquisition; (2) the need for the land; (3) the proposed use; 
(4) the amount of trust land the individual already owns and how much 
assistance that individual will need in handling his or her affairs—which 
only applies to acquisitions for individuals; (5) the impact of the land’s 
removal from state and local tax rolls; (6) the jurisdictional problems and 
land use conflicts that may arise; (7) whether the BIA is equipped to 
discharge the additional responsibilities associated with placing the land into 
trust; and (8) environmental compliance.98  For off-reservation acquisitions 
the Secretary must consider all eight on-reservation factors as well as the 
location of the proposed trust land in relation to both state and reservation 
boundaries.99  Additionally, if the off-reservation land will be used for 
business purposes, a plan outlining the expected economic benefits must be 
submitted for the Secretary to consider.100 
B. The Process for Transferring Land into Trust 
The process for transferring land into trust is relatively simple.  Once the 
tribe or individual Indian has acquired a piece of property in fee, they begin 
the fee-to-trust process by submitting an application to their regional BIA 
office with explanations of why their acquisition qualifies under each 
relevant Section 151 factor.101  Upon receipt of a fee-to-trust application, the 
BIA must give notice of the proposed trust acquisition to state and local 
governments with jurisdiction over the land and then allow thirty days for 
submission of comments regarding regulatory jurisdiction, real property 
taxes, and special assessments.102  The tribe is then often given the 
opportunity to respond to any comments, even though such an opportunity is 
not statutorily mandated.103  Once the Regional BIA is satisfied that all 
interested parties have been given reasonable notice and opportunity to 
comment, a final determination is made and notice of this determination 
must be published.104  Unless the appeals process is activated by 
administrative appeal made to the Board by an interested party,105 the land is 
 
 98.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10. 
 99.  Id. § 151.11. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Scrivner, supra note 89, at 606.  While Section 151 places fee-to-trust authority with the 
Secretary of the Interior, under universally accepted delegation principles, the Secretary delegated 
fee-to-trust decisions to the BIA’s Regional Directors.  Id. at 605–06. 
 102.  25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d). 
 103.  Hearing on H.R. 1291, H.R. 1234, and H.R. 1421 Before the H. Natural Res. Comm. 
Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. 6–7 (2011) (statement of Susan Adams, 
Supervisor, Marin Cnty., Cal.) [hereinafter Statement of Susan Adams]. 
 104.  25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b). 
 105.  Scrivner, supra note 89, at 607.  To qualify as an interested party with standing to appeal, 
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taken into trust thirty days after publication of the final determination 
notice.106  Should the appellant remain unsatisfied with the result of an 
administrative appeal to the Board, a judicial appeal can be made to the 
appropriate federal court, but only after the BIA decision is final and the 
administrative appeals process has been exhausted.107  While the BIA 
refrains from taking the land into trust until the appeals process is 
completed,108 sovereign immunity bars judicial review and title challenges 
after the land has been taken into trust.109 
IV.  GUIDANCE FOR APPLICATION OF THE LAW—INTERIOR BOARD OF 
INDIAN APPEALS’ DECISIONS 
As there is no currently applicable policy memo from the Secretary of 
the Interior giving the BIA Regional Directors guidance on how 
discretionary fee-to-trust decisions should be made,110 the Board decisions 
 
the appellant must have a legally protected interest that has been adversely affected by the 
challenged decision.  25 C.F.R. § 2.2 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 4.331 (2005); Anderson v. Great Plains 
Reg’l Dir., 52 IBIA 327, 331 (2010).  While the constitutional limitations on federal court 
jurisdiction do not apply to the Board, “as a matter of prudence, the Board generally limits its 
jurisdiction to cases in which the appellant can show standing.”  Santa Ynez Valley Concerned 
Citizens v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 42 IBIA 189, 192 (2006).  Thus, the Board generally requires that the 
appellant satisfy the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), standing requirements of 
(1) concrete and particularized injury to a legally protected interest; (2) the injury is fairly traceable 
to the appellee’s actions; and (3) the injury is capable of judicial resolution.  See, e.g., Rosebud 
Indian Land & Grazing Ass’n, v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 50 IBIA 46, 53 (2009); Voices for 
Rural Living v. Acting Pac. Reg’l Dir., 49 IBIA 222, 232 (2009). 
 106.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 15.07. 
 107.  43 C.F.R. § 4.314 (2005); Mary Jane Sheppard, Taking Indian Land Into Trust, 44 S.D. L. 
REV. 681, 685 (1998–99).  The appellant may also petition the Board for reconsideration, but the 
Board will only reconsider in extraordinary circumstances, such as a clear error of law or fact.  See, 
e.g., City of Eagle Butte v. Aberdeen Area Dir., 18 IBIA 21 (1989) (parcel of subject land was no 
longer under Indian ownership at time of Board decision); United Indians of All Tribes Found. v. 
Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y, 11 IBIA 276 (1983) (the Board relied on a rescinded regulation).  
The Board has also granted a petition for reconsideration where its initial decision required 
clarification due to risk of misinterpretation.  See, e.g., Bien Mur Indian Mkt. Ctr. v. Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y, 14 IBIA 242 (1986).  However, simple disagreement with the Board’s decision is 
insufficient grounds for reconsideration.  See, e.g., Needles Lodge v. Acting Phx. Area Dir., 31 IBIA 
123 (1997). 
 108.  25 C.F.R. § 2.6 (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 4.314. 
 109.  Neighbors for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 2004); Florida v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1985); Big Lagoon Park Co. v. Acting 
Sacramento Area Dir., 32 IBIA 309, 311, 322 (1998). 
 110.  The Secretary issued such a memo in 2008, but it was rescinded because its discussion of 
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offer the best insight into how the Section 151 factors should be applied. 
A.  Standard of Review 
It is fundamental to the Board’s review of BIA discretionary decisions 
that it does not substitute its judgment for the BIA’s.111  Rather, the Board 
will only verify that the BIA properly considered all the legal 
prerequisites—the Section 151 factors.112  Proof that the BIA considered 
each of the Section 151 factors must appear in the Notice of Decision, but 
there is no requirement that the BIA reach a particular conclusion on any 
given factor.113  Furthermore, the factors do not need to be “weighed or 
balanced in any particular way or exhaustively analyzed.”114  Since the final 
decision need only be reasonable in its overall analysis, an application may 
be granted or denied based on less than all the factors if several weighed 
heavily for or against trust status.115  Thus, the appellant’s unsubstantiated 
assertions or simple disagreement with the BIA decision are not valid 
grounds for an appeal to the Board.116  Additionally, while the Board does 
have authority to substantively review any legal issues raised, it may not 
review the constitutionality of any law; constitutional concerns must be 
judicially reviewed.117 
 
off-reservation acquisitions quickly became too controversial.  Telephone Interview with Cheryl 
Schmidt, Dir., Stand Up For Cal. (Oct. 6, 2011).  Known as the “Artman Memo on Commutable 
Distance,” the memo suggested that off-reservation acquisitions should be limited to those parcels 
located within a “commutable” distance from the tribe’s current reservation—a distance that an 
individual could reasonably be expected to drive to and from work—in order to facilitate 
employment opportunities for tribe members.  Id. 
 111.  E.g., Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. W. Reg’l Dir., 43 IBIA 158, 159–60 (2006); Cass Cnty. v. 
Midwest Reg’l Dir., 42 IBIA 243, 246 (2006).  However, 43 C.F.R. § 4.330(b) (2005) does provide 
that the Assistant Secretary can “remove the limitation on the Board’s review authority . . . [such 
that] the Board may fully review a BIA discretionary decision, even to the extent of substituting its 
judgment for BIA’s . . . [and issuing] a final Departmental decision on the merits.”  Village of 
Ruidoso v. Albuquerque Area Dir., 31 IBIA 143 (1997). 
 112.  E.g., Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 43 IBIA at 160. 
 113.  E.g., Eades v. Muskogee Area Dir., 17 IBIA 198, 202 (1989). 
 114.  E.g., Jackson Cnty. v. S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 47 IBIA 222, 231 (2008); Aitkin Cnty. v. Acting 
Midwest Reg’l Dir., 47 IBIA 99, 104 (2008); Cnty. of Sauk v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 45 IBIA 201, 
206–07 (2007), aff’d, No. 07-cv-543-bbc, 2008 WL 2225680 (W.D. Wis. May 29, 2008). 
 115.  E.g., McAlpine v. Muskogee Area Dir., 19 IBIA 2, 2, 6 (1990); Town of Charlestown v. E. 
Area Dir., 18 IBIA 67, 72 (1989). 
 116.  E.g., Aitkin Cnty., 47 IBIA at 104; Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 43 IBIA at 160; Cass Cnty., 42 
IBIA at 246–47. 
 117.  E.g., Jackson Cnty., 47 IBIA at 227–28 (2008); Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 43 IBIA at 160; Cass 
Cnty., 42 IBIA at 247. 
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B.  Factor One: Statutory Authority 
First, the BIA must consider whether it has “statutory authority for the 
acquisition and any limitations contained in such authority.”118  The BIA’s 
statutory authority to take land into trust is rarely an issue and is most 
frequently satisfied by the IRA or the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 
1983 (ILCA).119 
C.  Factor Two: Need for Land 
The second Section 151 factor for the BIA to consider is “[t]he need of 
the individual Indian or the tribe for additional land.”120  The Board gives the  
BIA . . . broad leeway in its interpretation or construction of tribal  
“need” for the land . . . . [because] it is readily imaginable that that  
“need” will vary from one tribe to another or from one individual Indian 
to another such that flexibility in evaluating “need” is an inevitable and  
necessary aspect of BIA’s discretion.121   
 
As such, contrary to the common understanding of “need,” a tribe does not 
have to be landless122 or financially destitute to satisfy the need 
requirement.123  The Board reasons that “[a] financially secure tribe might 
 
 118.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(a) (2005). 
 119.  Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006); Indian Land 
Consolidation Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2202–2221 (2006).  See supra note 82 for further 
discussion of the IRA and ILCA.  Statutory authority can also be provided by any of the many 
mandatory tribe-specific acts.  E.g., Isolated Tracts Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88–196, 77 Stat. 349.  
However, the focus of this Comment is discretionary fee-to-trust decisions under the IRA and ILCA. 
 120.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(b). 
 121.  Cnty. of Sauk v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 45 IBIA 201, 209 (2007). 
 122.  E.g., South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2005); Kansas 
v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 152, 155 (2001); see also United States v. 29 Acres of Land, 
809 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987); Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1011–16 (8th Cir. 1978); 
City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157, 162 (D.D.C. 1980); City of Tacoma v. Andrus, 
457 F. Supp. 342, 345–46 (D.D.C. 1978). 
 123.  E.g., South Dakota v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 39 IBIA 283, 290–91 (2004); Cnty. of 
Mille Lacs v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 169, 171–73 (2002).  The judiciary has affirmed the 
Board’s understanding of need.  South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 798–99.  In exploring the IRA’s 
legislative history, the Supreme Court found that: “The intent and purpose of the Reorganization Act 
was ‘to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative 
destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.’”  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 
145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1804,  at 6 (1934)).  With the Court’s view from 
Mescalero Apache Tribe in mind, the Eighth Circuit recently concluded that: 
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well need additional land in order to maintain or improve its economic 
condition if its existing land is already fully developed.”124  Thus, the Board 
has found a financially stable tribe’s need for land valid where the land base 
is fully developed and the tribe needs additional land to provide 
infrastructure and expanded economic development to support its members 
and protect the environment.125  There is also valid need where the tribe 
possesses a large amount of land but much of it is sub-marginal and 
unsuitable for development.126  Additionally, while the BIA is not required 
to consider a tribe’s income, it may do so.127 
Other needs the Board has affirmed as sufficient include: the need for 
trust status to protect the land from alienation and thereby secure it for future 
generations;128 the need for trust status to qualify for federal land 
management assistance grants and programs;129 the need for tribal self-
determination unhampered by the regulatory control of local government;130 
and the need to eliminate taxation.131  Furthermore, a tribe need only provide 
reasonable explanations for its asserted needs; the BIA is not compelled to 
require a specific level of detail, proof, or specificity from the tribe in 
describing its need.132 
Additionally, the difference between need for land and need for trust 
 
Congress believed that additional land was essential for the economic advancement and 
self-support of the Indian communities. . . .  [Thus, a]lthough the legislative history 
frequently mentions landless Indians, we do not believe that Congress intended to limit 
its broadly stated purposes of economic advancement and additional lands for Indians to 
situations involving landless Indians. 
South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 798. 
 124.  Cnty. of Mille Lacs, 37 IBIA at 173 (quoting Avoyelles Parish v. E. Area Dir., 34 IBIA 149 
(1999)). 
 125.  Cnty. of Mille Lacs, 37 IBIA at 173.  Much of the contention around the need requirement 
and financially secure tribes arises on applications from tribes with lucrative gaming operations.  See 
Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 22.  However, the Board has affirmed BIA 
conclusions on need in such cases because “the Nation’s interest in securing its tribal self-
determination and stability [is] rooted not in its gaming income, which ‘may not always be a viable 
income,’ but in its landbase.”  Cnty. of Sauk, 45 IBIA at 209. 
 126.  See Shawano Cnty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 40 IBIA 241, 243 (2005). 
 127.  Cnty. of Sauk, 45 IBIA at 210. 
 128.  25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006) (“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any 
title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or 
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”); 
e.g., South Dakota v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 39 IBIA 283, 292 (2004); see also COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §15.06 (detailed discussion of federal restraint on alienation of tribal land, 
which “reverses the common-law presumption of alienability, and vests great power over tribal land 
in the federal government”). 
 129.  E.g., Cass Cnty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 42 IBIA 243, 247 (2006). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Shawano Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 IBIA 62, 79 (2011). 
 132.  E.g., id. at 78. 
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land is a crucial detail; the BIA is to consider the need for land, not the need 
for trust land.133  Thus, the Board finds arguments that tribes could use the 
land as they propose to without trust status unpersuasive.134  The Board has 
also held that a tribe’s competency to handle its affairs is not an appropriate 
need consideration, and thereby finds arguments that a competent tribe fails 
to establish need unpersuasive as well.135 
D.  Factor Three: Proposed Use of the Land 
The third Section 151 factor for the BIA to consider is “[t]he purposes 
for which the land will be used.”136  The BIA need not examine every 
possible use for the land, but must show it considered “relevant facts . . . 
which are, or should be, within BIA’s knowledge” and should include 
discussion of these facts in its decision.137  Similarly, mere speculation by 
the appellant about an intended use other than that stated by the tribe in its 
application is an insufficient ground for the Board to vacate and remand a 
BIA decision.138  However, if the appellant substantiates such an allegation 
with evidence, the BIA must consider it in the proposed use analysis.139  
Furthermore, if the actual use of the land changes from the proposed use 
while the application is in process and the BIA issues a decision without 
knowledge of this changed use, the BIA can vacate its decision and 
reanalyze the application in light of the new information.140  However, a 
 
 133.  E.g., South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t would 
be an unreasonable interpretation of 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(b) to require the Secretary to detail 
specifically why trust status is more beneficial than fee status in the particular circumstance.”); South 
Dakota, 39 IBIA 283, 292–93 (2004). 
 134.  South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 801; South Dakota, 39 IBIA at 292–93. 
 135.  Cnty. of Mille Lacs v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 169, 173 (2002); South Dakota, 39 IBIA 
at 292. 
 136.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) (2005). 
 137.  City of Lincoln City v. Portland Area Dir., 33 IBIA 102, 107 (1999) (quoting Village of 
Ruidoso v. Albuquerque Area Dir., 32 IBIA 130, 139 (1998)). 
 138.  E.g., Iowa v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 42, 52–53 (2002). 
 139.  Village of Ruidoso, 32 IBIA at 138–40.  In that case, the appellant alleged that the tribe 
intended to use the land for gaming purposes and cited facts that showed the subject property had 
been donated to the tribe by a gaming operator, the gaming operator had established a gaming 
relationship with the tribe, and the apparent prior use of the property was for gaming-related 
purposes.  Id.  The Board found these facts relevant and held that the BIA should have addressed 
them in its analysis of the tribe’s proposed use of the property.  Id. at 140. 
 140.  Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 31 IBIA 238, 247–50 
(1997). 
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decision to accept land into trust based on a specific proposed use does not 
restrict actual use to that specified use in any way.141  Thus, if the actual use 
changes from the proposed use after the land has been accepted into trust, 
the Board cannot vacate and reanalyze the decision.142 
E.  Factor Four: Trust Land Already Owned and Degree of Assistance 
Needed 
The BIA need only apply the fourth Section 151 factor to applications 
from individual Indians: “[I]f the land is to be acquired for an individual 
Indian, [the BIA must consider] the amount of trust or restricted land already 
owned by or for that individual and the degree to which he needs assistance 
in handling his affairs.”143  This factor is relatively straightforward; the only 
Board commentary on it has been to confirm various needs as valid 
considerations.  These valid need considerations include the applicant’s age, 
income, education level, potential for health problems, need to protect 
homesite, and need for trust status to qualify for the BIA’s probate and estate 
planning services.144 
F.  Factor Five: Impact of Removal on State Tax Rolls 
The fifth factor requires the BIA to consider “the impact on the State 
and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land from the 
tax rolls.”145  Thus, when a state or local government taxes activities or 
transactions on the proposed trust land, asserts loss of such revenue if land is 
taken into trust, and provides an estimate of this loss, the BIA must consider 
such loss in making its decision.146  In considering an asserted negative 
impact from tax loss, the BIA is permitted to consider factors that may offset 
the tax loss, such as the tribe’s contribution to the economic growth of the 
area.147  However, while the BIA may consider any offsetting factors, it may 
not require the tribe to offer funds or promise contributions as compensation 
for tax loss from a successful trust acquisition.148 
The Board has also laid out several more important parameters for tax 
loss analysis.  First, the BIA need only consider the impact stemming from 
 
 141.  City of Lincoln City, 33 IBIA 102, 105–07 (1999). 
 142.  See id. 
 143.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(d) (2005). 
 144.  South Dakota v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 39 IBIA 301, 307–08 (2004). 
 145.  25 C.F.R § 151.10(e). 
 146.  E.g., Rio Arriba Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Acting Sw. Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 14, 25–26 (2001). 
 147.  Cnty. of Mille Lacs v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 169, 175 (2002). 
 148.  E.g., Shawano Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 IBIA 62, 81 (2011). 
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the specific request for that specific tract of land; it is not required to 
consider the cumulative impact of the tax loss resulting from all trust land in 
the area.149  Similarly, the BIA is only required to consider the tax amount to 
be lost based on the current use of the land, not the future loss based on 
proposed development, change in use,150 or speculative tax losses.151  
However, even though the BIA is not required to consider speculative tax 
losses, it may consider them if it believes such losses are relevant.152 
G.  Factor Six: Jurisdictional and Land Use Conflicts 
The sixth Section 151 factor is consideration of “[j]urisdictional 
problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise.”153  While 
such problems require consideration, there is no requirement that they be 
resolved as a precondition to acceptance of the land into trust.154  However, 
the Board has found a specific “type of potential land use conflict which 
should be resolved by agreement, if at all possible”; when the proposed 
acquisition is subject to a use restraint—such as a special use permit—at the 
time of application, the BIA is permitted to deny the application until the 
tribe makes a good faith effort to resolve the issue.155 
The Board’s jurisdiction and land use conflict holdings also parallel 
some of those from its tax loss analysis.  First, the BIA need only consider 
jurisdictional and land use conflict stemming from the specific request for 
that specific tract of land; it is not required to consider the cumulative impact 
resulting from all trust land in the area.156  However, even though the BIA is 
not required to consider cumulative impacts, it may consider them if it finds 
such impacts relevant.157  Similarly, the BIA is not required to consider 
 
 149.  E.g., Shawano Cnty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 40 IBIA 241, 249 (2005); South Dakota, 39 
IBIA at 308–09; Ziebach Cnty. v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 227, 230 (2002). 
 150.  Shawano Cnty., 40 IBIA at 249. 
 151.  E.g., Skagit Cnty. v. Nw. Reg’l Dir., 43 IBIA 62, 81 (2006) (quoting Rio Arriba, 38 IBIA at 
24). 
 152.  Aitkin Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 47 IBIA 99, 111 (2008). 
 153.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(f) (2005). 
 154.  Avoyelles Parish v. E. Area Dir., 34 IBIA 149, 155 (1999). 
 155.  Yerington Paiute Tribe v. Acting W. Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 261, 263 (2001). 
 156.  E.g., South Dakota v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 39 IBIA 283, 294–95 (2004). 
 157.  South Dakota, 39 IBIA at 309 (finding it proper for the BIA to consider a tribe’s argument 
that it already held a large amount of land in trust status, so adding the proposed parcel would not 
increase jurisdictional issues significantly). 
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speculative assertions that the tribe will alter the use of the land after trust 
status is achieved because “[t]he Regional Director is simply not required to 
speculate as to events that may or may not occur at some unknown point in 
the future.”158 
H.  Factor Seven: BIA’s Ability to Discharge Additional Responsibilities 
The seventh Section 151 factor is “whether the [BIA] is equipped to 
discharge the additional responsibilities resulting from the acquisition of the 
land into trust status.”159  This factor can be satisfied with minimal analysis 
because the Board has held that the BIA’s determination that it is equipped 
to discharge any additional responsibilities is sufficient.160  Thus, this factor 
has not emerged as a point of contention for fee-to-trust appeals, and the 
Board has not issued any further relevant or significant holdings regarding it. 
I.  Factor Eight: Environmental Compliance 
Under the eighth factor, the BIA must consider whether the applicant 
provided sufficient information to allow it to comply with 516 DM 6, 
appendix 4, National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing 
Procedures (NEPA) and 602 DM 2, Land Acquisitions: Hazardous 
Substances Determinations.161  This factor has not emerged as a point of 
contention for fee-to-trust appeals, and the Board has not issued any relevant 
or significant holdings regarding it. 
J.  Factor Nine: Proximity to State and Reservation Boundaries 
In addition to the previous eight factors, the BIA must consider two 
additional factors for off-reservation acquisitions.162  The first off-
reservation factor is consideration of the land’s proximity to state and 
 
 158.  E.g., Shawano Cnty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 IBIA 62, 81–82 (2011). 
 159.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(g) (2005). 
 160.  See, e.g., Roberts Cnty. v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 51 IBIA 35, 43–44 (2009) 
(“Appellants have provided nothing to contradict the Tribe’s submission, and, in the absence of any 
such showing, we are not convinced that the Regional Director was required to address this factor in 
more detail.”). 
 161.  25 C.F.R. § 151.10(h).  Enacted in 1969, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006) “requires 
federal administrative agencies to factor environmental considerations into their discretionary 
decision-making. . . . primarily by requiring preparation and public circulation of environmental 
impact statements (‘EISs’).”  Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Environmental Impact Assessments and Alternatives, SR045 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 757, 759 (2010). 
 162.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11; see supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (discussing which 
acquisitions are considered off-reservation acquisitions). 
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reservation boundaries.163  Then, “as the distance between the tribe’s 
reservation and the land to be acquired increases, the [BIA] shall give 
greater scrutiny to the tribe’s justification of anticipated benefits from the 
acquisition.”164  This factor has not emerged as a point of contention for fee-
to-trust appeals, and the Board has not issued any relevant or significant 
holdings regarding it. 
K.  Factor Ten: Expected Economic Benefits 
The second off-reservation factor requires the tribe to “provide a plan 
which specifies the anticipated economic benefits associated with the 
proposed use” if the land is being acquired for “business purposes.”165  This 
factor has not emerged as a point of contention for fee-to-trust appeals, and 
thus the Board has not issued any relevant or significant holdings regarding 
it. 
L.  Other Considerations 
The Board has also issued several non-factor-specific holdings for the 
BIA to follow.  First, where a long period of time has passed between the 
application and the BIA’s decision, the BIA must update its analysis before 
taking the land into trust.166  Additionally, the BIA only has to take 
reasonable efforts to notify local governments of its fee-to-trust decisions.167  
When the BIA has taken reasonable efforts, the burden then passes to any 
notified local official to pass notice on to other appropriate officials.168 
The Board, as well as federal courts, have also addressed allegations of 
built-in structural bias within the BIA that inappropriately affects the 
administration of the fee-to-trust process in favor of Indians.169  However, 
 
 163.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11(b). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. § 151.11(c). 
 166.  Okanogan Cnty. v. Acting Portland Area Dir., 30 IBIA 42, 43 (1996) (noting a gap of 
approximately five years between application and decision). 
 167.  Avoyelles Parish Police Jury v. E. Area Dir., 34 IBIA 149, 156 (1999). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1011 (D.S.D. 2005), aff’d, 
487 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2007); South Dakota v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 49 IBIA 129, 144 
(2009). 
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such allegations have been squarely rejected.170  Relying on Supreme Court 
precedent, a federal district court found the BIA’s policies of tribal self-
determination, Indian self-government, and hiring preferences for Indians 
appropriate because they were established by Congress in the IRA.171  The 
appellant must present a “substantial showing of bias” to disqualify an 
officer; without clear evidence, “courts should presume that public officers 
have discharged their official duties properly.”172  This has proven to be a 
high standard to meet, as even a showing that the deciding officer was 
currently a member and former tribal official of the tribe applying for a fee-
to-trust acquisition was not substantial enough to disqualify the officer for 
bias.173 
V.  APPLICATION OF THE LAW—PACIFIC REGION BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS’ DECISIONS 
A.  Methodology of This Project 
This study includes all Notices of Decision issued by the Pacific Region 
BIA Office174 between 2001 and 2011 under the statutory authority of the 
IRA and ILCA,175 for a total of 111 decisions from which both factual and 
analytical data were collected.176  The factual data compiled from each 
 
 170.  South Dakota, 49 IBIA at 144 (citing South Dakota, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1011). 
 171.  Id. (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court [has] found the preference policy reasonable and rationally 
designed to further Indian self-government and not violative of due process.”) (citing Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542, 555 (1974)). 
 172.  South Dakota, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (quoting United States ex rel. De Luca v. O’Rourke, 
213 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 1954); Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 929 F.Supp. 1165, 1176 
(W.D. Wis. 1996)). 
 173.  Roberts Cnty. v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 51 IBIA 35, 49–50 (2009). 
 174.  There are a total of twelve regional BIA offices, each of which independently issues 
decisions on fee-to-trust applications for its service area.  Regional Offices, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
THE INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/index.htm (last 
updated Sept. 21, 2012). 
 175.  Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 465–479 (2006); Indian Land 
Consolidation Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2202–2221 (2006); see also supra note 82 (explanation of 
why the IRA applies in some cases and the ILCA in others); supra note 119 (explaining that 
statutory authority can also be provided by any of the many mandatory tribe-specific acts). 
 176.  The Pacific Region BIA actually provided 114 Notices of Decision, but two were 
superseded due to error and one was stayed to allow the Attorney General to review environmental 
concerns.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Amber Soza, Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians (Mar. 24, 2011) (trust land decision on 1.48 acres) (superseded by Apr. 18, 2011); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Cedarville Rancheria (Feb. 22, 2008) (final trust land decision on 
8.44 acres, supersedes stayed July 25, 2007 decision); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to 
Norma Jean Hamlin Gandara, Morongo Band of Mission Indians (Aug. 27, 2002) (trust land 
decision on 5.19 acres) (superseded by Dec. 23, 2002).  In the two cases superseded due to error, 
only the final Notice of Decision was included in the analysis.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region 
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decision includes: the date of the decision; the county the proposed trust 
acquisition was located in; the size of the proposed trust acquisition; whether 
the request was tribal or individual; whether the request was for an on- or 
off-reservation acquisition; and whether the BIA decided to accept the land 
into trust or not.177  In addition to this factual data, the Pacific Region BIA’s 
analysis of each Section 151 regulatory factor was tabulated.178  The Pacific 
Region BIA’s particular expression of its reasoning and facts considered 
varied from decision to decision; thus, each consideration was grouped into 
broader categories to allow for meaningful analysis of the data.179  As the 
Pacific Region BIA frequently cited more than one consideration under each 
factor, multiple reasons were recorded when this occurred. 
While this study includes more data than previously collected regarding 
BIA decisions on discretionary fee-to-trust applications,180 it is important to 
note its limitations.  The data set for this analysis comes solely from the 
Pacific Region BIA Office, which serves California, and only covers 
decisions from 2001 through 2011.  These limitations make it inappropriate 
to draw conclusions about the entire history of discretionary fee-to-trust 
decisions or the actions of the BIA as a whole.  Additionally, the BIA 
primarily considers facts and reasons supplied by the tribe in its application 
and comments from government agencies, legislators, concerned 
individuals, and the like; it generally does not conduct its own independent 
 
BIA to Amber Soza, Morongo Band of Mission Indians (Apr. 18, 2011) (trust land decision on 1.48 
acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Norma Jean Hamlin Gandara, Morongo Band of 
Mission Indians (Dec. 23, 2002) (trust land decision on 5.19 acres).  However, the stayed July 25, 
2007 decision, not the final February 22, 2008 decision, was included in the analysis since it 
included full review while the final notice did not.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to 
Cedarville Rancheria (July 25, 2007) (trust land decision on 8.44 acres). 
 177.  See infra Table 1. 
 178.  See supra Part III.A (explaining the regulatory factors); Part IV (detailing the Board’s 
guidance on application of the factors). 
 179.  For example, under the second regulatory factor, need for the land, the original tabulation of 
BIA reasoning consisted of seventy-three uniquely expressed considerations.  This was further 
organized into fourteen categories.  See infra Table 5.  For example, the “Deficiencies in Current 
Land Holdings” category consists of the substantially similar considerations of: large portion 
unsuitable for development, current trust land is inadequate, current trust land is checkerboarded, 
and need to provide access to a landlocked parcel.  Id.  This same method was used to tabulate the 
data collected for each regulatory factor. 
 180.  This is likely due in part to the time-consuming process of obtaining the BIA fee-to-trust 
Notices of Decision.  They are not available in any electronic or hard copy database.  Instead, the 
interested party must contact the issuing BIA office and request them.  In most cases, a Freedom of 
Information Act Request (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)) must be filed. 
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investigation.181  Thus, in a given decision, it is unclear whether the absence 
of a particular consideration under any given factor is a reflection of the 
BIA’s choice of relevant facts or simply a reflection of the information 
provided to the BIA.  However, despite such limitations, and with these 
limitations in mind, the data set is still sufficient to reveal meaningful insight 
into the IRA fee-to-trust process because, as federal Indian policy expert 
Vine Deloria notes, “Regardless of the posture of any national 
administration toward Indians and their problems, the lower-level 
bureaucracy largely determines what the actual policy of the government 
will be.”182 
B.  Empirical Results 
1.  General Observations 
Based on review of the entire data set, several initial observations are 
apparent.  Most significantly, 100% of the proposed fee-to-trust acquisitions 
submitted to the Pacific Region BIA from 2001 through 2011 were 
granted.183  Additionally, across all 111 decisions, the Pacific Region BIA 
did not conclude that a single factor weighed against acceptance of the land 
into trust.  This resulted in a total of 10,538.03 acres being accepted into 
trust for individual Indians and tribes in California over that period.184  
Overall, the average request was for 94.94 acres and the median request was 
approximately 13.39 acres.185  The smallest request was for 0.19 acres and 
the largest for 1,160.00 acres.186 
 
 181.  See Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 43 IBIA 158, 165 (2006) (explaining that 
because the appellant did not participate in the comment process, the “[appellant] cannot reasonably 
expect BIA, in its trust acquisition decision, to address a concern that it did not know about”); Iowa 
v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 42, 53–54 (2002) (Finding: (1) because local governments did 
not respond, the BIA was not able to measure the impact of the proposed acquisition on them, and 
(2) “BIA may rely on the representations of a local governmental entity as to its legal authority.  BIA 
is not required to conduct an independent legal analysis of the authority.”); Rio Arriba Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Acting Sw. Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 14, 24 (2001) (agreeing with argument that “it was 
Appellant’s responsibility to notify BIA of any significant change in the information it had furnished 
previously”); City of Lincoln City v. Portland Area Dir., 33 IBIA 102, 107 (1999) (finding no 
authority for the appellant’s contention that the BIA must examine possible uses for the land that are 
not stated in the application); see also Scrivner, supra note 89, at 607 (no mention of independent 
investigation when describing the BIA’s decision-making process). 
 182.  AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 79, at 6. 
 183.  See infra Table 1. 
 184.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Sept. 19, 2008) (trust land 
decision on 0.19 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi 
Tribe (Feb. 26, 2008) (trust land decision on 1,160.00 acres); see infra Table 1.1. 
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The decisions were also divided and analyzed according to whether the 
application was submitted by a tribe for land to be taken into trust for the 
tribe as a whole or by an individual for land to be taken into trust on that 
individual’s behalf.  Ninety-seven of 111, or approximately 87%, were tribal 
applications, while individual Indians submitted 14, or approximately 13%, 
of the applications.187  The average tribal request was for 108.06 acres and 
the median tribal request was 19.70 acres.188  Range-wise, the smallest tribal 
request was for 0.19 acres and the largest for 1,160.00 acres.189  The average, 
median, smallest, and largest requests for individual applications—4.00, 
2.85, 0.39, and 13.68 acres respectively—were smaller than the tribal 
requests.190  A total of 55.97 acres were accepted into trust for individual 
Indians and 10,482.06 acres for tribes.191 
Additionally, the decisions were divided and analyzed according to 
whether the application was for an on- or off-reservation acquisition.192  Of 
the 111 decisions, 97, or approximately 87%, were for on-reservation 
acquisitions and 14, or 13%, were for off-reservation acquisitions.193  On-
reservation requests were made for an average of 94.37 acres and a median 
of 12.05 acres.194  The smallest on-reservation request was for 0.19 and the 
largest for 1,160.00 acres.195  While it does not change the statutory meaning 
 
 187.  See infra Table 2. 
 188.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 189.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Sept. 19, 2008) (trust land 
decision on 0.19 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi 
Tribe (Feb. 26, 2008) (trust land decision on 1,160.00 acres); see infra Table 1.1. 
 190.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Renee Najera, Morongo Band of Cahuilla 
Mission Indians (June 4, 2008) (trust land decision on 0.39 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. 
Region BIA to Maggie Margaret Sample Marquez, Wilma Jane Sample Shell, and Marian Louise 
Sample Stakewitz, Big Sandy Rancheria (Sept. 12, 2003) (trust land decision on 13.68 acres); see 
infra Table 1.1.  This difference in acreage is logically connected to that fact that individual 
acquisitions were predominately for primary residences whereas tribes sought to acquire additional 
trust land for diverse purposes such as land banking and commercial development.  See infra Part 
V.B.4.  Land banking is the practice of acquiring property for strategic development purposes, such 
as preparation for unspecified future needs.  See Diana A. Silva, Note, Land Banking as a Tool for 
the Economic Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 608 (2011). 
 191.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 192.  See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between on- and 
off-reservations acquisitions). 
 193.  See infra Table 3. 
 194.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 195.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Sept. 19, 2008) (trust land 
decision on 0.19 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi 
WAPLES WHITE TEXT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2013  5:18 PM 
 
280 
 
of on-reservation, 36% of on-reservation lands involved parcels located 
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and the remaining 64% of 
parcels were located outside of, but contiguous to, the exterior boundaries of 
land held in trust by the requesting tribe.196  For off-reservation applications, 
the average request was for 98.85 acres with a median request of 33.90 
acres.197  The smallest off-reservation request was for 0.56 acres and the 
largest was for 882.80 acres.198  A total of 9,154.16 on-reservation and 
1,383.87 off-reservation acres were accepted into trust.199 
2.  Factor One: Statutory Authority 
The Pacific Region BIA’s statutory authority to take land into trust was 
satisfied by the ILCA in 70% of decisions, with the remaining 30% satisfied 
by the IRA.200  This factor does not require further analysis, merely notation 
that the BIA is acting pursuant to statutory authority. 
3.  Factor Two: Need for Land 
Consistent with the Board’s grant of “broad leeway” and “flexibility” in 
determining need,201 the considerations the Pacific Region BIA noted in its 
need for the land analysis were numerous and varied; a total of 690 
considerations mentioned were grouped into 14 categories.202  In descending 
order of frequency of appearance among the 111 total decisions, the results 
were as follows: the amount of trust land the tribe currently owns was 
considered in 73.87% of decisions, the importance of self-determination and 
sovereignty in 72.07%, the fact that the tribe has lost trust land in 54.05%, 
deficiencies in current land holdings in 53.15%, housing considerations in 
37.84%, economic factors in 36.04%, cultural considerations in 25.23%, use 
considerations in 22.52%, long-term planning considerations in 18.02%, 
tribal membership considerations in 14.41%, location of the property in 
14.41%, the tribe’s achievements in 10.81%, the degree of cooperation with 
and support from local entities in 4.50%, and several miscellaneous 
 
Tribe (Feb. 26, 2008) (trust land decision on 1,160.00 acres); see infra Table 1.1. 
 196.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Sept. 29, 2010) (trust land 
decision on 0.56 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Mesa Grande Band of Mission 
Indians (Sept. 6, 2001) (trust land decision on 882.80 acres); see infra Table 1.1. 
 199.  See infra Table 1.1. 
 200.  See infra Table 4.  See also supra note 82, for further discussion of the IRA and ILCA. 
 201.  Cnty. of Sauk v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 45 IBIA 201, 209 (2007); see supra notes 120–35 and 
accompanying text (outlining the Board’s guidance on need analysis). 
 202.  See infra Table 5. 
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considerations in 4.50%.203 
While the most frequently cited category was the amount of current trust 
land owned by the tribe, this consideration does not appear to have much of 
a role beyond mere recitation because the average amount of current trust 
land owned was 4,622.49 acres and ten decisions noted amounts over 10,000 
acres.204  Thus, it appears that other circumstances can easily satisfy the need 
factor even where the tribe already owns a large amount of trust land, which 
is consistent with the Board’s holdings that additional land may be needed 
for a variety of reasons.205  Such reasons appear throughout the Pacific 
Region BIA’s decisions, as seen in the strong presence of consideration of 
deficiencies in current land holdings, economic factors, and housing 
considerations.206 
 
 203.  Id.  Thirty-two decisions noted land lost during the Termination Era, four decisions noted 
land lost during the Allotment Era, two noted land lost by forced sale, and one each by executive 
order and unspecified means.  Id. 
 204.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Nov. 
30, 2011) (trust land decision on 78.50 acres) (noting current trust land of 12,255.21 acres); Notice 
of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Jan. 24, 2011) (trust 
land decision on 49.47 acres) (noting current trust land of 12,303.50 acres); Notice of Decision from 
Pac. Region BIA to Tule River Tribe (Jan. 6, 2011) (trust land decision on 40.00 acres) (noting 
current trust land of 55,396.00 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tule River Tribe 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 40.00 acres) (noting current trust land of 55,396.00 acres); 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to John E. Linton, Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians (May 3, 2005) (trust land decision on 10.30 acres) (noting current tribal trust land of 
31,115.47); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Robert Allan St. Marie, Sr., Morongo Band 
of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Mar. 1, 2005) (trust land decision on 0.64 acres) (noting current tribal 
trust land of 31,000.00 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to David J. Matthews, 
Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Dec. 2, 2004) (trust land decision on 5.04 acres) (noting 
current tribal trust land of 31,115.47 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo 
Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Sept. 29, 2003) (trust land decision on 619.90 acres) (noting 
current trust land of 31,115.47 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Norma Jean 
Hamlin Gandara, Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Dec. 23, 2002) (trust land decision on 
5.19 acres) (noting current tribal trust land of 31,075.47 acres); see also infra Table 6. 
 205.  While acceptance of more land into trust when the tribe currently owns relatively large 
amounts of land already may be a point of contention for those in opposition to such an acquisition, 
the Board has made it clear that such arguments are wholly unpersuasive as the currently owned land 
may be deficient in some way.  Cnty. of Mille Lacs v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 169, 171–73 
(2002); see Shawano Cnty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 40 IBIA 241, 243 (2005); see also supra notes 
120–35 and accompanying text (outlining the Board’s guidance on need analysis); infra Table 5 
(listing reasons current trust land may be considered deficient). 
 206.  See infra Table 5.  The most frequently noted deficiencies in land were topographical 
problems that prohibit development, such as steep, rocky, mountainous terrain or drainage problems 
(24.32% of decisions).  Id.  Nearly as frequently, 18.92% of decisions note that the current trust land 
is inadequate because it is already fully developed or insufficient to meet the tribe’s development 
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The second and third most frequently cited categories, the importance of 
self-determination and sovereignty and the fact that the tribe has lost land, 
reflect a strong emphasis on policy-based considerations.207  The top 
considerations in the importance of self-determination and sovereignty 
category included statements that the tribe had established a need for self-
determination, self-jurisdiction, self-governance, and sovereignty.208  The 
lost land category included regular recognition of the tribe’s efforts to 
rebuild and consolidate its land, as well as the challenges it has faced in 
doing so.209  Consistent with the Self-Determination Era of federal Indian 
policy that began in the 1960s and continues through today,210 these results 
communicate recognition of a responsibility for, or duty to remedy, the harm 
inflicted on Indian communities during past policy eras.211 
4.  Factor Three: Proposed Use of the Land 
The third factor, the proposed use of the land, primarily comprised 
notation of the proposed and current use of the land—100.00% and 75.68% 
of decisions respectively.212  Residential use outnumbered commercial use, 
but not substantially.213  While much of the public concern about the transfer 
of fee land into trust revolves around how the land will be used once in trust, 
68.47% of decisions noted that the tribe did not plan to change the current 
use.214  Such concern may still be appropriate considering that approximately 
9% of decisions noted that the tribe had no specific immediate plan for the 
 
needs.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id.  BIA recognition of a tribe’s efforts to rebuild their land base is also seen in the relatively 
common reference to “checkerboarded” land as a deficiency in current land holdings.  Id.  
“Checkerboarded” is a term of art used when a tribe’s trust land holdings do not form a united 
whole, but instead form a patchwork pattern primarily due to changes in federal Indian land policy 
over the years.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.04. 
 210.  See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text (discussing the Self-Determination Era). 
 211.  This duty to remedy past harms is particularly well-illustrated by the Pacific Region BIA’s 
regular comparison of current trust holdings with past holdings—either original reservation size or 
amount of aboriginal land.  See infra Table 5. 
 212.  See infra Table 7. 
 213.  Id.  While Section 151 does not restrict an individual applicant’s use for trust land, the 
decisions over the last eleven years reflect a 100% residential use for individual acquisitions.  See 
infra Table 8. 
 214.  See infra Table 7.  However, as used in the decisions, the phrase “no planned change in 
current use” does not signify that no development will occur, but rather that such improvements will 
be consistent with the current use.  For example, there is no planned change in current use when the 
land currently has two mobile homes located on it and the tribe plans to replace the mobile homes 
with modular homes, a maintenance facility, a water storage tank, access roads, the tribal housing 
authority, and community development buildings.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to 
Karuk Tribe (Feb. 8, 2008) (trust land decision on 16.23 acres). 
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land, but that it would potentially be used for future residential or 
commercial development.215 
To a lesser degree than proposed and current use, the following 
considerations were also noted: the location of the land—18.02%; degree of 
cooperation with and support from local entities—9.91%; economic 
considerations—9.01%; importance of self-determination and sovereignty—
7.21%; deficiencies in current land holdings—7.21%; housing 
considerations—2.70%; and cultural considerations—1.80%.216 
5.  Factor Four: Trust Land Already Owned and Degree of Assistance 
Needed 
The amount of trust land already owned and degree of assistance needed 
factor only applies to individual applicants.217  Thus, all fourteen individual 
decisions should have included this analysis; however, three decisions did 
 
 215.  See infra Table 7.  However, the Pacific Region BIA has firmly rebutted concern about 
potential future development with responses such as, 
 The BIA is not required to make speculative inquiry concerning every possible use that 
may arise sometime in the future.  If and when the tribe decides to develop the subject 
parcels, they will have to comply with applicable federal requirements, as well as any 
agreement they now have with [the] County. 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi Tribe (Feb. 26, 2008) 
(trust land decision on 1,160.00 acres).  The Board’s holdings provide substantial support for this 
position.  See e.g., Iowa v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 42, 52–53 (2002). 
  Public concern about gaming use was also evident in the decisions, and the Pacific Region 
BIA responded to a number of comments to clarify that it was appropriately analyzing an application 
as a non-gaming request even though the current or proposed use involved the tribe’s casino, such as 
a shared parking lot or septic leach field.  See, e.g., Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (Aug. 19, 2008) (trust land decision on 1.72 acres) (“In 
accordance with the Department’s guidelines, the acquisition is not gaming-related if the land and 
improvements are not used exclusively for the gaming facility and not essential to its operation, but 
the gaming facility is merely sharing in infrastructure improvements.”); Notice of Decision from 
Pac. Region BIA to Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians (Mar. 20, 2003) (trust land 
decision on 42.00 acres) (finding that a septic field is merely shared infrastructure).  This is because 
under the Department of the Interior’s gaming checklist, an acquisition is not for gaming purposes 
unless the proposed use is exclusively for a gaming operation or is essential to the gaming operation.  
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, CHECKLIST FOR GAMING ACQUISITIONS 
GAMING-RELATED ACQUISITIONS AND IGRA SECTION 20 DETERMINATIONS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001904.pdf; see generally Erik M. Jensen, 
Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 675 (2008) (discussing Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act acquisitions). 
 216.  See infra Table 7. 
 217.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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not mention either prong.218  Of the eleven decisions to analyze this factor, 
100% indicated that the applicant did not own any other trust land.219  
Additionally, the Pacific Region BIA’s analysis of the degree of assistance 
needed indicates that applicant need weighs in favor of acceptance because 
90.91% of decisions that analyzed it concluded that even though no 
assistance was needed, the need to protect the land for future generations 
outweighed the fact that the applicant did not need assistance.220  Thus, this 
factor serves little function beyond mere recitation because the facts of the 
acquisition are easily overruled by a policy rationale that could arguably 
apply to all fee-to-trust acquisitions. 
6.  Factor Five: Impact of Removal on State Tax Rolls 
All but five decisions gave an estimated tax loss amount based on recent 
tax assessed on the subject property.221  The estimates averaged $9,277, with 
 
 218.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Orval, Mac & William Hayward, Redding 
Rancheria (Oct. 13, 2011) (trust land decision on 1.50 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region 
BIA to Lucille Rice, Morongo Band of Mission Indians (Sept. 14, 2011) (trust land decision on 1.34 
acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Jeanette McCain, Redding Rancheria (Feb. 17, 
2011) (trust land decision on 0.70 acres); see infra Table 9.  One of the individual decisions that was 
missing this analysis does mention under the need for the land analysis that the applicant needs help 
managing the property.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Jeanette McCain, Redding 
Rancheria (Feb. 17, 2011) (trust land decision on 0.70 acres). 
 219.  See infra Table 9.  However, this result does not lead to the conclusion that ownership of 
other trust land will prohibit further land being taken into trust for an individual’s benefit.  As seen 
in the need for the land analysis, it is likely that many policy-based and practical considerations 
would outweigh any contention that the individual already owns sufficient trust land.  See infra 
Table 5; supra notes 201–211 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacific Region BIA’s need 
analysis). 
 220.  See infra Table 9. 
 221.  See infra Table 10.  While a specific tax loss estimate may be highly relevant, the BIA’s 
analysis is not erroneous if such an estimate is not present.  See supra notes 145–52 and 
accompanying text (detailing the Board’s guidance on tax loss analysis).  The decisions that did not 
consider a specific estimate of tax loss noted mitigating circumstances such as: the tribe had entered 
an agreement for annual contributions in lieu of taxes; there is currently no retail activity on the land, 
so there is no loss of sales or use tax; and the amount is small, so impact is minimal.  Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Elk Valley Rancheria (June 9, 2011) (trust land decision on 2.00 
acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (Dec. 
13, 2004) (trust land decision on 10.00 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Elk 
Valley Rancheria (Jan. 23, 2004) (trust land decision on 179.09 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. 
Region BIA to Norma Jean Hamlin Gandara, Morongo Band of Mission Indians (Dec. 23, 2002) 
(trust land decision on 5.19 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Soboba Band of 
Luiseño Indians (Sept. 10, 2002) (trust land decision on 950.00 acres). 
  Additionally, several instances of what appeared to be erroneous copying and pasting from 
one document to another were found.  Two decisions contained identical tax analysis, in its entirety, 
despite a difference of approximately 420 acres in the subject parcels.  Notice of Decision from Pac. 
Region BIA to Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians 3 (Dec. 1, 2010) (trust land decision on 
431.26 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to San Pasqual Band of Diegueno Mission 
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a median of $2,916.222  The highest estimate was $97,220223 and sixteen 
decisions noted tax losses over $20,000.224  The Pacific Region BIA also 
 
Indians 4 (Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 9.08 acres).  Both Notices of Decision stated the 
following: 
 Parcels accepted into federal trust status are exempt from taxation and would be 
removed from the County’s taxing jurisdiction.  In the 2009–2010 tax years, the total tax 
assessed on the subject parcels was $1,777.72.  During the comment period, none of the 
solicited agencies indicated that any adverse impacts would result from the removal of 
the subject parcel from the tax rolls. 
 It is our determination that no significant impact will result from the removal of this 
property from the county tax rolls given the relatively small amount of tax revenue 
assessed on the subject parcel. 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians 3 (Dec. 1, 
2010) (trust land decision on 431.26 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to San 
Pasqual Band of Diegueno Mission Indians 4 (Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 9.08 acres). 
  Tax revenues were similarly transposed in two more cases with a difference of over 600 
acres in the proposed acquisitions.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo Band of 
Cahuilla Mission Indians 3 (Apr. 15, 2004); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo 
Band of Mission Indians 8 (Sept. 29, 2003) (trust land decision on 7.39 acres).  Given the common 
fact patterns, it is reasonable for the BIA to use common phrases and rationales across various 
decisions, as was present in the Notices of Decision analyzed for this Comment.  However, the BIA 
should not fail to provide individualized analysis based on the unique circumstances of each 
proposed acquisition. 
 222.  See infra Table 10. 
 223.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Augustine Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians 
(Jan. 8, 2008) (trust land decision on 37.08 acres) (noting previous year tax of $97,220). 
 224.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Nov. 
30, 2011) (trust land decision on 78.50 acres) (noting previous year tax of $20,176); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Jan. 24, 2011) (trust land 
decision on 49.47 acres) (noting previous year tax of $34,757); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region 
BIA to Tule River Tribe (Jan. 6, 2011) (trust land decision on 40.00 acres) (noting previous year tax 
of $36,293); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Sycuan Band of Kymeyaay Nation (Dec. 
14, 2010) (trust land decision on 48.64 acres) (noting previous year tax of $20,000); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Table Mountain Rancheria (Aug. 25, 2010) (trust land decision 
on 175.00 acres) (noting previous year tax of $66,830); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to 
Bear River Band of Rohnerville Rancheria (Mar. 22, 2010) (trust land decision on 113.00 acres) 
(noting previous year tax of $22,656); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tule River Tribe 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 40.00 acres) (noting previous year tax of $36,293); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Redding Rancheria (Nov. 27, 2009) (trust land decision on 3.65 
acres) (noting previous year tax of $22,400); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Augustine 
Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Jan. 8, 2008) (trust land decision on 37.08 acres) (noting previous 
year tax of $97,220); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Table Mountain Rancheria (Oct. 
15, 2007) (trust land decision on 72.81 acres) (noting previous year tax of $43,000); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk Indians (Jan. 12, 2007) (trust land 
decision on 297.18 acres) (noting previous year tax of $23,348); Notice of Decision from Pac. 
Region BIA to Shingle Spring Band of Miwok Indians (Sept. 8, 2006) (trust land decision on 77.03 
acres) (noting previous year tax of $23,039); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo 
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considered a variety of circumstances that mitigated or offset the tax loss, 
financially or otherwise.  The most common mitigating factor—considered 
in 41.44% of decisions—was ways the tribe contributes to the community, 
such as providing employment, purchasing goods and services, and making 
charitable contributions.225  The tribe’s efforts to cooperate with and support 
from local entities was noted in 34.23% of decisions, and benchmarking 
with county tax revenue totals to put the estimated tax loss in perspective 
was seen in 27.03%.226  However, the Pacific Region BIA’s emphasis on 
benchmarking is arguably meaningless, because only an incredibly large or 
extremely high-value property would result in a tax loss that would make 
such a comparison relevant. 
While not as prominent as in other factors, policy-based considerations, 
such as the need for self-determination or a statement that the tribe’s needs 
outweigh the impact of removal, were mentioned in 26.13% of decisions.227  
The remaining considerations were responses to local concerns and several 
miscellaneous considerations, in 5.41% and 6.31% of decisions, 
respectively.228 
7.  Factor Six: Jurisdictional and Land Use Conflicts 
Concern about the state and local governments’ loss of control over the 
land is one of the primary arguments against fee-to-trust acquisitions.229  
Thus, the concerned public would hope to see some teeth in the jurisdiction 
and land use conflict analysis.  However, overall, the results show that the 
Pacific Region BIA has largely avoided significant analysis and replaced it 
with filler considerations.230  For example, 92.79% of the decisions recited 
 
Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians (Jan. 26, 2005) (trust land decision on 715.00 acres) (noting 
previous year tax of $54,000); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Santa Ynez Band of 
Mission Indians (Jan. 14, 2005) (trust land decision on 6.90 acres) (noting previous year tax of 
$43,340); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Sycuan Band of Mission Indians (May 14, 
2002) (trust land decision on 82.85 acres) (noting previous year tax of $24,875); Notice of Decision 
from Pac. Region BIA to Table Mountain Rancheria (Apr. 9, 2002) (trust land decision on 7.76 
acres) (noting previous year tax of $34,164); see infra Table 10. 
 225.  See infra Table 11. 
 226.  Id.  While a tribe’s commitment to make contributions in lieu of tax loss is a rational reason 
for the BIA to consider the tax impact of removal nominal, the BIA has no authority to mandate a 
tribe to do so or condition acceptance upon such a promise.  E.g., Shawano Cnty. v. Acting Midwest 
Reg’l Dir., 53 IBIA 62, 81 (2011); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 227.  See infra Table 11. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  The Pacific Region BIA did take public concern into consideration; it specifically addressed 
public concerns received in 12.61% of decisions and also emphasized the degree of cooperation with 
and support from local entities in 26.13% of considerations.  See infra Table 12. 
 230.  See also infra note 302 (providing an example of conspicuous use of filler analysis in the 
proposed use factor). 
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the legal results of transfer to trust status: criminal jurisdiction will remain 
with the state, but the land will be removed from state and local civil 
jurisdiction.231  While relevant, these results are true of every fee-to-trust 
acquisition in California,232 and thus the observations do not constitute 
meaningful analysis.  There was also regular consideration—30.63% of 
decisions—of how various services will be provided to the land.233  Again, 
while relevant, this is simply recitation of routine results of transfer to trust 
status; in fact, most of the services simply continue without change.234  
Additionally, in almost a quarter—23.42%—of decisions, the Pacific Region 
BIA engaged in minimal analysis, which demonstrates a reprehensible 
failure to fully consider the significant jurisdiction and land use 
consequences of a transfer of fee land to trust status.235 
The second most common category of considerations was factors that 
contribute to mitigation or absence of jurisdictional conflict, which appeared 
in 57.66% of decisions.236  On the surface, the considerations in this category 
do provide some indication that the loss of state and local jurisdiction will 
not have a negative effect on the community.  For example, it is reasonable 
to assert that the fact that the land use will not change or that the proposed 
use is consistent with current zoning indicates a low potential for 
jurisdictional conflict.237  However, this reasoning ignores the fact that once 
the land is taken into trust, the tribe is no longer bound by local zoning 
regulations or the use stated in its application, which is precisely the public’s 
basis for concern about jurisdictional and land use conflict.238 
Even in the rare instance of admitted land use conflict, the Pacific 
 
 231.  See infra Table 12. 
 232.  California is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (2006) and Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 
(2006), which authorized state courts to exercise jurisdiction over offenses by or against Indians if 
the state has amended its constitution or enacted legislation for this purpose, and thus eliminated 
special federal criminal jurisdiction over reservations in affected areas.  Goldberg, supra note 69, at 
536–38. 
 233.  See infra Table 12. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  See infra Table 13.  Of the 26 decisions categorized as containing only minimal analysis, 
approximately half only recited the maintenance of criminal jurisdiction by the state and transfer of 
civil and regulatory jurisdiction to the tribe.  Id.  The other half noted these jurisdictional changes 
plus one additional factor such as the fact that no adverse comments were received or police service 
would continue as is.  Id. 
 236.  See infra Table 12. 
 237.  See id. 
 238.  See Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 5. 
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Region BIA concluded that the tribe’s needs outweighed jurisdictional 
conflict.239  Policy-based considerations were also used to respond to public 
concerns and were present in 9.01% of decisions.240 
8.  Factor Seven: BIA’s Ability to Discharge Additional Responsibilities 
In the vast majority of decisions—91.89%—the Pacific Region BIA 
found that the acquisition would present no significant additional burdens on 
its operations.241  It came to this conclusion most frequently due to the 
absence of a change in land use.242  Other significant considerations 
included: the fact that the tribe did not have other leases, rights of way, or 
other trust applications forthcoming; the tribe would assume development 
and day-to-day management of the property; or the property was on-
reservation.243 
Where the Pacific Region BIA did anticipate additional burdens, it noted 
them and held them to be minimal burdens that it was equipped to handle.244  
As the Board has sanctioned minimal analysis of the seventh factor by 
holding that the BIA’s determination of its capacity is conclusive,245 the 
Pacific Region BIA’s analysis certainly satisfies this standard.  However, the 
 
 239.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Table Mountain Rancheria 9 (Oct. 15, 2007) 
(trust land decision on 72.81 acres) (Noting local concern about uses that are incompatible with the 
subject land’s current zoning, but concluding, “when considering the Tribe’s land acquisition 
request, the Department recognizes the Tribe’s ongoing struggle to reestablish its land base . . . .  
With its limited land base, the Tribe, as a sovereign government, has implemented a utilization plan 
that best meets the needs of its members.  It is our determination that the needs of the Tribe in this 
case out weigh [sic] any jurisdictional conflicts that may exist.”); see infra Table 12. 
 240.  See infra Table 12.  For example, in a 2006 Notice of Decision, the Pacific Region BIA 
responded to local concerns about the loss of jurisdiction with particularly strong, broad policy 
rationales: 
The gist of the above concerns is the loss of jurisdiction over the subject property.  The 
County will in fact lose jurisdictional control with an approved acquisition.  However, the 
very essence of a “trust” acquisition is to enable tribes . . . the opportunity to plan and 
implement programs for the benefit of its community.  The United States recognizes the 
right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.  It is our determination that the needs of the Tribe in this case out weigh 
[sic] any jurisdictional issues that may arise as a result of a trust conversion. 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Shingle Spring Band of Miwok Indians 7 (Sept. 8, 
2006) (trust land decision on 77.03 acres). 
 241.  See infra Table 14. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id.  Probate services to individual applicants comprised the majority of the noted additional 
burdens, with lease, mortgage, and construction loan processing appearing relatively frequently as 
well.  Id. 
 245.  See, e.g., Roberts Cnty. v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 51 IBIA 35, 43–44 (2009); see 
also supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing Board guidance on the additional BIA 
responsibility analysis). 
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Pacific Region BIA did make an effort to give this factor more than minimal 
consideration by reinforcing its determination with mention of: how services 
will be provided—17.12%; policy considerations—12.61%; absence of 
activities that would require BIA involvement—12.61%; the land’s 
character—8.11%; the degree of cooperation with local entities—3.60%; 
and financial considerations—3.60%.246 
9.  Factor Eight: Environmental Compliance 
The environmental compliance review is straightforward with specific 
federal requirements to be met.247  While there was some public concern 
about potential use, reflected in the Pacific Region BIA’s analysis of this 
factor and introductory summary of comments received, the federal 
requirements were met in 100% of applications.248 
10.  Factor Nine: Proximity to State and Reservation Boundaries 
The Pacific Region BIA exhibited some confusion in its application of 
factor nine as evidenced by several incidents of mistaken analysis.  Analysis 
of the proximity to state and reservation boundaries is only statutorily 
required for off-reservation acquisitions,249 but the Pacific Region BIA 
 
 246.  See infra Table 14.  It is interesting that the most frequent policy consideration in the factor 
seven analysis was a recognition that the whole exercise of transferring fee land to trust status would 
not be required but for the wrongful termination of the tribe in the first place.  Id.  While only 
mentioned in 8.11% of decisions, it not only reaffirms the Pacific Region BIA’s commitment to 
remedying past injury to the tribes, but provides a powerful response to any argument against the 
acquisition on factor seven grounds.  Id.; see supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text (reflecting 
on the Pacific Region BIA’s emphasis on lost land under the factor one need analysis). 
 247.  See supra note 161 and accompanying text (explaining the environmental compliance 
requirements). 
 248.  See infra Table 15.  NEPA was satisfied by categorical exclusion due to no change in land 
use in 62.16% of decisions and Environmental Assessment (EA) resulting in issuance of a Finding of 
No Significant Impact (FONSI) in 40.54% of decisions.  Id.  These percentages exceed 100% 
because three decisions involved multiple parcels where NEPA was satisfied by an EA and FONSI 
on one and a categorical exclusion on another.  Id.  Hazardous substance determinations were 
satisfied in all decisions by a Phase 1 Contaminant Survey Checklist that reflected no hazardous 
materials or contaminants on the subject property.  Id. 
 249.  Section 151 states: 
The [BIA] shall consider the following requirements in evaluating tribal requests for the 
acquisition of lands in trust status, when the land is located outside of and noncontiguous 
to the tribe’s reservation, and the acquisition is not mandated: . . . The location of the land 
relative to state boundaries, and its distance from the boundaries of the tribe’s 
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analyzed it in five on-reservation acquisitions and failed to mention it in one 
off-reservation acquisition.250  Given the strongly favorable analysis in the 
other factors overall, it is unlikely that inclusion or exclusion of this analysis 
would have changed the outcome of any of the flawed decisions.251  
However, consideration of the correct factors should be a bare minimum. 
The location of the subject property relative to state boundaries was 
noted in specific mileage in 61.11% of decisions, while 38.89% of decisions 
generally noted that the property does not cross state boundaries.252  The 
subject property was an average of 6.60 miles away from other trust land, 
and the median distance was 1.40 miles away.253  The closest distance was 
0.08 miles and the farthest was 30.00 miles.254  Additionally, 66.67% of the 
decisions noted other considerations, such as the tribe’s need or history.255 
11.  Factor Ten: Expected Economic Benefits 
Like factor nine, factor ten need only be considered for off-reservation 
acquisitions, but with the additional condition that it only applies to off-
reservation land being acquired for business purposes.256  Of the fourteen 
 
reservation . . . . 
25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2005). 
 250.  See infra Table 16.  Factor nine was unnecessarily analyzed in five on-reservation 
acquisitions.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians 4 (Mar. 9, 2010) (trust land decision on 30.00 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region 
BIA to Mooretown Rancheria 5–6 (June 25, 2003) (trust land decision on 160.05 acres); Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Mooretown Rancheria 5 (June 6, 2002) (trust land decision on 
33.14 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Sycuan Band of Mission Indians 13 (May 
14, 2002) (trust land decision on 82.82 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tyme 
Maidu Tribe 6–7 (May 7, 2001) (trust land decision on 18.50 acres).  Factor nine should have been, 
but was not, analyzed in one off-reservation acquisition.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA 
to San Pasqual Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 9.08 acres).  
Interestingly, this decision also contained a possible error in the tax analysis.  See supra note 221. 
 251.  See infra notes 268–71 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of rubber-
stamping in the Pacific Region BIA’s trust land decisions). 
 252.  See infra Table 16. 
 253.  See infra Table 17. 
 254. Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Sept. 15, 2010) (trust land 
decision on 20.70 acres) (noting distance from other trust land of 0.08 miles); Notice of Decision 
from Pac. Region BIA to Karuk Tribe (Mar. 12, 2008) (trust land decision on 2.64 acres) (noting 
distance from other trust land of 15.00 and 30.00 miles for the two parcels in the proposed 
acquisition); see also infra Table 17. 
 255.  See infra Table 16. 
 256.  Section 151 states, 
The [BIA] shall consider the following requirements in evaluating tribal requests for the 
acquisition of lands in trust status, when the land is located outside of and noncontiguous 
to the tribe’s reservation, and the acquisition is not mandated: . . . Where land is being 
acquired for business purposes, the tribe shall provide a plan which specifies the 
anticipated economic benefits . . . . 
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off-reservation decisions, only seven included factor ten analysis; five were 
not required to because the land was not acquired for a business purpose, but 
the remaining two should have included factor ten analysis.257  As with the 
errors in the factor nine analysis, it is unlikely that the errors in the factor ten 
analysis would have changed the outcome of the flawed decisions.258  
However, the legislative intent to give greater scrutiny to off-reservation 
acquisitions is clear on the face of Section 151: “[A]s the distance between 
the tribe’s reservation and the land to be acquired increases, the Secretary 
shall give greater scrutiny to the tribe’s justification of anticipated benefits 
from the acquisition. . . . [and] greater weight to the concerns raised.”259  
Thus, the failure to even consider the additional factors is a considerable 
error. 
The proposed use was stated in 100% of decisions that analyzed the 
factor.260  Even though Section 151 requires “a plan which specifies the 
anticipated economic benefits associated with the proposed use,”261 just over 
half—57.14%—of decisions actually specified expected benefits.262  Only 
two—28.57%—provided a business plan.263  The decisions also contained 
reference to the need for the land, mostly phrased in policy-based language, 
as well as recognition of cooperation with the city and history of investment 
 
25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2005). 
 257.  See infra Table 18.  Two off-reservations acquisitions should have, but did not, include 
factor ten analysis.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to San Pasqual Band of Diegueno 
Mission Indians 3 (Jan. 4, 2010) (trust land decision on 9.08 acres) (tribe intends to build shopping 
plaza with at least one retail store, a restaurant and a gas station); Notice of Decision from Pac. 
Region BIA to Mesa Grande Band of Mission Indians 9 (Sept. 6, 2001) (trust land decision on 
882.80 acres) (tribe intends to use for commercial bison operation involving “direct sale of breeding 
stock and meat animal, and . . . spin-off businesses that include food specialty items . . . , art and 
handcrafted items”).  The San Pasqual decision also includes erroneous factor nine analysis and 
potentially erroneous tax analysis.  See supra notes 221, 249–50 and accompanying text. 
 258.  See infra notes 268–71 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of rubber-
stamping in the Pacific Region BIA’s trust land decisions). 
 259.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11. 
 260.  See infra Table 18. 
 261.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11(c). 
 262.  See infra Table 18. 
 263.  Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tule River Tribe (Jan. 6, 2011) (trust land 
decision on 40.00 acres); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Tule River Tribe (Jan. 4, 
2010) (trust land decision on 40.00 acres); see infra Table 18.  While two applications included a 
business plan, they were both for the same parcel.  The 2011 application was simply a re-submission 
of the 2010 request. 
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on the subject property.264  While the analysis of this factor was minimal, it 
has not emerged as a point of contention for fee-to-trust appeals, and thus is 
apparently adequate. 
C.  Conclusions from the Pacific Region BIA Decisions 
Other than the handful of erroneously applied factors or missing 
analysis,265 the results clearly show that the Pacific Region BIA followed the 
regulatory requirements and Board guidelines in making fee-to-trust 
decisions over the last eleven years.  This compliance level is consistent with 
government findings of BIA performance on a national scale; in 2006, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the BIA “generally 
followed its regulations for processing land in trust applications.”266  
However, from the Pacific Region BIA decision data, it is equally apparent 
that despite the façade of multi-factor analysis and diverse, individualized 
considerations,267 the process is merely an exercise in rubber-stamping.268  
Strong indications of rubber-stamping in the Pacific Region BIA fee-to-trust 
decisions include the 100% acceptance rate,269 the lack of a single factor 
being found to support denial, meaningless “filler” considerations,270 and 
frequent mention of policy statements capable of negating almost any 
contrary argument.271 
 
 264.  See infra Table 18. 
 265.  See supra notes 221, 250, 257 and accompanying text. 
 266.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-781, INDIAN ISSUES: BIA’S EFFORTS TO 
IMPOSE TIME FRAMES AND COLLECT BETTER DATA SHOULD IMPROVE THE PROCESSING OF LAND IN 
TRUST APPLICATIONS 5 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/p 
kg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-781/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-781.pdf; see also EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 2 (“[T]he Department’s process for assessing tribal applications for the 
Secretary of Interior to take land into trust for Indian gaming was in accordance with laws and 
regulations.”). 
 267.  A total number of 2,438 considerations were mentioned in the Pacific Region BIA Notices 
of Decision from 2001 through 2011.  See infra Table 19. 
 268.  “[R]ubber-stamp: . . . to approve, endorse, or dispose of (as a document or policy) as a 
matter of routine use without the exercise of judgment or at the implied command of another person 
or body.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 1,983 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 2002). 
 269.  See infra Table 1. 
 270.  See supra notes 226–40 and accompanying text (noting discussion of meaningless 
benchmarking in the tax impact analysis, mere recitation of the legal results of transfer in the 
jurisdictional conflict analysis, and land use conflict analysis premised on inapplicable zoning 
regulations); see also infra note 302 (providing an example of conspicuous filler analysis of the 
proposed use factor). 
 271.  For example, 90.91% of the individual decisions that analyzed the need of the applicant 
under factor four found that the need to protect the land for future generations—a sweeping policy 
consideration—outweighed the fact that the applicant needed no assistance.  See supra note 220 and 
accompanying text.  Additionally, generic policy considerations, such as need for self-determination 
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Nevertheless, the BIA is not solely responsible; in a 2006 study, the 
GAO found that “most of the criteria in the regulations are not specific and 
thus do not offer clear guidance for how the BIA should apply them. . . .  As 
a result, the BIA decision maker has wide discretion.”272  Thus, the problem 
is not one of inappropriate application of clear guidelines, but rather of a 
toothless system with “standards [that] can be met by virtually any trust land 
request.”273  Accordingly, the level of negative impact an affected 
community must show in order to successfully challenge a trust acquisition 
request is extremely high. 
The Pacific Region BIA fee-to-trust decisions also demonstrate how 
unbalanced the system is.  For example, of all 2,438 considerations 
mentioned, only 292, or 11.98%, reflected consideration of state and local 
interests.274  The lack of symmetry in the analysis “has resulted in a trust 
 
or sovereignty, were included in 72.07% of the factor two, need for the land, analysis.  See supra 
notes 201–211 and accompanying text. 
  This issue even persists up to the judicial appeals level in federal courts: “To the extent 
plaintiffs argue that the proposed acquisition is inconsistent with § 465, this argument fails because, 
as discussed in more detail below, the regional director expressly found that the acquisition will 
foster self-determination.”  City of Yreka v. Salazar, No. CIV. 2:10-1734 WBS EFB, 2011 WL 
2433660, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2011).  Furthermore, the degree to which a trust acquisition must 
further federal Indian policy goals is minimal: “The acquisition need not be essential or sine qua non 
to self-determination or economic advancement, but the [BIA] must conclude that the acquisition is 
more than merely helpful or appropriate.”  Id. at *7. 
 272.  GAO REPORT, supra note 266, at Highlights. 
 273.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 7. 
 274.  See infra Table 19.  Furthermore, some considerations mentioned in support of accepting 
land into trust were contradictory to basic principles established by the Board when viewed from the 
affected community’s position.  For example, the Board has been clear that the BIA need not 
consider speculative consequences, uses, or tax impacts.  See supra Part IV (explaining Board 
guidance on application of the regulatory factors).  However, the Pacific Region BIA found a tribe’s 
need for land-banking—essentially building up the land base simply to have more land for potential 
future use—relevant, and allowed indefinite statements of proposed use, such as merely mentioning 
potential future development.  See infra Tables 5, 7. 
  Additionally, various considerations were mentioned in support of acceptance, as seen from 
the tribe’s perspective, while the same considerations from the community perspective were found to 
weigh in favor of denial.  For instance, just as a tribe may desire trust status for a parcel in order to 
protect from unwanted development or provide a semi-rural lifestyle, a community may oppose trust 
status for a parcel because they will lose the ability to zone and otherwise regulate the property to 
protect it from unwanted development.  See Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Barona 
Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians 8–9 (Sept. 12, 2002) (trust land decision on 
385.15 acres) (“The Barona Band presents two reasons for its need for additional land: 1) the Band is 
growing; 2) Wildcat Canyon Road has become very busy due to an off-reservation housing 
development . . . .  It is the Band’s desire to ensure that all current and future members have 
accessibility to home sites, to allow those individuals who desire, to live among their people in a 
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land process that fails to meaningfully include legitimate [state and local] 
interest[s], to provide adequate transparency to the public, or to demonstrate 
fundamental balance in trust land decisions.”275  Again, this unbalanced 
analysis is not the product of inappropriate use of discretion by the BIA, but 
rather of federal policy: the “BIA has the specific mission to serve Indians 
and tribes and is granted broad discretion to decide in favor of tribes.”276 
In fact, Section 151 on its face provides a strong indication of this built-
in process bias.  Section 151 requires heightened scrutiny for off-reservation 
acquisitions, which appears to indicate consideration of local interests.277  
However, land located outside of the reservation, but contiguous to its 
exterior boundaries, is classified as on-reservation.278  As a result, 
acquisitions of contiguous land are not subject to heightened scrutiny even 
though the land is physically outside of the current reservation and actually 
off-reservation under the common understanding of the plain language.279  
This distinction is important because it significantly alters the percentage of 
applications that are subjected to the heightened off-reservation scrutiny; 
64% of the Pacific Region BIA decisions were for parcels located outside of, 
but contiguous to, the exterior boundaries of the requesting tribe’s 
reservation, but due to their on-reservation classification were only subjected 
to the lower on-reservation scrutiny.280  Thus, Section 151 facilitates transfer 
into trust of lands that are physically outside of reservation boundaries and 
thereby dramatically shifts the balance in favor of Indian interests to the 
 
semi-rural setting.”); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians 
3 (Sept. 10, 2002) (trust land decision on 950.00 acres) (“It is the Band’s desire to ensure that all 
current and future members have accessibility to home sites, to allow those individuals who desire, 
to live among their people in a semi-rural setting.”). 
 275.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 5. 
 276.  Id. at 8; see also Who We Are, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/index.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012) (“The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) mission is to ‘enhance the quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to 
carry out the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of American Indians, Indian tribes 
and Alaska Natives.’”) (emphasis added). 
  The BIA’s unbalanced analysis also finds support in long-standing principles of 
interpretation applied to federal Indian law—the canons of construction, which require government 
“[u]ndertakings with the Indians [to] be liberally construed to the benefit of the Indians.”  Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972), supplemented by 360 
F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev’d, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  “These canons were first 
developed in the context of treaty interpretation, but the courts have consistently extended them to 
non-treaty sources of positive-law, such as agreements, statutes, executive orders, and federal 
regulations.”  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 2.02[1]. 
 277.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2005). 
 278.  See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 279.  25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (indicating heightened scrutiny only “when the land is located outside of 
and noncontiguous to the tribe’s reservation”); see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text 
(discussing which acquisitions are considered off-reservation acquisitions). 
 280.  See infra Table 1.1. 
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detriment of state and local interests. 
VI.  IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The prevalent rubber-stamping, lack of meaningful standards, and 
unbalanced analysis have caused “significant controversy, serious conflicts 
between tribes and states, counties and local governments, including 
litigation costly to all parties, and broad distrust of the fairness of the 
system.”281  Specifically, the loss for perpetuity of the authority to plan, 
zone, and regulate is a significant loss of control for a community.  Because 
zoning is “one of the primary ways in which the community can maintain its 
integrity,” this erosion of land planning authority essentially nullifies shared 
community goals, such as carefully crafted community plans.282  In 
particular, gaming acquisitions are generally the subject of fierce community 
opposition and debate due to their effect on the surrounding region.283 
Furthermore, loss of tax base is a chief concern for many 
communities.284  It may be reasonable to accept a tax loss as relatively 
 
 281.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 5. 
 282.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 24. 
 283.  See, e.g., Courtenay Edelhart, Porterville Gaming Gives Kern Glimpse of What May Come 
Here, THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN, Feb. 4, 2012, http://www.bakersfield.com/news/business/x1 
135852814/Porterville-gaming-gives-Kern-glimpse-of-what-may-come-here (including interviews 
with community members who support local Indian casinos); Edward Sifuentes, Indian Reservation 
Expansion Drawing Objections From Neighbors, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, 
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/region-indian-reservation-expansions-drawing-
objections-from-neighbors/article_aac7b9da-d871-51ae-969c-b87613feb080.html (“The county 
Board of Supervisors has a long-standing policy of opposing tribal land transfers out of concern the 
land could be used for building casinos.”). 
  While a successful IRA trust acquisition does not automatically authorize gaming on the 
land, trust status is required for all Indian gaming on lands acquired after 1988, and thus the IRA fee-
to-trust process is frequently the first step toward establishment of a new Indian gaming operation.  
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2006); see supra notes 11–14 and 
accompanying text (discussing the increase in Indian gaming operations and its effects). 
 284.  The comments received and summarized in the Pacific Region BIA Notices of Decision 
from 2001 through 2011 reflect an overwhelming opposition to the loss of tax revenue from trust 
land acquisitions.  E.g., Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission 
Indians 3 (Nov. 30, 2011) (trust land decision on 78.50 acres) (summarizing comments received that 
note how tax loss will adversely affect many county entities and services, including the county 
library and several schools); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Table Mountain Rancheria 
3 (Aug. 25, 2010) (trust land decision on 175.00 acres) (“[T]he county states that the trust 
acquisition will impact its ability to maintain adjacent roadways and develop Millerton Road . . . as 
designated in the Fresno County General Plan.”). 
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insignificant based on an annual estimate and current use considerations, as 
did the Pacific Region BIA in accordance with Board guidelines.285  
However, the loss of tax revenue is much more difficult to minimize when 
one factors in removal for perpetuity and future development on the land, 
which could potentially yield much higher tax revenues.286  Additionally, 
even though the Pacific Region BIA heavily emphasized offsetting the tax 
loss through contributions to the community and economic stimulation,287 
there is still a notable loss of power.  Rather than the assurance of tax 
revenue lawfully owed, the county is forced to accept the less attractive 
alternative of relying on these voluntary contributions.  It is with these 
significant land use and revenue consequences in mind that twenty-one 
states sided with Rhode Island by signing onto an amicus curiae brief in 
defense of state and local interest in the Carcieri case, observing that, 
[T]he exercise of [fee-to-trust decision-making] power has 
substantial, and permanent, consequences for the impacted state and 
local communities.  Indeed, that power gives the [BIA] the capacity 
to change the entire character of a state, particularly when the [BIA] 
uses it in coordination with modern Tribes, some of which have 
developed substantial wealth, through Indian gaming or otherwise, 
and are located in populated areas and existing communities.288 
Even though an appeals process is in place to protect both the Indians 
and communities from erroneous decisions,289 the initial BIA decision is of 
paramount importance because the vast majority of BIA decisions prevail 
 
 285.  See infra Tables 10, 11. 
 286.  For example, a Santa Barbara County tax loss analysis of a 1,400.00 acre parcel the Santa 
Ynez Band of Chumash Indians would like transferred to trust status projected a loss of $19 million 
over ten years and $150 million over fifty years if the land was used for housing as the tribe states as 
its proposed use.  Doreen Farr, Chumash Fee-to-Trust Impacts Too Costly, SANTA BARBARA NEWS 
PRESS, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.newspress.com/Top/Article/article.jsp?Section=OPINIONS-
LETTERS&ID=566267434210820139&Archive=true.  The study also indicated a potential loss of 
$55 million over ten years or $450 million over fifty years if the property was developed according 
to a 2004 development proposal, which included a 300-room hotel, golf course, equestrian center 
and 275 homes.  See also Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 23–24 (“The property 
tax is, however, the major source of local funding for schools and local governments generally, so 
repeated acquisitions of land in trust can seriously undermine local governments.  This situation is 
aggravated by the refusal of the BIA to consider the cumulative effect on the tax rolls of taking new 
land into trust.  Thus, even if half the land in a county is already in trust, a new 100-acre acquisition 
is analyzed as if it were the first acquisition in trust in the county.”). 
 287.  See infra Table 11 (showing that 41.82% of decisions mention off-set of the tax loss by 
tribal contributions to the community). 
 288.  Brief of the States of Ala., Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 2, 
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2008) (No. 07-526), 2008 WL 2445505 at *2. 
 289.  See supra notes 106–17 and accompanying text (explanation of the appeals process and 
standard of review). 
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due to an extremely low appeal rate.290 
Because the current fee-to-trust process largely ignores or downplays 
these critical community concerns, state and local governments may need to 
turn to the political process in order to influence public policy and motivate 
legislative action.  In fact, the time is ripe for a legislative overhaul of the 
fee-to-trust process due to the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in 
Carcieri v. Salazar.291  There the Court held that only tribes under federal 
jurisdiction at the time of the IRA’s enactment in 1934 are eligible for its 
fee-to-trust process. 292  This decision shocked Indian Country, and tribes 
immediately began calling for legislative action—a “Carcieri fix.”293  State 
 
 290.  Only 4 of the 111 total fee-to-trust decisions issued by the Pacific Region BIA from 2001 
through 2011 were appealed to the Board.  Blue Lake Mobile Home Park Tenants Ass’n v. Pac. 
Reg’l Dir., 52 IBIA 19, 19–20 (2010) (dismissing appeal because the land had already been 
transferred into trust and the Board has “no authority to . . . divest the United States of title to the 
land held in trust for the Tribe and return fee simple to the Tribe”); City of Yreka v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 
51 IBIA 287, 287–88 (2010) (affirming BIA decision because appellant failed to show BIA decision 
was based on material errors of fact or improper exercise of discretion); Bunney v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 
49 IBIA 26, 26–27 (2009) (affirming BIA decision because appellant failed to show that the 
“Regional Director failed to properly exercise his discretion, that the decision is in error, or that 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence”); Friends of E. Willits Valley v. Acting Pac. Reg’l 
Dir., 37 IBIA 213, 216–217 (2002) (dismissing for failure to show standing because appellant failed 
to “describe any concrete injury which affects it ‘in a personal and individual way’”) (citations 
omitted). 
  Only one Pacific Region BIA fee-to-trust decision from 2001 through 2011 has been 
substantively challenged in the federal courts.  City of Yreka v. Salazar, No. CIV. 2:10-1734 WBS 
EFB, 2011 WL 2433660 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2011).  There, the court agreed with the Board’s 
determination that the Pacific Region BIA had properly considered each factor and exercised its 
discretion reasonably.  Id. at *10.  A second Pacific Region fee-to-trust case was brought in the 
federal courts but the plaintiffs were challenging a standing determination issued by the Board rather 
than the substance of the BIA’s fee-to-trust decision.  Pres. of Los Olivos v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079–80 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 291.  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  The Carcieri case involved a Rhode Island tribe 
that successfully transferred a parcel of land into trust status through the IRA fee-to-trust process and 
then proceeded to disregard local building codes.  Id. at 385.  In response, the State of Rhode Island 
challenged the BIA’s fee-to-trust decision, arguing that the tribe was not eligible for the IRA’s fee-
to-trust process because it was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was enacted.  Id. 
at 382.  The Court found that due to the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction,” the IRA only 
applies to tribes that were “under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s enactment” in 1934.  
Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  This holding was shocking given that for over seventy years, the BIA had been accepting 
land into trust on behalf of tribes that were recognized after 1934.  Hettler, supra note 49, at 1380.  
Furthermore, 
This decision will create a cloud upon the trust title of every tribe first recognized by 
Congress or the executive branch after 1934, every tribe terminated in the termination era 
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and local governments also began calling for comprehensive reform of “a 
broken system, where the non-tribal entities most affected by the fee to trust 
process are without a meaningful role.”294  Thus, the Carcieri decision 
presents a historic opportunity for broader reform of a system that has left 
both tribal and non-tribal entities deeply dissatisfied.295 
A.  Re-define Need 
The IRA and its fee-to-trust process were enacted in 1934 in reaction to 
the Allotment Era policies, which had essentially destroyed the Indian land 
base and left tribes economically and culturally devastated.296  However, the 
landscape is vastly different today.297  Due to a combination of the federal 
Indian policy shift to a firm commitment to self-determination and 
protection of Indian culture and the tremendous success of many Indian 
gaming operations and other economic development projects, many tribes 
utilizing the fee-to-trust process no longer fit the post-Allotment reality of 
nearly universal need.298  Thus, current efforts to reform the fee-to-trust 
 
that has since been restored, and every tribe that adopted the IRA or OIWA and changed 
its name or organizational structure since 1934.  It will also result in incessant litigation 
to determine which of the over 500 tribes fall within its terms and prohibit future trust 
acquisitions for such tribes as are finally found to be within its net.  Thus, it is clear that a 
congressional “fix” for this decision is both necessary and appropriate. 
Rice, supra note 7, at 594. 
 294.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 59. 
 295.  Id. (explaining the system is “broken” because non-tribal entities do not have a meaningful 
role in the process); Rice, supra note 7, at 592 (asserting that the system is “dysfunctional” because 
the BIA has been adverse to accepting land into trust after litigation involving breach of the 
government’s trust obligations).  Tribes have also complained that the process is slow, which causes 
significant delays in development plans, and that some BIA offices do not prioritize proposed trust 
acquisition applications.  Jack McNeel, Indian Law Practitioners Stress Importance of Land into 
Trust, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 23, 2004, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2004/02/23/indian-law-practitioners-stress-
importance-of-land-into-trust-90003.  Several commentators have labeled the BIA’s inefficient 
handling of trust land requests “neglect.”  Rice, supra note 7, at 589. 
 296.  See supra notes 45–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Allotment Era and its effects). 
 297.  Hearing on H.R. 1291, H.R. 1234 and H.R. 1421 Before the H. Natural Res. Comm. 
Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. 54–56 (2011) (statement of Donald 
Craig Mitchell, Att’y at Law Supervisor, Anchorage, Ala.) (arguing for the Carcieri decision should 
be upheld because the IRA was enacted to address the social and economic conditions of 1934, 
which have now changed considerably). 
 298.  See supra notes 71–100 and accompanying text (discussing the Self-Determination Era and 
the fee-to-trust process).  Consequently, “[w]hile the legacy of allotment still lives on today, tribes 
often apply to have the Secretary of the Interior take land into trust for reasons that do not fall under 
that initial purpose.”  Hettler, supra note 49, at 1401.  For example, tribes most frequently request 
land to be taken into trust for economic development purposes, but there is some debate regarding 
the existence of actual economic benefits.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 22–23; 
see infra text accompanying notes 321–23 (discussing reasons why the fee-to-trust program does not 
fulfill the original policy goals). 
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process should more clearly define the scope and limits of need under the 
IRA.  Susan Adams’s testimony before the House of Representatives 
summarizes the issue well: 
The BIA regulations provide inadequate guidance as to what 
constitutes legitimate tribal need for trust land acquisitions.  There 
are no standards other than that the land is necessary to facilitate 
tribal self-determination, economic development or Indian housing.  
These standards can be met by virtually any trust land request, 
regardless of how successful the tribe is or how much land it 
already owns.  As a result, there are numerous examples of BIA 
taking additional land into trust for economically and 
governmentally self-sufficient tribes already having wealth and 
large land bases.299 
 
Accordingly, a more nuanced, critical approach to the need analysis 
should be designed to weed out applications from tribes with adequate tribal 
resources.  It is important to remember that there are still many tribes with a 
legitimate need to rebuild their land bases, expand their economic 
development projects, and achieve greater levels of self-governance.300  
 
 299.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Notice of 
Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Nov. 30, 2011) (trust land 
decision on 78.50 acres) (accepting approximately 80 acres into trust for a tribe that already owned 
12,305 acres of trust land and operated a profitable casino); Notice of Decision from Pac. Region 
BIA to Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians (Jan. 24, 2011) (trust land decision on 49.47 acres) 
(accepting approximately 50 acres into trust for a tribe that already owned 12,305 acres of trust land 
and operated a profitable casino). 
 300.  For example, 29 of the 111 total Pacific Region BIA Notices of Decision were for tribes 
with less than 100 acres of current trust land, and 9 tribes had less than 20 acres.  See infra Table 1.  
Many of these tribes lost their land during the Termination Era and thus requested land to be taken 
into trust as part of an ongoing effort to rebuild their former land bases.  See, e.g., Notice of Decision 
from Pac. Region BIA to Redding Rancheria (Nov. 11, 2009) (trust land decision on 3.65 acres) 
(tribe lost land in the Termination Era, currently has only 3.33 acres in trust); see also infra Table 5.  
Similar to the description of need in many Pacific Region BIA Notices of Decision, the Board 
described the Redding Rancheria’s need: 
 Despite the fact that the termination policy has been expressly repudiated by both 
Congress and the Executive branch, those tribes that have been restored are still seeking 
adequate federal assistance in reestablishing and strengthening their own governments, 
and in acquiring lands to replace those lost through termination.  The lack of an adequate 
land base is the primary limiting factor in the efforts of restored tribes to reconstitute their 
tribal governments, provide housing for tribal members, and develop local economies. 
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However, “‘Need’ is not without limits.”301  Thus, the objective of reform 
should be to highlight and more specifically define legitimate needs, while 
placing clear upper limits on what constitutes need. 
B.  Increase Scrutiny of the Proposed Use 
Similar to the need for a more specific definition of need, the proposed 
use should be subjected to higher scrutiny.  As the fee-to-trust process is 
currently implemented, too many applications with vague, nonspecific 
statements about the proposed use of the land are accepted.302  As the legal 
counsel for the Office of the Governor for California has pointed out a 
number of times, when there is insufficient information about the future use 
of the land, the BIA cannot properly evaluate the proposed acquisition.303  
Likewise, state and local entities cannot properly assess and provide 
 
 Termination continues to reveal its devastating effect on the Redding Rancheria as is 
demonstrated by their inadequate trust land base.  Although the Tribe and the land within 
the Rancheria boundaries were restored by court order, the tribe only has 3.33 acres of 
land in federal trust. 
. . . . 
 It is our determination that the Redding Rancheria has an established need for 
additional trust land based on the above stated reasons. 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Redding Rancheria 3 (Nov. 27, 2009) (trust land 
decision on 3.65 acres). 
 301.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62. 
 302.  See infra Table 7.  A particularly vague proposed use analysis stated, in its entirety: 
 This parcel of land is within the Traditional Use Area of the Tribe.  The Tribe seeks to 
consolidate its land base, provide the opportunity to diversify its economic development 
and protect its natural and cultural resources. 
 In systematically acquiring its aboriginal territory, the Tribe seeks to consolidate its 
land base, provide for the opportunity to diversify its economic development and protect 
its natural and cultural resources.  While, there is no specific development proposal for 
the property; it has the potential for exceptional highway commercial development.  
Further, it is exceptionally situated to benefit the Tribe, in that it abuts to an existing 
Tribal trust parcel. 
Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 4 (Sept. 20, 2011) 
(trust land decision on 5.31 acres). 
  Furthermore, beyond excessive vagueness, this analysis is a prime example of filler analysis.  
First, the third sentence essentially echoes the first two.  Additionally, every on-reservation 
acquisition abuts trust land.  See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  Thus, this proposed 
acquisition is no more exceptionally suited than the vast majority.  See infra Table 3 (87% of the 
Pacific Region Notices of Decision from 2001 through 2011 were for on-reservation acquisitions). 
 303.  Letter from Andrea Lynn Hoch, Legal Affairs Sec’y, Office of the Governor of Cal., to 
Robert Eben, Superintendent, Pac. Region Bureau of Indian Affairs 3 (Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 
Letter] (on file with author) (“The application speaks generally of the need to establish a larger land 
base but provides no specific uses for these proposed additional lands.  The Band states no 
immediate need or use for the land. . . .  Since the Notice does not indicate a particular need or use of 
the parcel, there does not appear to be enough information for the Secretary to properly review the 
Band’s application.”). 
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comments to the BIA regarding the proposed acquisition without a full and 
accurate picture of how the land will be used, and thus how it will impact 
their community.  The degree of disclosure required should be similar to that 
required for local planning, zoning, and permitting processes.304  Because 
these processes “are being preempted by the trust land decision, . . . . [more 
specific] information about intended uses is reasonable and fair to 
require.”305 
Some communities have even seen their worst nightmare realized when 
a tribe successfully transfers land into trust, purportedly for a non-gaming 
use, and subsequently commences gaming activity on the land.306  In fact, 
the Office of the Inspector General found that the “Department [of the 
Interior] and the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) lack a 
process for ensuring that all lands used by Indian tribes for gaming meet the 
requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.”307  In response, NIGC 
and Office of Indian Gaming Management officials have suggested that the 
Section 151 factors be amended to require tribes to certify, subject to 
criminal penalties, that any gaming on their land is not the product of an 
unapproved conversion of a non-gaming fee-to-trust acquisition to a gaming 
use.308 
This suggested amendment for unapproved gaming conversions does 
not translate seamlessly to issues a community may have when a tribe’s 
actual use differs from its proposed use.  This is due to the Board’s 
unwavering protection of tribal sovereignty by finding that acceptance of 
land into trust based on a specific proposed use does not restrict actual use in 
any way.309  However, land use restrictions and intergovernmental 
agreements are enforceable once the land is taken into trust and promote 
 
 304.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 61. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 12, at 5, 7, 18; see also supra note 283 (explaining that 
trust status is a necessary prerequisite for Indian gaming on land acquired after 1988). 
 307.  EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 12, at i. 
 308.  Id. at 8 (“[O]ne possible solution would be to amend the requirements in 25 C.F.R. Part 151 
to require all tribes that have taken land into trust since the passage of [the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act] to certify in writing, subject to criminal penalties (Title 18), that (1) no gaming is 
taking place on those lands; or (2) the lands have been converted and that the use of the lands for 
gaming has been approved through an official land determination made by the [Department of the 
Interior].”). 
 309.  City of Lincoln City v. Portland Area Dir., 33 IBIA 102, 105–07 (1999); see also supra Part 
IV.D. 
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self-determination by allowing tribes to decide, plan, and negotiate as a 
sovereign nation.310  Thus, use of these tools to prevent conflict by 
restricting tribal use to that proposed in the fee-to-trust application should be 
strongly encouraged, or even mandated, by the fee-to-trust process.311  In 
this way, legitimate state and local concerns about the loss of land use 
planning authority would be meaningfully addressed, while still honoring 
the tribe’s desired use for the land and sovereignty over it.312 
C.  Provide Meaningful Standards for the BIA 
The recommendations to re-define need and increase scrutiny of the 
proposed use are both symptoms of a process-wide issue that is widely 
recognized as a critical flaw: “The lack of meaningful standards or any 
objective criteria in fee to trust decisions made by the BIA.”313  Modeled 
 
 310.  Friends of E. Willits Valley v. Cnty. of Mendocino, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 714–16 (Ct. App. 
2002).  There the court explained: 
We hold that federal law does not void prior restrictions on land agreed to before the land 
passed into trust. . . .  [Federal law] precludes involuntary local regulation of tribal lands; 
our decision does not alter that rule.  Moreover, sovereignty and self-determination are 
promoted when tribes are free to decide what voluntary agreements they will or will not 
enter into, and when and under what circumstances they will waive their sovereign 
immunity and subject themselves to state court jurisdiction.  Were we to hold that even 
voluntary restrictions on land use are automatically voided by the passage of land into 
trust . . . the ability of tribes to negotiate and plan would be impeded. . . .  The public 
policies underlying federal Native American law countenance statutory interpretations 
that . . . preserv[e] for Native American tribes the freedom to judge for themselves what 
agreements best promote their own welfare. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
  Intergovernmental agreements, also called Memorandums of Agreement or Understanding 
(MOAs and MOUs), have been used successfully “in a wide array of subject areas, including 
enforcement of judgments, education, environmental control, child support, law enforcement, 
taxation, hunting and fishing, and zoning.”  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §6.05. 
 311.  Given that the very nature of an intergovernmental agreement fosters cooperation, 
understanding, and mutual benefit, their use should be strongly encouraged to address friction across 
a range of fee-to-trust issues, including mitigation of environmental impacts and pressure on local 
infrastructure and services.  Lawmakers made tribal–state gaming compacts a central component of 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in order to accommodate the often extremely adverse positions of 
tribes and states on gaming matters.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2006) (“Class III gaming activities shall 
be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are . . . conducted in conformance with a Tribal-
State compact . . . .”), invalidated by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 6.05.  Thus, such a provision may be a just and effective solution for 
fee-to-trust issues as well. 
 312.  While tribes would likely argue that a provision limiting their unrestricted use of trust land 
infringes on their sovereignty rights, use would only be restricted when it varied from the use chosen 
and described by the tribe itself.  Thus, such a provision would encourage full and honest disclosure 
of the actual intended use, as well as fostering a cooperative relationship with affected communities.  
Furthermore, an expedited review process could be designed to allow tribes to alter the land use once 
in trust should they find the stated proposed use is no longer ideal at some point. 
 313.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62. 
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after a crucial component of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act process,314 
the reformed fee-to-trust process should include a factor that requires the 
BIA to “balance the benefit to the tribe against the impact to the local 
community.”315  In this way, legitimate state and local interests will receive 
due consideration, rather than sporadic mention and easy dismissal, as 
demonstrated in the Pacific Region BIA decisions.316  Critics also argue that 
the BIA’s wide discretion needs to be limited by increased guidance on the 
type of situation that should result in denial of a proposed trust 
acquisition.317  In addition to re-definition of need and heightened scrutiny of 
the proposed use, lawmakers need to clarify what jurisdictional and land use 
conflicts and what tax impacts should weigh in favor of denial.318 
Even beyond factor-specific clarity, some are calling for lawmakers to 
revisit the very rationale for the fee-to-trust program: 
[W]e do not say today that there is no genuine rationale for a land 
into trust program, but it can be said that there is a lack of clearly 
articulated and well-justified reason for this massive governmental 
program and that any reform of the program ought to seek to 
articulate its goals in a concrete and ascertainable way.319 
Thus, the fee-to-trust process needs to be updated to reflect the 
landscape of the twenty-first century, which is vastly different than that 
immediately following the Allotment Era policies and subsequent enactment 
of the IRA.320  Review on a foundational level is particularly important in 
 
 314.  25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2006) (“Subsection (a) of this section will not apply when—(A) 
the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, 
including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly 
acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming 
activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination . . . .”). 
 315.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62. 
 316.  See infra Table 19. 
 317.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 24–25 (Discussing inadequate guidance 
for trust land decision makers and quoting a GAO report: “For example, one criterion requires BIA 
to consider the impact of lost tax revenues on state and local governments.  However, the criterion 
does not indicate a threshold for what might constitute an unacceptable level of lost tax revenue and, 
therefore, a denial of an application.”). 
 318.  GAO REPORT, supra note 266, at 18 (demonstrating the standards’ vagueness with a graph 
juxtaposing the Section 151 text with the GAO’s analysis of what each factor means). 
 319.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 23. 
 320.  See supra Parts II.F, III.A.,VII.A. 
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light of a recent study that called the rationale of the fee-to-trust program 
into serious doubt with findings that indicate that “in many instances, the 
acquisition of land in trust for tribes actually inhibits economic 
development,” which is the primary justification for the fee-to-trust 
program.321  Experts agree that the unique nature of trust land is to blame.322  
For example, restrictions on alienation of trust land limit its value as 
collateral for loans necessary to develop it.323  Thus, the underlying rationale 
and goals should be revisited as the starting point for any reform. 
D.  Create a Meaningful Role for State and Local Entities 
While Section 151 does include a mechanism for incorporating state and 
local interests in the fee-to-trust process,324 it is severely inadequate.  The 
notice provided to state and local governments is limited and often 
insufficient for such entities to comprehensively analyze and comment on 
the proposed acquisition.325  For example, the notice does not include the 
actual fee-to-trust application and often does not state the tribe’s proposed 
use.326  Additionally, state and local governments are only invited to 
comment narrowly, on tax revenue and jurisdictional conflict impacts only, 
in a limited thirty-day period.327  In order to meaningfully participate in the 
process and protect legitimate interests, state and local governments need 
full disclosure of the proposed trust acquisition and more time to respond. 
Furthermore, “governments and individuals with significant interests 
[are often] unaware of the acquisition request until it is too late” because the 
process only includes notice to state and local governments with regulatory 
jurisdiction.328  This excludes nearby state and local governments as well as 
affected individuals, who may have significant concerns.  Moreover, while 
 
 321.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 22–23 (citing TERRY L. ANDERSON, 
SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATION?: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS (1995) 
(reporting a study that found trust status actually impedes the economic productivity of the 
property)). 
 322.  Examining Executive Authority, supra note 12, at 23. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d) (2005); see also supra text accompanying note 102 
(discussing the IRA notice and comment provision). 
 325.  GAO REPORT, supra note 266, at 20. 
 326.  See Notice of Decision from Pac. Region BIA to Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians 
(Aug. 27, 2010) (notice of (non-gaming) land acquisition application). 
 327.  25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d); see also supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the 
IRA notice and comment provision). 
 328.  To Amend the Act of June 18, 1934, To Reaffirm the Auth. of the Sec’y of the Interior To 
Take Land into Trust for Indian Tribes: Hearing on H.R. 3697 and H.R. 3742 Before the H. Comm. 
on Natural Res., 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Att’y Gen. of Conn.) 
[hereinafter Statement of Richard Blumenthal]. 
WAPLES WHITE TEXT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2013  5:18 PM 
[Vol. 40: 251, 2012] Extreme Rubber-Stamping 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
305 
 
the BIA often does accept comments from affected individuals, it is not 
statutorily mandated to even consider them.329  Thus, “towns and their 
residents appear[] to have little chance of even being heard, let alone 
challenging [a] tribe’s land trust requests.”330  Accordingly, the extremely 
narrow notice requirement should be expanded to include: full disclosure of 
the tribe’s intentions for the proposed acquisition; a longer comment period; 
notice to all state and local governments, not just those with regulatory 
jurisdiction; the opportunity for comments on the full range of impacts, not 
just tax and jurisdictional conflict; and the opportunity for public comment. 
Beyond simply broadening the notice requirements, “a new paradigm is 
needed where counties are considered meaningful and constructive 
stakeholders in Indian land related determinations.”331  To this end, the fee-
to-trust process should strongly encourage intergovernmental agreements 
between tribes and affected communities that address the full range of 
impacts.  Providing an expedited process or a lower threshold for 
demonstrated need when such agreements have been reached would 
“encourage[] cooperation and communication . . . and reduce costs and 
frustration to all involved.”332  Encouragement of intergovernmental 
agreements would ensure all affected parties, both tribal and non-tribal, have 
meaningful roles in the process and adequate opportunity to protect their 
interests. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Similar to the snapshot of reality the Indian Country Today maps 
immediately convey,333 the acceptance rate for IRA fee-to-trust acquisitions 
in California from 2001 through 2011 instantly communicates an equally 
powerful message:334 with a 100% acceptance rate, the process is merely an 
exercise in extreme rubber-stamping.  Given that treaties were the primary 
method of swindling Indians out of billions of acres of homeland,335 perhaps 
Indians—now on the receiving end of an extremely unbalanced, but entirely 
 
 329.  25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d). 
 330.  See Statement of Richard Blumenthal, supra note 328, at 50. 
 331.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62. 
 332.  Statement of Susan Adams, supra note 103, at 62. 
 333.  See supra text accompanying note 5 (describing the maps). 
 334.  See infra Table 20. 
 335.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §§ 1.01, 1.03[1]. 
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legal, process—are finally achieving some degree of justice, however ironic.  
Although such results may be well-deserved, the means—a biased, toothless 
process—do not justify the ends.  The consequences for affected 
communities are too significant to be cavalierly swept aside: the loss, for 
perpetuity, of planning, zoning, and other regulatory control, as well as 
substantial portions of tax revenue.336  Thus, there is great need for 
comprehensive reform of the fee-to-trust process.  At its core, such reform 
must create a meaningful role in the process for affected communities, 
establish clear and specific standards, and emphasize collaborative solutions.  
In this way, the miniscule red dots representing Indian Country can grow in 
proportion to the appropriate needs of the tribes, while a graph of the 
acceptance rate will depict an equally appropriate degree of balance and 
efficacy in the IRA fee-to-trust process. 
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 336.  25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006); 25 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (2006). 
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!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-,>#
%?@5A#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions#
#
# !ABCDC4E#!?FA# G4HEFI# <BJAD#
%JC@A#4J#
;EKCLCKH?5#
"EM#4J#"NNM
:ADAJL?FC4E "HFB4OA#
*# 11.30.2011 P?E#!CAQ4# >R6.,#
Tribe#M#0?5?#
S?EK#4N#'HCDAE4#
1CDDC4E#;EKC?ED#
4N#FTA#0?5?#
:ADAJL?FC4E 
ON -#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%#
(# 10.13.2011 PT?DF?# *6.,#
Individual#M#
1AO@AJ#4N#
:AKKCEQ#
:?EBTAJC? 
ON -#UCFTCE <GG&0%#
-# 10.4.2011 :CLAJDCKA# 7,6,,#
Tribe - 14J4EQ4#
S?EK#4N#1CDDC4E#
;EKC?ED 
ON -#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%#
7# 9.20.2011 :CLAJDCKA# .6-*#
Tribe - <QH?#
G?5CAEFA#S?EK#4N#
G?THC55?#;EKC?ED#
4N#<QH?#G?5CAEFA#
;EKC?E#
:ADAJL?FC4E 
ON -#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%#
.# 9.14.2011 :CLAJDCKA# *6-7#
Individual -
1AO@AJ#4N#
14J4EQ4#S?EK#
4N#1CDDC4E#
;EKC?ED 
ON -#UCFTCE <GG&0%#
V# 6.17.2011 P?E#!CAQ4# +,6,,#
Tribe - 3CAW?D#
XS?J4E#'4EQY#
ZJ4H[#4N#FTA#
G?[CF?E#ZJ?EKA#
S?EK#4N#1CDDC4E#
;EKC?ED#4N#FTA#
3CAW?D#
:ADAJL?FC4E 
ON -#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%#
># 6.9.2011 !A5#$4JFA# (6,,# Tribe - &5\#3?55AI#:?EBTAJC? 
ON -#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%# # # #
R# 5.31.2011 P?E#!CAQ4# *V6V+#
Tribe - 
&UCC??[??I[#
S?EK#4N#
]HOAI??I#
;EKC?ED 
ON#M#
B4EFCQH4HD <GG&0%# # # #
+# 4.18.2011 :CLAJDCKA# *67R#
Individual - 
1AO@AJ#4N#
14J4EQ4#S?EK#
4N#1CDDC4E#
;EKC?ED#
ON - UCFTCE <GG&0%# # # #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-,2#
%3456#*7##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !689:9;<#!3=6# >;?<=@# A8B6:#
%B946#;B#
C<D9E9D?35#
"<F#;B#"GGF
H6:6BE3=9;<# "?=8;I6#
*,# 3.28.2011 H9E6B:9D6# J7(,#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G#
1;B;<K;#L3<D#
;G#>3M?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON - N9=M9< A>>&0%#
**# 3.24.2011 H9E6B:9D6# *7,,#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G#
1;B;<K;#L3<D#
;G#>3M?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON -#N9=M9<# A>>&0%#
*(# 3.22.2011 H9E6B:9D6# .7,+#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G#
1;B;<K;#L3<D#
;G#>3M?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON - N9=M9< A>>&0%#
*-# 2.17.2011 OM3:=3# ,7P,#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G#
H6DD9<K#
H3<8M6B93 
ON - N9=M9< A>>&0%#
*J# 1.24.2011 O3<#!96K;# J+7JP#
Tribe - 0353#
L3<D#;G#'?9:6Q;#
19::9;<#C<D93<:#
;G#=M6#0353#
H6:6BE3=9;< 
ON - 
8;<=9K?;?: A>>&0%#
*.# 1.6.2011  %?53B6# J,7,,# Tribe - %?56#H9E6B#%B946 
OFF §#(,#
I956:#3N3@ A>>&0%#
*R# 12.14.2010 O3<#!96K;# J27RJ#
Tribe - O@8?3<#
L3<D#;G#
S?I6@33@#
$3=9;< 
ON - 
8;<=9K?;?: A>>&0%#
*P# 12.1.2010 H9E6B:9D6# J-*7(R#
Tribe - 1;B;<K;#
L3<D#;G#>3M?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON -#
8;<=9K?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
*2# 9.29.2010 O9:T9@;?# ,7.R# Tribe#F#S3B?T#%B946 
OFF - ,7*(#
I956:#3N3@ A>>&0%# # # #
*+# 9.21.2010 U?I4;5D=# *(7,.# Tribe - L5?6#'3T6#H3<8M6B93 
ON - 
8;<=9K?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
(,# 9.15.2010 O9:T9@;?# (,7P,# Tribe#F#S3B?T#%B946 
OFF - 7,2#
I956:#3N3@ A>>&0%# # # #
(*# 8.25.2010 VB6:<;# *P.7,,#
Tribe - %3456#
1;?<=39<#
H3<8M6B93 
ON - 
8;<=9K?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-,+#
%>?5@#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !@ABCB4D#!>E@# F4GDEH# <AI@C#
%IB?@#4I#
;DJBKBJG>5#
"DL#4I#"MML
:@C@IK>EB4D# "GEA4N@#
((# 5.28.2010 :BK@ICBJ@# (,6,,#
Tribe - <OG>#
F>5B@DE@#P>DJ#4M#
F>QGB55>#;DJB>DC#
4M#<OG>#F>5B@DE@#
;DJB>D#
:@C@IK>EB4D 
ON -#RBEQBD <FF&0%#
(-# 3.22.2010 SGN?45JE# **-6,,#
Tribe - P@>I#
:BK@I#P>DJ#4M#
EQ@#:4QD@IKB55@#
:>DAQ@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBOG4GC <FF&0%#
(7# 3.9.2010 :BK@ICBJ@# -,6,,#
Tribe - <OG>#
F>5B@DE@#P>DJ#4M#
F>QGB55>#;DJB>DC#
4M#<OG>#F>5B@DE@#
;DJB>D#
:@C@IK>EB4D 
ON -#RBEQBD <FF&0%#
(.# 1.4.2010 T>D#!B@O4# +6,U#
Tribe - T>D#
0>CVG>5#P>DJ#4M#
!B@OG@D4#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
OFF -#
JBCE>DA@#D4E#
5BCE@J 
<FF&0%#
(W# 1.4.2010 %G5>I@# 7,6,,# Tribe - %G5@#:BK@I#%IB?@ 
OFF §#(,#
NB5@C#>R>H <FF&0%#
(X# 11.27.2009 TQ>CE># -6W.# Tribe - :@JJBDO#:>DAQ@IB> ON - RBEQBD <FF&0%#
(U# 10.2.2009 SGN?45JE# .6,*#
Tribe#L#PBO#
'>O44D#
:>DAQ@IB> 
OFF #§#,6(.#
NB5@C#>R>H <FF&0%# # # #
(+# 3.4.2009 1>J@I># **6W*#
Tribe - 0BA>HGD@#
:>DAQ@IB>#4M#
FQGYAQ>DCB#
;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBOG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
-,# 3.3.2009 !@5#$4IE@# X6*+# Tribe#L#TNBEQ#:BK@I#:>DAQ@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBOG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
-*# 9.22.2008 TQ>CE># ,6.,# Tribe#L#:@JJBDO#:>DAQ@IB> ON - RBEQBD <FF&0%# # # #
-(# 9.19.2008 TBCYBH4G# ,6*+# Tribe#L#Z>IGY#%IB?@ 
ON - 
A4DEBOG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
--# 9.19.2008 [I@CD4# X*6*+#
Tribe -#PBO#
T>DJH#:>DAQ@IB>#
4M#14D4#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBOG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-*,#
%2345#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !57898:;#!2<5# =:>;<?# @7A59#
%A835#:A#
B;C8D8C>24#
";E#:A#"FFE
G595AD2<8:;# "><7:H5#
-I# 8.19.2008 G8D5A98C5# *6J(#
Tribe - @K>2#
=2485;<5#L2;C#:F#
=2M>8442#B;C82;9#
:F#@K>2#=2485;<5#
B;C82;#
G595AD2<8:; 
ON -#N8<M8; @==&0%#
-.# 6.27.2008 G8D5A98C5# IJJ6O.#
Tribe - P:3:32#
L2;C#:F#'>895Q:#
B;C82;9 
ON -#
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%#
-O# 6.4.2008 G8D5A98C5# ,6-+#
Individual - 
15H35A#:F#
1:A:;K:#L2;C#
:F#=2M>8442#
18998:;#B;C82;9 
ON -#
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%#
-J# 5.14.2008 P89R8?:># ,6+,# Tribe#E#S2A>R#%A835 
OFF - *6I#
H8459#2N2? @==&0%#
-T# 5.6.2008 P2;#!85K:# T6,,#
Tribe - P?7>2;#
L2;C#:F#
S>H5?22?#
$2<8:; 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%#
-+# 3.13.2008 P89R8?:># (6OI# Tribe#E#S2A>R#%A835 
OFF  §#*.#
H8459#2N2? @==&0%#
I,# 3.5.2008 UA59;:# *-6-+#
Tribe#E%2345#
1:>;<28;#
G2;7M5A82 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
I*# 2.26.2008 S8;K9# **O,6,,#
Tribe#E#P2;<2#
G:92#G2;7M5A82#
%27M8#%A835 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
I(# 2.8.2008 P89R8?:># *O6(-# Tribe - S2A>R#%A835 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
I-# 1.8.2008 G8D5A98C5# -J6,T#
Tribe#E#
@>K>9<8;5#L2;C#
:F#=2M>8442#
18998:;#B;C82;9 
ON - N8<M8; @==&0%# # # #
II# 12.14.2007 P2;#!85K:# -6-*#
Tribe - P2;#
029V>24#L2;C#:F#
!85K>5;:#
18998:;#B;C82;9 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
I.# 10.15.2007 UA59;:# J(6T*#
Tribe - %2345#
1:>;<28;#
G2;7M5A82 
ON - 
7:;<8K>:>9 @==&0%#
#
#
#
# #
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-**#
%>?5@#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !@ABCB4D#!>E@# F4GDEH# <AI@C#
%IB?@#4I#
;DJBKBJG>5#
"DL#4I#"MML
:@C@IK>EB4D# "GEA4N@#
7O# 7.25.2007 14J4A# P677#
Tribe#L#
F@J>IKB55@#
:>DAQ@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
7S# 5.10.2007 T>D#!B@R4# *,6(S#
Tribe - '>#U455>#
V>DJ#4M#'GBC@D4#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
7P# 1.12.2007 %G45GND@# (+S6*P#
Tribe - 
%G45GND@#V>DJ#
4M#1@L=GW#
;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
7+# 12.1.2006 TBCWBH4G# *-67O# Tribe - X>IGW#%IB?@ 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
.,# 9.22.2006 YI@CD4# O,6,,#
Tribe - %>?5@#
14GDE>BD#
:>DAQ@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
.*# 9.15.2006 ZGN?45JE# 7,6*-# Tribe - V5G@#'>W@#:>DAQ@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%#
.(# 9.8.2006 &5#!4I>J4# SS6,-#
Tribe - TQBDR5@#
T[IBDR#V>DJ#4M#
1B\4W#;DJB>DC#
4M#TQBDR5@#
T[IBDRC#
:>DAQ@IB>#
3@I4D>#%I>AE 
OFF#L#5@CC#
EQ>D#*#NB5@#
>\>H 
<FF&0%# # # #
.-# 8.29.2006 T4D4N># *P6,-#
Tribe#L#!IH#
FI@@W#:>DAQ@IB>#
04N4#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
.7# 8.4.2006 ZGN?45JE# O6-O# Tribe#L#V5G@#'>W@#:>DAQ@IB> ON - \BEQBD <FF&0%# # # #
..# 6.26.2006 TBCWBH4G# ,6S,# Tribe - X>IGW#%IB?@ 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
.O# 5.15.2006 YI@CD4# +6P(#
Tribe -#VBR#
T>DJH#:>DAQ@IB>#
4M#14D4#;DJB>DC 
ON - \BEQBD <FF&0%# # # #
.S# 4.9.2006 1@DJ4ABD4# *+6S,#
Tribe -#
TQ@I\44J#3>55@H#
:>DAQ@IB>#4M#
04N4#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
.P# 2006 T>D#!B@R4# (6(O#
Tribe - THAG>D#
V>DJ#4M#
XGN@H>>H#
$>EB4D 
ON - 
A4DEBRG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-*(#
%2345#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !57898:;#!2<5# =:>;<?# @7A59#
%A835#:A#
B;C8D8C>24#
";E#:A#"FFE
G595AD2<8:;# "><7:H5#
.+# 8.17.2005 !54#$:A<5# -6IJ# Tribe - &4K#L2445?#G2;7M5A82 ON - N8<M8; @==&0%#
I,# 8.17.2005 O2;#!85P:# *6QR#
Tribe - S2A:;2#
TA:>U#:F#<M5#
=2U8<2;#TA2;C5#
S2;C#:F#18998:;#
B;C82;9 
ON -#
7:;<8P>:>9 @==&0%#
I*# 7.26.2005 %>:4>H;5# *6,,#
Tribe - =M87K5;#
G2;7M#G2;7M5A82#
:F#15EV>K#
B;C82;9 
ON - N8<M8; @==&0%#
I(# 6.17.2005 W>H3:4C<# Q6*-# Tribe - X2A>K#%A835 
ON - 
7:;<8P>:>9 @==&0%#
I-# 5.3.2005 G8D5A98C5# *,6-,#
Individual - 
15H35A#:F#
1:A:;P:#S2;C#
:F#=2M>8442#
18998:;#B;C82;#
%A835 
ON - N8<M8; @==&0%#
IJ# 3.1.2005 G8D5A98C5# ,6IJ#
Individual - 
15H35A#:F#
1:A:;P:#S2;C#
:F#=2M>8442#
18998:;#B;C82;#
%A835 
ON - 
7:;<8P>:>9 @==&0%#
I.# 2.25.2005 O2;#!85P:# .6J(#
Individual - 
15H35A#:F#<M5#
'2#Y:442#B;C82;#
G595AD2<8:; 
ON - N8<M8; @==&0%# # # #
II# 2.4.2005 15;C:78;:# *,6(+#
Tribe - G:>;C#
L2445?#B;C82;#
%A835 
ON - N8<M8; @==&0%# # # #
IR# 1.26.2005 G8D5A98C5# R*.6,,#
Tribe - 1:A:;P:#
S2;C#:F#=2M>8442#
18998:;#B;C82;9 
ON - 
7:;<8P>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
IQ# 1.14.2005 O2;<2#S2A32A2# I6+,#
Tribe - O2;<2#
Z;5[#S2;C#:F#
18998:;#B;C82;9 
ON - 
7:;<8P>:>9 @==&0%# # # #
#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-*-#
%>?5@#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !@ABCB4D#!>E@# F4GDEH# <AI@C#
%IB?@#4I#
;DJBKBJG>5#
"DL#4I#"MML
:@C@IK>EB4D# "GEA4N@#
O+# 12.13.2004 :BK@ICBJ@# *,6,,#
Tribe - <PG>#
F>5B@DE@#Q>DJ#4M#
F>RGB55>#;DJB>DC#
4M#<PG>#F>5B@DE@#
;DJB>D#
:@C@IK>EB4D 
ON -#SBERBD <FF&0%#
T,# 12.2.2004 :BK@ICBJ@# .6,7#
Individual#L#
14I4DP4#Q>DJ#
4M#F>RGB55>#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC#
4M#ER@#14I4DP4#
:@C@IK>EB4D 
ON - SBERBD <FF&0%#
T*# 11.5.2004 1>J@I># ***6T,#
Tribe - 0BA>HGD@#
:>DAR@IB>#4M#
FRGUAR>DCB#
;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
T(# 7.12.2004 '>CC@D# VT.6,,#
Tribe - 
WGC>DKB55@#;DJB>D#
:>DAR@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
T-# 6.1.2004 WBCUBH4G# (6.,#
Tribe - XG>IEY#
3>55@H#;DJB>D#
:@C@IK>EB4D 
ON - SBERBD <FF&0%#
T7# 4.15.2004 :BK@ICBJ@# (TT6,,#
Tribe - 14I4DP4#
Q>DJ#4M#F>RGB55>#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
T.# 4.15.2004 :BK@ICBJ@# T6-+#
Tribe - 14I4DP4#
Q>DJ#4M#F>RGB55>#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
ON - SBERBD <FF&0%# # # #
TO# 3.3.2004 :BK@ICBJ@# *7.6,,#
Tribe - 14I4DP4#
Q>DJ#4M#F>RGB55>#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
ON -#SBERBD <FF&0%# # # #
TT# 1.23.2004 !@5#$4IE@# *T+6,+# Tribe - &5U#3>55@H#:>DAR@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
TV# 1.15.2004 !@5#$4IE@# ,6-(# Tribe - WNBER#:BK@I#:>DAR@IB> ON - SBERBD <FF&0%# # # #
T+# 1.15.2004 W>D#!B@P4# .V.6,,#
Tribe - Q>I4D>#
ZI4G[#4M#ER@#
F>[BE>D#ZI>DJ@#
Q>DJ#4M#1BCCB4D#
;DJB>DC 
ON -#
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
V,# 12.18.2003 \BDP# ..6-O# Tribe - W>DE>#:4C>#:>DAR@IB> 
OFF - -#
NB5@C#>S>H <FF&0%# # # #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-*2#
%3456#*7##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !689:9;<#!3=6# >;?<=@# A8B6:#
%B946#;B#
C<D9E9D?35#
"<F#;B#"GGF
H6:6BE3=9;<# "?=8;I6#
J*# 10.27.2003 K3<=3#L3B43B3# *(7-M#
Tribe - K3<=3#
N<6O#L3<D#;G#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON - 
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%#
J(# 9.29.2003 H9E6B:9D6# M*+7+,#
Tribe - 1;B;<P;#
L3<D#;G#19::9;<#
C<D93<: 
ON - 
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%#
J-# 9.15.2003 QB6:<;# .7-*#
Tribe - %3456#
1;?<=39<#
H3<8R6B93 
ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%#
J2# 9.12.2003 QB6:<;# *-7MJ#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G L9P#
K3<D@#H3<8R6B93 
ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%#
J.# 6.25.2003 L?==6# *M,7,.#
Tribe - 
1;;B6=;S<#
H3<8R6B93 
ON -#
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%#
JM# 5.28.2003 !65#$;B=6# 27-2# Tribe - KI9=R#H9E6B#H3<8R6B93 ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%#
JT# 4.18.2003 !65#$;B=6# +7M(# Tribe -#&5U#V3556@#H3<8R6B93 ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%#
JJ# 3.20.2003 %?;5?I<6# 2(7,,#
Tribe - >R98U6<#
H3<8R#H3<8R6B93#
;G#16FW?U#
C<D93<: 
ON -#
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
J+# 3.13.2003 '3U6# ,7-J#
Tribe - L9P#
V3556@#H3<8R6B93#
;G#0;I;#C<D93<: 
ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%# # # #
+,# 3.11.2003 !65#$;B=6# *7,*# Tribe - KI9=R#H9E6B#H3<8R6B93 ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%# # # #
+*# 2.21.2003 '3::6<# -7(*#
Tribe - 
K?:3<E9556#C<D93<#
H3<8R6B93 
ON - 
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
+(# 2003 H9E6B:9D6# .7,,#
Tribe - 1;B;<P;#
L3<D#;G#>3R?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON - 
8;<=9P?;?: A>>&0%# # # #
+-# 12.23.2002  H9E6B:9D6# .7*+#
Individual - 
16I46B#;G#=R6#
1;B;<P;#L3<D#
;G#>3R?9553#
19::9;<#C<D93<: 
ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%# # # #
+2# 10.8.2002 !65#$;B=6# *7-J# Tribe - KI9=R#H9E6B#H3<8R6B93 ON - S9=R9< A>>&0%#
#
# # #
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-*.#
%>?5@#*6##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !@ABCB4D#!>E@# F4GDEH# <AI@C#
%IB?@#4I#
;DJBKBJG>5#
"DL#4I#"MML
:@C@IK>EB4D# "GEA4N@#
+.# 9.12.2002 O>D#!B@P4# -Q.6*.#
Tribe - R>I4D>#
SI4GT#4M#EU@#
F>TBE>D#SI>DJ@#
R>DJ#4M#1BCCB4D#
;DJB>DC 
ON -#
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
+V# 9.10.2002 :BK@ICBJ@# +.,6,,#
Tribe - O4?4?>#
R>DJ#4M#'GBC@W4#
;DJB>DC 
ON -#
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
+X# 6.19.2002 1@DJ4ABD4# *76,,#
Tribe - F4H4E@#
3>55@H#R>DJ#4M#
04N4#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
+Q# 6.6.2002 RGEE@# --6*7#
Tribe - 
144I@E4YD#
:>DAU@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
++# 5.14.2002 O>D#!B@P4# Q(6Q.#
Tribe - OHAG>D#
R>DJ#4M#1BCCB4D#
;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%#
*,,# 5.3.2002 1>J@I># V*6.(#
Tribe - $4IEU#
Z4I[#:>DAU@IB>#
4M#14D4#;DJB>DC 
OFF - (#
NB5@C#>Y>H 
#
<FF&0%#
*,*# 4.9.2002 ZI@CD4# X6XV#
Tribe - %>?5@#
14GDE>BD#
:>DAU@IB> 
ON -#YBEUBD <FF&0%# # # #
*,(# 11.30.2001 <N>J4I# X(6X(#
Tribe - \>A[C4D#
:>DAU@IB>#4M#1@L
=G[#;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
*,-# 9.28.2001 %G45GND@# (Q6*X#
Tribe - 
%G45GND@#R>DJ#
4M#1@L=G[#
;DJB>DC#4M#
%G45GND@#
:>DAU@IB> 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
*,7# 9.12.2001 O>D#!B@P4# (X6X+#
Tribe - OHAG>D#
R>DJ#4M#1BCCB4D#
;DJB>DC 
OFF -*#NB5@#
>Y>H <FF&0%# # # #
*,.# 9.6.2001 O>D#!B@P4# QQ(6Q,#
Tribe - 1@C>#
SI>DJ@#R>DJ#4M#
1BCCB4D#;DJB>DC 
OFF –#,6X7#
NB5@C#>Y>H <FF&0%# # # #
*,V# 6.29.2001 O>D#R@ID>IJBD4# 7V6,,#
Tribe - O>D#
1>DG@5#R>DJ#4M#
O@II>D4#1BCCB4D#
;DJB>DC 
ON - 
A4DEBPG4GC <FF&0%# # # #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-*2#
%3456#*7##Factual Data – All Decisions (Continued)#
#
# !689:9;<#!3=6# >;?<=@# A8B6:#
%B946#;B#
C<D9E9D?35#
"<F#;B#"GGF
H6:6BE3=9;<# "?=8;I6#
*,J# 5.23.2001 K;5;# L-7.,#
Tribe -  
H?I:6@#M3<D#;G#
K;8N3F!6FO6#
P9<=?<#C<D93<:#
;G#=N6#H?I:6@#
C<D93<#H3<8N6B93 
ON - 
8;<=9Q?;?: A>>&0%#
*,L# 5.7.2001 M?==6# *L7.,#
Tribe - %@I6#
139D?#%B946#;G#
M6BB@#>B66R#
H3<8N6B93 
ON - 
8;<=9Q?;?: A>>&0%#
*,+# 5.4.2001 16<D;89<;# *2,7SL#
Tribe - 
TN6BU;;D#V3556@#
H3<8N6B93#;G#
0;I;#C<D93<: 
OFF F#S7(#
I956:#3U3@ 
#
A>>&0%#
**,# 4.27.2001 '3R6# S,7,,#
Tribe - M9Q#
V3556@#M3<D#;G#
0;I;#C<D93<:#;G#
=N6#M9Q#V3556@#
H3<8N6B93 
ON -#
8;<=9Q?;?: A>>&0%#
***# 4.17.2001 T3<#M6B<3BD9<;# S+7((#
Tribe - T3<#
13<?65#M3<D#;G#
T6BB3<;#19::9;<#
C<D93<: 
ON - 
8;<=9Q?;?: A>>&0%#
#
#
#
%3456#*7*##Factual Data – Total Acres Accepted#
#
#
# Tribal 
Acres 
Individual 
Acres
On-Reservation 
Acres
Off-Reservation 
Acres:
All Acres 
Average: *,L7,2 S7,,# +S7-J# +L7L.# +S7+S#
Median: *+7J, (7L.# *(7,.# --7+,# *-7-+#
Smallest: ,7*+ ,7-+# ,7*+# ,7.2# ,7*+#
Largest: *W*2,7,, *-72L# *W*2,7,,# LL(7L,# *W*2,7,,#
Contiguous <)3# <)3# 2(#X2SYZ# <)3# <)3#
Within <)3# <)3# -.#X-2YZ# <)3# <)3#
Total: 10,482.06# 55.97 9,154.16 1,383.87 10,538.03#
#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-*>#
%?@5A#(6##Tribal v. Individual Acquisition Comparison#
 
#  % of Total Decisions 
Total Acquisitions ***# *,,B#
Tribal Acquisitions +># C>B#
Individual Acquisitions *7# *-B#
#
#
#
%?@5A#-6##On- v. Off-Reservation Acquisition Comparison 
 
#  % of Total Decisions 
Total Acquisitions ***# *,,B#
On-Reservation Acquisition +># C>B#
Off-Reservation Acquisition *7# *-B#
#
#
#
%?@5A#76##Factor 1 – Statutory Authority  
<55#!ADEFE4GF#
#  % of Total Applications 
Accepted Under ILCA >C# >,B#
Accepted Under IRA --# -,B#
#
#
#
%?@5A#.6##Factor 2#H#Need for the Land Considerations 
<55#!ADEFE4GF#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Amount of Trust Land Currently Owned 82 73.87%#
Importance of Self-Determination and Sovereignty: 80 72.07%#
#
I#$AAJ#K4L#4L#MLE@?5#N4?5#4K#FA5KOJAMALPEG?ME4G# Q. .C6.QB#
I#$AAJ#K4L#4L#MLE@?5#N4?5#M4#ARALDEFA#STLEFJEDME4G8#
FA5KON4UALG?GDA#?GJ#F4UALAENGMV# -- -,6,,B#
I#'?DW#4K#5?GJ#EF#XLEP?LV#5EPEMEGN#K?DM4L#EG#AKK4LMF#M4#
LAAFM?@5EFY#MLE@?5#N4UALGPAGM# *, +6,*B#
I#%LE@A#Y?F#LAFX4GFE@E5EMV#M4#EMF#PAP@ALF#M4#LAO
AFM?@5EFY#MLE@?5#STLEFJEDME4G# > Q6-*B#
I#$AAJ#M4#D5?LEKV#STLEFJEDME4G# ( *6C,B# # # # #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-*2#
%3456#.7##Factor 2#8#Need for the Land Considerations (Continued) 
955#!6:;<;=><#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Tribe Has Lost Trust Land:# 60 54.05%# # # # #
#
?#">@=;>@#6AA=BC#3>D#>66D#C=#:=><=5;D3C6#53>DE#
B64F;5D#53>D#43<6# GH G*7GGI# # # # #
?#%BF<C#53>D#5=<C#;>#%6BJ;>3C;=>#&B3# -( (272-I# # # # #
?#K=JL3B6#:FBB6>C#CBF<C#53>D#M=5D;>@<#N;CM#<;O6#=A#
=B;@;>35#B6<6BP3C;=># (* *27+(I# # # # #
?#%B;46#M3<#A=F>D#;C#:M3556>@;>@#C=#B63:QF;B6#5=<C#
53>D#DF6#C=#5;J;C;>@#A3:C=B<#=A#J3BR6C#3P3;534;5;CS#
3>D#CB;435#AF>D<7# *T *.7-(I#
# # # #
?#%BF<C#53>D#5=<C#;>#955=CJ6>C#&B3# G# -7H,I# # # # #
?#K=JL3B6#:FBB6>C#CBF<C#53>D#M=5D;>@<#N;CM#3J=F>C#
=A#34=B;@;>35#53>D# -# (7T,I# # # # #
?#%BF<C#53>D#5=<C#4S#A=B:6D#<356# (# *72,I# # # # #
?#%BF<C#53>D#5=<C#4S#F><L6:;A;6D#J63><# *# ,7+,I# # # # #
?#%BF<C#53>D#5=<C#4S#6U6:FC;P6#=BD6B# *# ,7+,I#
# # # #
Deficiencies in Current Land Holdings:* 59 53.15%#
#
?#'3B@6#L=BC;=>#F><F;C3456#A=B#D6P65=LJ6>C#DF6#C=#
C=L=@B3LMS#V<C66LE#M;@M#35C;CFD6E#B=:RSE#A5==D#O=>6E#
B;P6B#DB3;>3@6#43<;>E#J=F>C3;>=F<E#<6><;C;P6#
4;=5=@;:35#M34;C3CE#A3F5C#5;>6<W# (T# (G7-(I#
?#KFBB6>C#CBF<C#53>D#;<#;>3D6QF3C6#V35B63DS#AF55S#
D6P65=L6DX#;>#CM6#LB=:6<<#=A#46;>@#D6P65=L6DX#
:3>>=C#<F<C3;>#M=F<;>@#=B#6:=>=J;:#D6P65=LJ6>C#
>66D<X#>=#=CM6B#L3B:65#=N>6D#4S#CM6#CB;46#;<#<F;C3456#
A=B#CM6#F<6W# (*# *27+(I#
?#KFBB6>C#CBF<C#53>D#;<#:M6:R6BY4=3BD6DZZ## *+# *T7*(I#
?#$=>YCB;435#53>D#4=BD6B;>@#:FBB6>C#CB;435#53>D#;<#
F>D6<;B3456#DF6#C=#D6P65=LJ6>C# G# -7H,I#
?#$66D#C=#LB=P;D6#3::6<<#C=#53>D5=:R6D#L3B:65# G# -7H,I#
#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-*+#
%>?5@#.6##Need for the Land Considerations (Continued)#
<55#!@ABCB4DC#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Housing Considerations:# 42 37.84%#
#
E#$@@F#G4H#I4JCBDK# (L (76-(M#
E#$JN?@H#4G#N@N?@HC#BD#D@@F#4G#I4JCBDK#4H#4D#>#
I4JCBDK#O>BP#5BCPQ#DJN?@H#4G#N@N?@HC#5BRBDK#4GGS#
H@C@HR>PB4D#FJ@#P4#5>AT#4DSH@C@HR>PB4D# *U *V6((M#
E#'>AT#4G#5>DF#BC#WHBN>HX#5BNBPBDK#G>AP4H#BD#@GG4HPC#P4#
WH4RBF@#I4JCBDK# *, +6,*M#
E#YJHH@DP#@A4D4NBA#>DF#I4JCBDK#CBPJ>PB4D#GJHPI@H#
ZJCPBGX#D@@F#G4H#5>DF#BD#PHJCP#G4H#I4JCBDK#WJHW4C@C#
[IBKI#F@N>DF@CA>5>PBDK#WHBA@C#4G#Y<#H@>5#@CP>P@\# L V6-*M#
E#%HB?>5#I4JCBDK#BC#CJ?CP>DF>HF# - (6L,M# # # # #
Economic Factors:# 40 36.04%# # # # #
#
E#$@@F#PI@#5>DF#G4H#AJHH@DP#F@R@54WN@DPQ#D@@F#P4#
WH4N4P@#@A4D4NBA#CP>?B5BPX# (. ((6.(M# # # # #
E#'>AT#4G#5>DF#BC#WHBN>HX#5BNBPBDK#G>AP4H#BD#@GG4HPC#P4#
F@R@54W#@A4D4NX# *, +6,*M# # # # #
E#%HJCP#CP>PJC#BC#AHBPBA>5#[D@A@CC>HX#P4#]J>5BGX#G4H#
G@F@H>5#WH4KH>NC8#AJHH@DP#4W@H>PB4D#HJDC#4D#PBKIP#
?JFK@P\# V .67*M#
# # # #
E#%HB?>5#K4>5#P4#BNWH4R@#]J>5BPX#4G#5BG@#?X#@A4D4NBA#
F@R@54WN@DP# V .67*M# # # # #
E#%HB?@#N@N?@HC#I>R@#IBKI#JD@NW54XN@DP#H>P@# -# (6L,M#
# # # #
E#<5PI4JKI#PHB?@#I>C#>#WH4GBP>?5@#A>CBD48#I>C#D@@F#P4#
FBR@HCBGX#G4H#@A4D4NBA#CP>?B5BPX# (# *6U,M#
E#<WW5BA>PB4D#D@@F#D4P#?@#F@DB@F#?@A>JC@#PI@#PHB?@#
I>C#>#CJAA@CCGJ5#4GGSH@C@HR>PB4D#?JCBD@CC# *# ,6+,M#
E#%I@H@#BC#AJHH@DP5X#>#O>BPBDK#5BCP#G4H#C@HRBA@C#
WH4RBF@F#4D#5>DF# *# ,6+,M#
Cultural Considerations:# 28 25.23%# # # # #
# E#%HB?>5#4H#BDFBRBFJ>5#K4>5#P4#AH@>P@#A4NNJDBPX#>DF#PHB?>5#AJ5PJH@8#>DF#WH4P@AP#AJ5PJH>5#H@C4JHA@C# *L# *.6-(M# # # # #
# E#$@@F#P4#WH4P@AP#AJ5PJH>5#H@C4JHA@C#[JDCW@ABGB@F\# *,# +6,*M# # # # #
#
E#$@@F#P4#WH4P@AP#AJ5PJH>5#H@C4JHA@C#[CW@ABGBA#
H@C4JHA@C#N@DPB4D@F#?JHB>5#KH4JDFC8#A@H@N4DB>5#CBP@8#
IBCP4HBA#RB55>K@\# 7# -6V,M# # # # ## E#$@@F#P4#WH4P@AP#PI@#@DRBH4DN@DP# -# (6L,M#
# E#%HB?@#I>C#>#CPH4DK#A4DD@APB4D#P4#PI@#>H@>8#I>C#4AAJWB@F#CJHH4JDFBDK#5>DF#G4H#A54C@#P4#*,,#X@>HC# *# ,6+,M#
Use Considerations:# 25 22.52%#
#
E#0H4W4C@F#^C@# *U *V6((M#
E#YJHH@DP#^C@# *, +6,*M#
#
#
#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-(,#
%2345#.6##Need for the Land Considerations (Continued)#
744#!589:9;<:#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Long-Term Planning Considerations: 22 18.02%#
#
=#$55>#?;#@A;?58?#2<>#@A5:5AB5#?C5#A5:5AB2?9;<#2<>#
42<>#32:5#D;A#DE?EA5#F5<5A2?9;<:# *G *H6((I##
=#$55>#D;A#42<>J32<K9<F# G L6(*I# # # # #
=#$55>#?;#@A;?58?#2<>#@A5:5AB5#?C5#?A935# . M6.,I# # # # #
=#';<F#?5AN#:EAB9B24#;D#?C5#?A935#>5@5<>:#;<#?A935O:#
23949?P#?;#@A;B9>5#5N@4;PN5<?Q#C;E:9<F#2<>#
8;NNE<9?P#2<>#F;B5A<N5<?#:5AB985:# ( *6G,I#
# # # #
Tribal Membership Considerations: 16 14.41%# # # # #
#
=#R9S5#;D#?A935## *. *-6.*I# # # # #
=#05A85<?#;D#?A935#N5N35A:#TC;#2A5#P;E?C#U#C;E:9<FQ#
5N@4;PN5<?Q#2<>#8E4?EA24#A5:;EA85#>5N2<>:#T944#
9<8A52:5#5V@;<5<?9244P# *, +6,*I#
# # # #
=#%A935#5V@5A95<89<F#?A5N5<>;E:#FA;T?CW#N5N35A:#
2A5#A5?EA<9<F#?;#?C5#A5:5AB2?9;<#U#<55>#D;A#N;A5#
C;E:9<FQ#9<DA2:?AE8?EA5Q#58;<;N98#>5B54;@N5<?# H# .6M*I#
# # # #
=#%A9324#F;24#?;#3A9<F#N5N35A:#328K#?;#?C5#
A5:5AB2?9;<# -# (6L,I# # # # #
Location of the Property:# 16 14.41%# # # # #
# =#'2<>#9:#;<JA5:5AB2?9;<#X8;<?9FE;E:#;A#T9?C9<Y# *.# *-6.*I# # # # #=#Z<>9B9>E24O:#42<>#9:#84;:5#?;#2#A542?9B5O:#@A;@5A?P# M# -6H,I#
# # # #
Tribe's Achievements:# 12 10.81%#
#
=#%A935#C2:#:?A;<F#F;B5A<N5<?Q#N2<P#82@23949?95:Q#
2<>#2#FA;T9<F#58;<;NP# G# L6(*I#
=#%A935#C2:#3E94?#2/#82:9<;Q#F;B5A<N5<?#85<?5AQ#D9A5#
>5@2A?N5<?Q#C524?C#849<98Q#493A2APQ#>2P#82A5Q#
8;NNE<9?P#8;445F5# M# -6H,I#
=#%A935#5N@4;P#N2<PQ#C2:#4;T5A5>#E<5N@4;PN5<?#
2<>#A29:5>#?C5#5>E82?9;<#45B54#;D#9?:#N5N35A:# *# ,6+,I#
Degree of Cooperation with and Support From Local 
Entities:# 5 4.50%#
#
=#%A935#C2:#>5N;<:?A2?5>#8;NN9?N5<?#?;#8;;@5A2?5Q#
:E8C#2:#3P#5<?5A9<F#1"[O:)\;;@5A2?9B5#7FA55N5<?:# -# (6L,I#
=#\;E<?P#2<>#:?2?5#>9>#<;?#;3]58?#?;#:?2?5>#<55># *# ,6+,I#
=#[<9^E5#89A8EN:?2<85/#%AE:?#28^E9:9?9;<#T2:#2<#
2FA55>J?;#42<>#5V8C2<F5#T9?C#8;E<?P#?;#A5N5>P#2<#
5<8A;28CN5<?#;<?;#?A9324#42<>#3P#?C5#8;E<?P#29A@;A?# *# ,6+,I#
#
#
#
#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-(*#
%>?5@#.6##Need for the Land Considerations (Continued) 
<55#!@ABCB4DC#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Miscellaneous:# 5 4.50%#
#
E#F@>GBHBA>GB4D#4H#GI@#J@C@JK>GB4D# - (6L,M#
E#%JB?@#I>C#D@K@J#>NN@N#G4#BGC#5>DN#?>C@# * ,6+,M# # # # #
E#;DNBKBNO>5#>PP5BA>DG#D@@NC#>CCBCG>DA@#BD#Q>D>RBDR#
GI@#PJ4P@JGS# * ,6+,M# # # # #
Total Considerations:# 692  # # # # #
* Both trust and fee lands 
** Checkerboarded is a term used to describe when a tribe's trust land holdings do not form a 
united whole, but instead form a patchwork pattern primarily due to changes in federal Indian 
land policy.#
# # # #
#
#
%>?5@#T6##Factor 2 – Need for the Land Considerations – Amount of Current 
Trust Land 
<55#!@ABCB4DC#
#
# Of Decisions That Mention Amount of Current Trust Land 82 Decisions or 73.87% 
Average: 78T((67+#
Median:# ---6((#
Low:# ,#
High: ..8-+T6,,#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-((#
%2345#67##Factor 3 – Purpose Considerations 
844#!59:;:<=;#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Proposed Use:# 111 100.00%#
# >#$<#?42==5@#9A2=B5#:=#9CDD5=E#C;5F# 6G GH7I6J#
# >#K5;:@5=E:24# -* (67+-J#
#  #
>#L?59:M:9#?42=#E<#3C:4@#D5;:@5=95;# (, *H7,(J#
>#0D<N:@5#M<D#?<E5=E:24#MCECD5#A<C;:=B# **# +7+*J#
# >#O<PP5D9:24# (- (,76(J#
# #
>#L?59:M:9#?42=#M<D#9<PP5D9:24#C;5#Q;E<D2B5R#
@2S#92D5#M29:4:ESR#;A<??:=B#?42T2R#D5E2:4#;E<D5R#
B2;#;E2E:<=R#P:=:UP2DER#BD<95DS#;E<D5R#
D5;E2CD2=ER#5V?2=@#9CDD5=E#9<PP5D9:24#
@5N54<?P5=ER#?2DW:=B#4<ER#A524EA#94:=:9R#4<@B5#
M<D#ED:324#BC5;E;X# *- **76*J# # # # #
>#$<#;?59:M:9#:PP5@:2E5#?42=R#3CE#?<E5=E:24#M<D#
MCECD5#@5N54<?P5=E#QA:BAY2S#9<PP5D9:24#
@5N54<?P5=ER#2@@:E:<=24#A<C;:=BR#;E<D2B5R#B2;#
;E2E:<=R#P:=:UP2DER#ED:324#<MM:95;R#MCECD5#Y2E5D#
=55@;R#9C4ECD24#29E:N:E:5;X# *,# +7,*J#
#
>#OC4ECD24#L:B=:M:92=95#Q@5N54<?#95P5E5DSR#<?5=#
;?295#M<D#;5=;:E:N5#3:<4<B:924#A23:E2ER#?D<E59E#
9C4ECD24#D5;<CD95;R#3C:4@#PC;5CPR#3C:4@#9C4ECD24#
95=E5DR#D5;E<D5#=<=UZ=@:2=#A:;E<D:9#;:E5X# *- **76*J#
# # # #
#
>#O<PPC=:ES#Z=MD2;EDC9ECD5#QY2;E5Y2E5D#ED52EP5=E#
M29:4:ESR#;E<DP#@D2:=R#2995;;#D<2@R#Y2E5D4:=5R#Y2E5D#
E2=WR#5P5DB5=9S#B5=5D2E<DX# *( *,7H*J#
# # # #
# >#%D:324#2@P:=:;ED2E:<=# *, +7,*J# # # # #
#
>#O<PPC=:ES#[29:4:E:5;#Q;9A<<4R#;5=:<D#95=E5DR#
9<PPC=:ES#95=E5DR#5P5DB5=9S#;5DN:95;R#@DCB#
ED52EP5=E#M29:4:ESX# H 67(*J#
# # # #
#
>#8BD:9C4ECD24#QAC=E:=BR#BD2T:=BR#D2=9AR#N:=5S2D@R#
Y:=5DSX# G# .7I*J# # # # #
# >#'2=@U32=W:=B# *# ,7+,J#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-(-#
%>?5@#A6##Factor 3 – Purpose Considerations (Continued) 
<55#!@BCDC4ED#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Current Use:# 84 75.68%#
#
F#3>B>EG#H@EGCI@5J#4I#K>L4ICGJM# -. -*6.-N#
F#:@DCO@EGC>5# -, (A6,-N#
F#PQII@EG#QD@#E4G#K@EGC4E@ORR# (A (76-(N#
F#P4KK@IBC>5#HGIQBS#DB>5@D8#DG4I>T@8#B54D@O#
U>IOV>I@#DG4I@8#U4G@58#O>J#B>I@8#U@>5GU#B5CECB8#O@EG>5#
B5CECBM# *. *-6.*N#
F#P4KKQECGJ#W>BC5CGC@D#HX@>O#YG>IG#ZI4TI>K8#[>KC5J#
I@D4QIB@D#B@EG@I8#B4KKQECGJ#B@EG@I8#D@EC4I#B@EG@I8#
[44O#OCDGIC?QGC4E#[4I#54V#CEB4K@8#OIQT#GI@>GK@EG#
[>BC5CGJ8#?>D@?>55#[C@5ODM# *, +6,*N#
# # # #
F#0>ISCET#54G# *,# +6,*N#
F#%IC?>5#>OKCECDGI>GC4E# \# A6(*N#
F#P4KKQECGJ#;E[I>DGIQBGQI@#H>CI#]Q>5CGJ#K4ECG4ICET#
DJDG@K8#V>G@I#ZQKZ#U4QD@8#V@55D8#>BB@DD#I4>O8#D@ZGCB#
5@@BU#[C@5OM# A# ^6-*N#
F#<TICBQ5GQI>5#4I#TI>_CET# \# A6(*N#
F#PQ5GQI>5#DCTEC[CB>EB@#HB@I@K4EC>5#DCG@8#?QIC>5#
TI4QEOD8#E4E`;EOC>E#UCDG4ICB#DCG@M# ^# .67*N#
F#P>DCE4#CE[I>DGIQBGQI@#H@EGI>EB@8#Z>ISCET#54GM# -# (6A,N#
Location:# 20 18.02%# # # # #
# F#'>EO#CD#4E`I@D@Ia>GC4E#HB4EGCTQ4QD#4I#VCGUCEM# *\ *^6((N# # # # #
# F#;EOCaCOQ>5bD#I@5>GCa@#5Ca@D#>BI4DD#DGI@@G# * ,6+,N# # # # #
# F#!CDG>EB@#[I4K#GIC?>5#5>EO# * ,6+,N# # # # #
Degree of Cooperation with and Support from Local 
Entities:# 11 9.91%# # # # #
#
F#YZ@BC[CB#>BGD#4[#GIC?@#V4ISCET#VCGU#54B>5#@EGCGC@D#
HGIC?@#U>D#DG>G@O#VC55#B4KZ5J#VCGU#54B>5#5>VDc#GIC?@#CD#
B4EDCO@ICET#54B>5#CEZQGc#GIC?@#BQII@EG5J#V4ISCET#4QG#
>#5>EO#QD@#CDDQ@#VCGU#GU@#B4QEGJc#GIC?@#GIC@O#G4#@EG@I#
1"d8#?QG#OCOEbG#OQ@#G4#B4QEGJbD#O@K>EO#[4I#>#
V>Ca@I#4[#D4a@I@CTEGJM# \# A6(*N#
# # # #
F#%IC?>5#[>BC5CGJ#4E#GU@#5>EO#ZI4aCO@D#D@IaCB@D#G4#
K@K?@ID#>EO#E4E`K@K?@ID# -# (6A,N# # # # #
F#'4B>5#DQZZ4IG#HP4QEGJ#U>D#4S>J@O#O@a@54ZK@EGc#
5@GG@ID#4[#DQZZ4IG#[4I#ZI4Z4D@O#QD@#V@I@#I@B@Ca@OM# (# *6\,N# # # # #F#PQII@EG#QD@#CD#B4EDCDG@EG#VCGU#_4ECET# (# *6\,N#
F#0I4Z4D@O#QD@#B4EDCDG@EG#VCGU#BQII@EG#QD@# *# ,6+,N#
Economic Considerations:# 10 9.01%#
#
F#:@DZ4ED@#G4#P4KK@EGD/#$4G#>#T>KCET#>B]QCDCGC4E#
C[#E4G#@eB5QDCa@5J#[4I#T>KCET#>EO#E4G#@DD@EGC>5#G4#
T>KCET#4Z@I>GC4EfU@I@#K@I@5J#DU>ICET#
CE[I>DGIQBGQI@#HZ>ISCET#54G8#D@ZGCB#5@@BU#[C@5OM# A ^6-*N#
F#0QIZ4D@#CD#[4I#@B4E4KCB#O@a@54ZK@EG# ( *6\,N#
F#=C55#>554V#CEBI@>D@O#[CE>EBC>5#DG>?C5CGJ#?J#
OCa@IDC[JCET#GIC?@bD#I@a@EQ@#?>D@# *# ,6+,N#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-(2#
%3456#78##Factor 3 – Purpose Considerations (Continued) 
955#!6:;<;=><#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Importance of Self-Determination and Sovereignty: 8 7.21%#
#
?#0@AB=<6#;<#C=#6>D3>:6#<65EFG6C6AH;>3C;=># 2 -8I,J#
?#0@AB=<6#;C#C=#6>D3>:6#<=K6A6;L>CM#3>G#<65EF
L=K6A>3>:6# - (87,J#
?#0@AB=<6#;<#C=#E3:;5;C3C6#A63:N@;<;C;=>#=E#CA;435#53>G<# - (87,J#
?#0@AB=<6#;<#C=#355=O#CA;46#C=#BA6K6>C#@>O3>C6G#
G6K65=BH6>C# ( *8P,J#
Deficiencies in Current Land Holdings: 8 7.21%# # # # #
#
?#0@AB=<6#;<#E=A#53>G#:=><=5;G3C;=># 2 -8I,J# # # # #
?#Q@AA6>C#CA@<C#53>G#;<#@><@;C3456#E=A#G6K65=BH6>C# ( *8P,J# # # # #
?#R;55#355=O#3::6<<#C=#53>GF5=:S6G#B3A:65# ( *8P,J# # # # #
Housing Considerations:# 3 2.70%# # # # #
#
?#J#O;55#G6:A63<6#D=@<;>L#>66G<#4M# (# *8P,J# # # # #
?#Q;CM#O3>C<#D;LD6A#G6><;CM#D=@<;>L#=>#CD6#53>GT#4@C#
:3>UC#E=A:6#CD;<# *# ,8+,J# # # # #
Cultural Considerations:# 2 1.80%#
#
?#0@AB=<6#;<#C=#BA=C6:C#:@5C@A35#A6<=@A:6<#V4@A;35#
LA=@>G<W# ( *8P,J#
Total Considerations: 410 #
* As used in the decisions, the phrase “no planned change in current use” does not signify no 
development will occur, but rather, such improvements will be consistent with the current use. 
** Current use mentioned elsewhere in analysis in 7 of the 27 decisions that did not mention it 
under Factor 3 analysis.#
#
#
%3456#P8##Factor 3 – Purpose Considerations 
X>G;K;G@35#!6:;<;=><#">5M#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 14 Total  
Decisions#
Proposed Use# 14 100.00%#
#
?#$=#:D3>L6# *2 *,,8,,J#
?#$=#;HH6G;3C6#B53>>6G#:D3>L6#EA=H#K3:3>CT#@<6#E=A#
E@C@A6#BA;H3AM#A6<;G6>:6# ( *28(+J#
Current Use# 13 92.86%# # # # #
# ?#0A;H3AM#A6<;G6>:6# ** 7P8.7J## # # # #?#Y3:3>C# ( *28(+J# # # # #
Location# 3 21.43%# # # # #
# ?#R;CD;>#6ZC6A;=A#4=@>G3A;6<#=E#A6<6AK3C;=># (# *28(+J# # # # #?#[653C;K6#5;K6<#3:A=<<#<CA66C# *# 78*2J# # # # #
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-(.#
%>?5@#+6##Factor 4 – Other Trust Land Owned and Degree of Assistance Needed#
;ABCDCBE>5#!@FCGC4AG#4A5H#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 11 Total  
Decisions#
Amount of Other Trust Land Owned by the 
Applicant:# 11 100.00% 
# I#$4A@# **# *,,6,,J#
Degree of Assistance the Applicant Needs: 10 90.91% # # # #
#
I#$4#>GGCGK>AF@#A@@B@B8#?EK#A@@B#K4#LM4K@FK#N4M#
NEKEM@#O@A@M>KC4AG#4EKP@COQG#N>FK#KQ>K#GQ@#B4@G#A4K#
A@@B#>GGCGK>AF@# R S(6S-J#
# # # #
I#'CKK5@#4M#A4#>GGCGK>AF@#A@@B@B# ( *R6*RJ# # # # #
Miscellaneous: # # # # #
#
I#<554KT@AK#L45CFC@G#F4AKMC?EK@B#K4#54GK#5>AB#N4M#KMC?@#
>AB#>LL5CF>AKUG#N>TC5H# -# (S6(SJ# # # # #
I#%M>AGN@M#K4#KMEGK#T>AB>K@B#N4M#KQ@#>LL5CF>AK#VF5>GG#
T@T?@MG#CA#M@GK4M>KC4A#5CKCO>KC4AW#L@M#>T@ABT@AK#K4#
;'X<Y# (# *R6*RJ#
# # # #
Total Considerations: 27 # # # # #
Errors#
# I#Z>FK4M#-#GQ4E5B#Q>D@#?@@A#>A>5H[@B8#?EK#P>G#A4K\# - A)>#
* One of the decisions that was missing Factor 4 analysis mentioned that the applicant needs 
help managing the property under Factor 2.#
#
#
%>?5@#*,6##Z>FK4M#.#]#Projected Tax Loss Based on Previous Year Tax Amount 
#
# All Decisions# Tribal Decisions# Individual Decisions#
Total ^+R-87,,# ^+_+87SR ^*-8+((##
Average ^+8(SS# ^*,87(7 ^*8,S*##
Median ^(8+*_# ^-8_RS ^7-+# # # # #
High ^+S8((,# ^+S8((, ^-87_.# # # # #
Low ^,# ^, ^**R# # # # #
Decisions that do not mention 
previous year tax amount
.#4N#***#B@FCGC4AG#
76.,J#
7#4N#+S#B@FCGC4AG#
76*(J#
*#4N#*7#B@FCGC4AG#
S6*7J# # # # #
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-(2#
%3456#**7##Factor 5 – Tax Loss Considerations 
855#!69:;:<=;#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Projected Tax Loss:# 111 100.00%#
#
>#$<?6#@A6B:<C;#D<A#A696=?E#@A<@6A?F#?3G#3H<C=?#I<A#
?J6#@A<@6A?F# *,2 +.7.,K#
>#LCAA6=?5F#=<#9<HH6A9:35#39?:B:?FM#;<#=<#5<;;#<I#
;356;M#C;6#<A#IA3=9J:;6#?3G# + N7**K#
>#0A<@6A?F#:;#?3G#6G6H@?#DO;#P:?J:=#?A:435#QRGS#:;#
9<C=?F#53=RS#6G6H@?#A6T3AR56;;#<I#?AC;?#;?3?C;#
4693C;6#53=R#C;6E# N U7(*K#
>#$<#H6=?:<=#<I#?3G#5<;;#3H<C=?# . V7.,K#
>#0<?6=?:35#<II;6?/#OI#53=R#:;#563;6R#?<#3#=<=WO=R:3=#
6=?:?FM#9<C=?F#P<C5R#T6?#;<H6#:=9<H6# * ,7+,K# # # # #
Ways the Tribe Contributes to the Community: 46 41.44%# # # # #
#
>#%3G#5<;;#:;#=<?#3#H3Q<A#:H@39?#T:B6=#53AT6#3H<C=?#
?A:46#9<=?A:4C?6;#?<#9<HHC=:?F#9<H@3A6R#?<#?J6#
A653?:B65F#;H355#?3G#5<;;# V( -U7NVK#
# # # #
>#0CA9J3;6#<I#T<<R;#3=R#;6AB:96;#DB6=R<A;#?J6F#
;C@@<A?#@3F#;356;#3=R#P3T6#?3G6;S#?A:46#@3F;#;356;#
?3G#<=#<IIWA6;6AB3?:<=#@CA9J3;6;E# -* (U7+-K#
# # # #
>#&H@5<FH6=?# (N (.7(-K#
# # # #
>#X6RC9?:<=#:=#9<C=?FW;@<=;<A6R#;6AB:96;#DR3F93A6M#
P65I3A6M#J<C;:=TM#H6R:935M#R6=?35E# *V# *(72*K#
>#LJ3A:?3456#9<=?A:4C?:<=;#D?<#;9J<<5;M#9J3A:?:6;M#
<?J6A#<AT3=:Y3?:<=;M#@<5:96M#A<3R#:H@A<B6H6=?E# *-# **7U*K#
>#O=9<H6#?3G6;#6H@5<F66;#@3F# *(# *,7N*K#
>#Z6=6A35#69<=<H:9#;?:HC53?:<=#D[;:T=:I:93=?#
@<;:?:B6#69<=<H:9#R:;?A:4C?:<=#:=#?J6#9<C=?F[E# N# U7(*K#
>#\6R6A35#IC=R;#3B3:53456#I<A#;9J<<5;#P)#O=R:3=#
9J:5RA6=# V# -72,K#
>#8;#:;#53=R#P:55#=<?#46=6I:?#9<HHC=:?FM#4C?#:=#?AC;?#
?A:46#P:55#R6B65<@#]#6H@5<FH6=?M#9<=;?AC9?:<=M#
@CA9J3;6;# *# ,7+,K#
Degree of Cooperation with and Support from Local 
Entities:# 38 34.23%# # # # #
#
>#$<#3RB6A;6#9<HH6=?;#A696:B6R# (+# (27*-K# # # # #
>#%A:46#J3;#3TA66R#?<#B<5C=?3AF#3==C35#9<=?A:4C?:<=;#
:=#5:6C#<I#5<;?#?3G# +# N7**K# # # # #
>#L<C=?F#;C@@<A?;#39^C:;:?:<=S#T<<R#P<A_:=T#
A653?:<=;J:@# -# (7U,K# # # # #>#%A:46#J3;#;3:R#P:55#3??6H@?#?<#A6;<5B6#XG#I:=3=9:35#
:;;C6;#4F#:=#5:6C#@3FH6=?;# *# ,7+,K#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-(>#
%?@5A#**6##Factor 5 – Tax Loss Considerations (Continued) 
<55#!ABCDC4ED#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Benchmarking: # 30 27.03%#
#
F#G4HI?JA#K4K?5#B4LEKM#IJ4IAJKM#K?N#K4#54DK#?H4LEK#
?EO#PCEO#DH?55#CE#B4HI?JCD4E# (- (,6>(Q#
F#%?N#54DD#CD#?#PJ?BKC4E#4P#?#Q#4P#K4K?5#B4LEKM#
IJ4IAJKM#K?NAD# *. *-6.*Q#
F#G4HI?JA#K4K?5#B4LEKM#K?N#K4#54DK#?H4LEK#?EO#PCEO#
DH?55#CE#B4HI?JCD4E# R .67*Q#
F#%?N#54DD#CD#?#PJ?BKC4E#4P#?#Q#4P#K4K?5#B4LEKM#K?NAD# ( *6S,Q#
F#G4HI?JA#IJ4IAJKM#T?5LA#K4#K4K?5#T?5L?KC4E#4P#?55#
IJ4IAJKM#CE#B4LEKM# ( *6S,Q# # # # #
Tribe's Needs# 29 26.13%#
# # # #
 
F#%?N#ANAHIKC4E#CD#E4K#H4KCT?KC4E#UEAAO#K4#P4J#
VLJCDOCBKC4E8#DA5PWOAKAJHCE?KC4E8#X4LDCEY8#5?EO#@?DAZ (* *S6+(Q 
F#%JC@A[D#EAAOD#P?J#4LK\ACYX#CHI?BK#PJ4H#JAH4T?5 S >6(*Q 
Local Concerns: 6 5.41% 
#
F#G4EBAJE#KX?K#K?N#54DD#E4\#CD#DH?558#@LK#CP#
OATA54IAO#\4L5O#@A#DL@DK?EKC?5]^;<#E4K#JA_LCJAO#
K4#DIABL5?KA#K4#I4KAEKC?5#54DK#JATAELA#CP#OATA54IAO# ( *6S,Q#
# # # #
F#G4EBAJE#?@4LK#@LDCEADD#4E#KXA#5?EO#X?TCEY#K?N#
ANAHIKC4E#?OT?EK?YA]^;<#ANI5?CED#?\?M# * ,6+,Q# # # # #
F#G4EBAJE#?@4LK#?OTAJDA#CHI?BKD#4P#B4HHAJBC?5#
OATA54IHAEK]^;</#KXCD#CD#E4K#KJC@A[D#DK?KAO#EAAO# * ,6+,Q#
# # # #F#G4EBAJE#?@4LK#54DD#4P#?#DIABCPCB#?II5CB?KC4E##
PAA]^;</#KXCD#CD#?#4EA#KCHA#54DD#`#E4K#DCYECPCB?EK# *# ,6+,Q#
F#:ABACTAO#4@VABKC4E8#@LK#E4#DIABCPCB#OAK?C5# *# ,6+,Q#
Miscellaneous:# 7 6.31%# # # # #
#
F#"E5M#E4KAD#IJATC4LD#K?N#MA?J#?H4LEKE4#4KXAJ#
?E?5MDCD#?K#?55# 7# -6R,Q# # # # #
F#%?NAD#?JA#BLJJAEK# (# *6S,Q# # # # #
F#"E5M#E4KAD#E4#B4HHAJBC?5#?BKCTCKM8#D4#E4#D?5AD#4J#
LDA#K?N#54DDE4#4KXAJ#?E?5MDCD#?K#?55# *# ,6+,Q# # # # #
Total Considerations: 414 #
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
-(2#
%3456#*(7##Factor 6 – Jurisdiction and Land Use Conflict Considerations 
855#!69:;:<=;#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Legal Results of a Transfer to Trust Status: 103 92.79%#
#
>#?@:A:=35#BC@:;D:9E:<=#F:55#@6A3:=#F:EG#EG6#;E3E6# *,* +,7++H#
>#%G6#53=D#F:55#46#@6A<I6D#J@<A#;E3E6#3=D#5<935#9:I:5#
BC@:;D:9E:<=K#E@:46#F:55#3;;6@E#9:I:5#3=D#@6LC53E<@M#
BC@:;D:9E:<=# NN O+7-NH#
>#"=5M#@6LC53E<@M#BC@:;D:9E:<=#F:55#46#5<;E#4693C;6#
53=D#:;#35@63DM#6P6AQE#J@<A#9<C=EM#R<=:=L# ( *72,H#
Factors that Contribute to Mitigation or Absence of 
Jurisdictional Conflict:# 64 57.66%# # # # #
#
>#$<#9G3=L6#:=#53=D#C;6# -N --7--H# # # # #
>#S63;<=;#FGM#53=D#C;6#F:55#=<E#46#3=#:;;C6#T9C@@6=E#
C;6#:;#9<=;:;E6=E#F:EG#9C@@6=E#R<=:=LK#Q@<Q<;6D#C;6#
:;#9<=;:;E6=E#F:EG#9C@@6=E#R<=:=LK#Q@<Q<;6D#C;6#:;#
9<=;:;E6=E#F:EG#;C@@<C=D:=L#C;6K#Q@<Q<;6D#C;6#:;#
9<=;:;E6=E#F:EG#Q3;E#C;6K#Q@<Q<;6#C;6#9<=J<@A;#E<#
9:EMU:;;C6D#Q6@A:EV# (- (,7N(H#
# # # #
>#"=U@6;6@I3E:<=#39WC:;:E:<=# O .7X*H#
# # # #
>#Y<=:=L#F:55#=<E#9G3=L6# .# X7.,H#
>#'3=D#:;#=<E#9C@@6=E5M#F:EG:=#9:EM)9<C=EMZ;#
BC@:;D:9E:<=[#;<#F:55#=<E#3JJ69E#9:EM)9<C=EM#
@6LC53E:<=;# -# (7N,H#
How Services Will Be Provided: 34 30.63%# # # # #
#
>#0<5:96#;6@I:96#F:55#9<=E:=C6#4M#9<C=EM#;G6@:JJ# **# +7+*H# # # # #
>#%@:46#Q@<I:D6;#I3@:<C;#;6@I:96;#T;3J6EM#Q3E@<5[#J:@6#
;3J6EM#9G69\#3=D#Q@<E69E:<=[#F66D#343E6A6=E[#
L6=6@35#A3:=E6=3=96[#J6=9:=L#EG6#53=D#E<#3I<:D#
;69C@:EM#:;;C6;V# *-# **7N*H#
# # # #
>#]:@6#;6@I:96;#F:55#9<=E:=C6#3;#:;#T4M#9<C=EM[#E@:46#
<@#^C@63C#<J#'3=D#13=3L6A6=EV# 2# N7(*H# # # # #>#&A6@L6=9M#;6@I:96;#F:55#9<=E:=C6#3;#:;#T4M#9<C=EM#
<@#E@:46V# O# .7X*H#
#
#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
-(+#
%>?5@#*(6##Factor 6 – Jurisdiction & Conflict Considerations (Continued) 
<55#!@ABCB4DC#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Degree of Cooperation with and Support from Local 
Entities:# 29 26.13%#
#
E#%FB?@#G>C#54DHICJ>DKBDH#L4FMBDH#F@5>JB4DCGBN#LBJG#
54A>5#@DJBJB@C#J4#L4FM#4OJ#>DP#QOFBCKBAJB4D>5#BCCO@C# *. *-6.*R#
E#$4#>KS@FC@#A4TT@DJC#F@A@BS@K# U V6(*R#
E#1"W#4F#X44N@F>JBS@#<HF@@T@DJ#BD#N5>A@# V Y6-*R#
E#'4A>5#C@FSBA@#NF4SBK@FC#BDKBA>J@#JG@#>AZOBCBJB4D#LB55#
D4J#>KS@FC@5P#BTN>AJ#JG@T#[\BF@#AGB@]#BDKBA>J@K#
>AZOBCBJB4D#LB55#D4J#A>OC@#?OFK@D^#CG@FB]]#BDKBA>J@K#
CONN4FJ_D4J@K#>AZOBCBJB4D#LB55#D4J#BTN>AJ#C@FSBA@C^#
X>5#%F>DC#BDKBA>J@K#JF>]]BA#LB55#D4J#?@#>#NF4?5@T`# 7 -6Y,R#
E#X4ODJP#CONN4FJC#JG@#>AZOBCBJB4D^#5@JJ@FC#4]#CONN4FJ#
]F4T#CJ>J@8#54A>58#>DK#D>JB4D>5#5@HBC5>J4FC## - (6V,R#
# # # #E#a4S@FDT@DJ>5#>H@DAB@C#G>S@#F@A4HDBb@K#CN@AB>5#CBHDB]BA>DA@#4]#JG@#5>DK#J4#JG@#JFB?@#]4F#T>DP#P@>FC# *# ,6+,R#
E#WDK@F#1"W#JFB?@#LB55#N>P#TB55B4DC#]4F#NO?5BA#C>]@JP#
BD#>F@># *# ,6+,R#
Public Concern:# 14 12.61%# # # # #
#
E#%FB?@#4F#BDKBSBKO>5#>NN5BA>DJcC#A4DJF>AJC#]4F#OJB5BJB@C#
LB55#D4J#AG>DH@8#LB55#CJB55#?@#N>BK#>C#JG@P#>F@#D4L# - (6V,R# # # # #
E#:&#A4ODJP#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#54CC#4]#ABSB5#QOFBCKBAJB4D/#
JG@#S@FP#@CC@DA@#4]#JFOCJ#>DK#]@K@F>5#N45BAP#BC#J4#>554L#
JFB?@C#J4#C@5]IH4S@FD# ( *6U,R#
# # # #
E#:&#A4DA@FD#JG>J#AOFF@DJ#A4DJF>AJO>5#5BTBJ>JB4DC#4D#
5>DK#OC@#LB55#D4J#?@#G4D4F@K/#JFB?@#LB55#A4TN5P#LBJG#
JG@C@#ODJB5#JG@#A4DJF>AJ#@dNBF@C# ( *6U,R#
# # # #
E#:&#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#D4DIb4D@K#OC@/#TBJBH>JB4D#
T@>COF@C#LB55#?@#J>M@D8#OC@C#G>S@#?@@D#54DHICJ>DKBDH8#
F@A4HDBJB4D#4]#JFB?@cC#CJFOHH5@#J4#F@I@CJ>?5BCG#5>DK#
?>C@8#JFB?@cC#D@@KC#4OJL@BHG#QOFBCKBAJB4D>5#A4D]5BAJ# (# *6U,R#
E#:&#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#N4J@DJB>5#A4TT@FAB>5#
K@S@54NT@DJ/#D4#K4AOT@DJC#@dBCJ#JG>J#JFB?@#G>C#
A4TT@FAB>5#K@S@54NT@DJ#BD#TBDK^#e;<#A>DD4J#]4FA@#
JFB?@#J4#L>BS@#C4S@F@BHD#BTTODBJP#4F#F@CJFBAJ#]OJOF@#
K@S@54NT@DJ#4F#>5J@F>JB4D# (# *6U,R#
E#:&#A4TT@DJC#JG>J#N@FTBJ#D@@K@K#]4F#NF4N4C@K#OC@/#
NF4N4C@K#OC@#L4O5K#4D5P#?@#>554L@K#?P#N@FTBJ#B]#BD#
]@@8#?OJ#D4J#CO?Q@AJ#J4#b4DBDH#B]#BD#JFOCJ^#>NN@>FC#
N@FTBJ#LB55#?@#BCCO@K#LBJG4OJ#NF4?5@T# (# *6U,R#
E#:&#ABJP#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#L>J@F)C@L@F#QOFBCKBAJB4D/#LB55#
F@T>BD#C>T@#LG@JG@F#BD#]@@#4F#JFOCJ# *# ,6+,R#
E#:&#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#H>TBDH#OC@/#e;<#G>C#K@J@FTBD@K#
BC#D4J#H>TBDH#OC@# *# ,6+,R#
E#:&#A4DA@FD#>?4OJ#JFOCJ#CJ>JOC#J@FTBD>JBDH#
@>C@T@DJC/#@>C@T@DJC#LB55#F@T>BD#BD#N5>A@# *# ,6+,R#
E#:&#A4TT@DJC/#JFB?@cC#OC@#K4@C#D4J#NF@A5OK@#
F@CBK@DJB>5)>HFBAO5JOF>5#OC@#4]#COFF4ODKBDH#5>DK# *# ,6+,R#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
--,#
%2345#*(6##Factor 6 – Jurisdiction & Conflict Considerations (Continued)#
744#!589:9;<:#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Policy Considerations:# 10 9.01%#
#
=#%>935?:#<55@#;ABC59DE:#FA>9:@98B9;<24#8;<G498B# H .6I*J#
=#%>935#E2:#5:B2349:E5@#<55@#G;>#:54GK@5B5>L9<2B9;<# . I6.,J#
=#M58;D<9N5#B>935?:#;<D;9<D#2BB5LOB:#B;#>5:B;>5#42<@#
32:5# ( *6P,J#
=#%>935#E2:#>5:O;<:93949BQ#B;#O>;R9@5#G;>#C54G2>5#;G#9B:#
L5L35>:S#9<84A@5:#>55:B2349:EL5<B#;G#B>9324#
FA>9:@98B9;<#;R5>#42<@:# * ,6+,J#
=#T5@5>24#28B#5<8;A>2D5:#8;<:B>A8B9;<#;G#4;C#9<8;L5#
E;A:9<D#49U5#BE2B#O>;O;:5@# * ,6+,J# # # # #
Total Considerations -H-# #
#
#
%2345#*-6##Factor 6 – Jurisdiction and Land Use Conflict 
19<9L24#7<24Q:9:#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Analysis only mentions criminal and civil/regulatory 
jurisdiction,* plus: # 26 23.42%#
#
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#;<4Q# *( *,6P*J# # # # #
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#$;#
2@R5>:5#8;LL5<B:#>5859R5@# I -6H,J# # # # #
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#0;4985#
:5>R985#C944#8;<B9<A5#2:#9:#X3Q#8;A<BQ#;>#B>935Y# - (6Z,J#
# # # #
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#
&L5>D5<8Q#:5>R985#C944#8;<B9<A5#2:#9:#X3Q#8;A<BQ#;>#
B>935Y# (# *6P,J#
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#%>935#
C944#8;<@A8B#O2B>;4:#2<@#5>58B#G5<89<D# (# *6P,J#
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#$55@#G;>#
:54GK@5B5>L9<2B9;<# *# ,6+,J#
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#T9>5#C944#
8;<B9<A5#2:#9:#X3Q#89BQ#;>#['1Y# *# ,6+,J#
=#V>9L9<24#2<@#89R94)>5DA42B;>Q#FA>9:@98B9;<#W#\E5>9GG#
C>;B5#45BB5>#;G#:AOO;>B# *# ,6+,J#
] Criminal jurisdiction will remain with the state while the tribe will assert civil and regulatory 
jurisdiction.#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
--*#
%>?5@#*76##Factor 7 – Additional BIA Responsibility Considerations#
<55#!@ABCB4DC#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
No Significant Additional Burdens Because: 102 91.89%#
#
E#$4#AF>DG@#BD#5>DH#IC@# J- K.6JJL#
E#$4#5@>C@C8#MBGFNC#4O#P>Q#4M#4NF@M#NMICN#>RR5BA>NB4DC#
O4MNFA4SBDG# (. ((6.(L#
E#%MB?@#PB55#>CCIS@#H@T@54RS@DN#>DH#H>QUN4UH>Q#
S>D>G@S@DN# *J *.6-(L#
E#"DUM@C@MT>NB4D#>AVIBCBNB4D# *( *,6W*L#
E#X4DA5IC4MQ#CN>N@S@DN#4O#D4#CBGDBOBA>DN#>HHBNB4D>5#
?IMH@DC# *( *,6W*L#
# # # #E#%MB?@#>5M@>HQ#F>C#5>DH#BD#NMICN#>DH#NFIC#P4MYBDG#M@5>NB4DCFBR# -# (6J,L#
E#%MB?@#AIMM@DN5Q#>AA@RNC#5BNN5@#F@5R8#@ZR@AN#5@CC#>C#
RM4[@ANC#GM4P# *# ,6+,L#
Additional Burdens Are Minimal, and the BIA is 
Equipped to Handle Them:# 21 18.92%#
# # # #
 
E#0M4?>N@#C@MTBA@C ** +6+*L 
E#'@>C@#4M#S4MNG>G@#RM4A@CCBDG K .67*L 
E#&>C@S@DN#RM4A@CCBDG# 7# -6K,L#
E#<RRM4T>5#4D#F4ICBDG#H@T@54RS@DN8#A4DCNMIANB4D#
54>D# -# (6J,L#
E#:4>H#C@MTBA@C#\A4DCNMIANB4D8#S>BDN@D>DA@]# *# ,6+,L#
E#^I>MN@M5Q)C@SBU>DDI>5#>D>5QCBC#4O#SBNBG>NB4D#
S@>CIM@C# *# ,6+,L#
E#_;<#O4M@CN@H#5>DH#D@@HC#SGSN#R5>D#U#NMB?@#PB55#
>S@DH#R5>D#N4#BDA5IH@# *# ,6+,L#
How Services Will Be Provided: 19 17.12% 
#
E#<AA4IDN#4O#F4P#@S@MG@DAQ#>DH#OBM@#C@MTBA@C#PB55#
?@#RM4TBH@H#\`@H@M>58#NMB?@8#CN>N@]# *7 *(6K*L# # # # #
E#%MB?@#PB55#RM4TBH@#C>O@NQ#R>NM45C8#P@@H#>?>N@S@DN#
>DH#@S@MG@DAQ#C@MTBA@C8#S>BDN>BD#M4>HC8#R>Q#O4M#
4NF@M#C@MTBA@C#>C#M@VIBM@H# W J6(*L#
# # # #
Policy Considerations:# 14 12.61%# # # # #
#
E#=F45@#@Z@MABC@#P4I5H#D4N#@T@D#?@#M@VIBM@H#?IN#O4M#
PM4DGOI5#N@MSBD>NB4D# +# W6**L# # # # #
E#<AVIBCBNB4D#PB55#M@CI5N#BD#BDAM@>C@H#NMB?>5#C@5OU
CIOOBAB@DAQ#>DH#I5NBS>N@5Q#5@CC#H@R@DH@DA@#4D#_;<#
4T@M>55# .# 76.,L#
# # # #
No Activities That Would Require BIA Involvement: 14 12.61%#
# # # #
#
E#$4#54GGBDG#4M#O4M@CNMQ#M@C4IMA@C#N4#S>D>G@ *- **6J*L##
E#$4#SBDBDG#4M#SBD@M>5#M@C4IMA@C#N4#S>D>G@ 7 -6K,L#
E#$4#R5>D#N4#H@T@54R ( *6W,L#
E#$4#>GMBAI5NIM@ ( *6W,L#
#
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
--(#
%2345#*67##Factor 7 – Additional BIA Responsibility Considerations (continued)#
844#!59:;:<=;#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
Character of Land Analysis: 9 8.11%#
#
>#$<#?:@2?:2=#A23:B2B# . 67.,C#
>#$<#;B?D9BD?5;# - (7E,C#
>#$<#A2F2?G<D;#H2;B5#?5I<J24# * ,7+,C#
>#$<#5=J:?<=I5=B24#:;;D5;# * ,7+,C#
>#$<#;B2=G:=K#B:I35?#<?#G5=;5#J5K5B2B:<=# * ,7+,C#
# # # #>#$<#A:;B<?:924#;:B5;# *# ,7+,C#
>#$<#9?:B:924#A23:B2B# *# ,7+,C#
Degree of Cooperation/Support from Local Entities: 4 3.60%#
# # # #
 
>#1"L#:=#@4295 ( *7M,C 
>#%?:35#:;#B2N:=K#I:B:K2B:<=#I52;D?5; * ,7+,C 
>#0?<@<;5G#D;5#:;#9<=;:;B5=B#H:BA#F<=:=K# *# ,7+,C#
Financial Considerations: 4 3.60% 
#
>#!5J54<@I5=B#H:44#35#O:=2=95G#3P#B?:35Q#=<B#O5G5?24# ( *7M,C# # # # #
>#RL!#H:44#;@<=;<?#G5J54<@I5=BQ#;<#=<#:II5G:2B5#
:I@29B#<=#ST8# ( *7M,C# # # # #
Total Considerations: 248 # # # # #
#
#
%2345#*.7##Factor 8 – Environmental Compliance Considerations 
844#!59:;:<=;#
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 111 Total  
Decisions#
NEPA Satisfied:# 114* 100.00%#
#
>#$<#9A2=K5#:=#42=G#D;5#U#92B5K<?:924#5V94D;:<=# W+ W(7*WC#
>#&=J:?<=I5=B24#8;;5;;I5=B#X&8Y#@?5@2?5G#2=G#
G:;B?:3DB5GQ#Z:=G:=K#<O#$<#[:K=:O:92=B#TI@29B#
XZ"$[TY#:;;D5G# 6. 6,7.6C#
Hazardous Substances Determinations Satisfied:
# # # #
 
>#8@@?<@?:2B5#?5@<?B#X0A2;5#*#\<=B2I:=2=B#[D?J5P#
\A59N4:;BY#;D3I:BB5G#BA2B#?5O459B;#=<#A2F2?G<D;#
I2B5?:24;#<?#9<=B2I:=2=B; *** *,,7,,C 
Public Concern: 
#
>#8GG?5;;#@D34:9#9<=95?=#23<DB#@<B5=B:24#D;5#XST8#
=<B#?5]D:?5G#B<#9<=;:G5?#;@59D42B:J5#42=G#D;5#
2445K2B:<=;#:=#5=J:?<=I5=B24#?5J:5H^#B?:35#942?:O:5G#
@?<@<;5G#D;5^#B?:35#;B2B5G#=<B#@42==:=K#B<#3D:4G#
92;:=<^#ST8#O:=G;#OD44P#9<=;:;B5=B#H:BA#9<2;B24#
@?<B59B:<=#?5KD42B:<=;Y# . 67.,C#
# # # #
Total Considerations: 230 # # # # #
* NEPA was satisfied in 100% of decisions, but 3 decisions involved property in multipl parcels 
where NEPA was satisfied by an EA/FONSI for some parcels and by a categorical exclusion for 
others.##
# # # #
# #
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
23456#7,/#(.*8#(,*(9# Extreme Rubber-Stamping#
0&00&:!;$&#'<=#:&3;&=#
---#
%>?5@#*A6##Factor 9 – Location Relative to State Boundaries#
#
# #
# of Decisions 
Considered 
In#
% of 18 Decisions 
That Analyze 
Factor 9*#
Location Relative to State Boundaries: 18 100.00% 
#
B#$4C@#DE5@F#GH4D#I4JCEKL4LF#FC>C@F#>JM#0>IEGEI# **# A*6**N#
B#!4@F#J4C#IH4FF#FC>C@#?4LJM>HE@F#>JM#EF#EJ#F>D@#
I4LJCO#>F#@PEFCEJK#CHLFC#5>JM# Q# -R6R+N#
B#STL>H@5O#EJ#U<8#I4JFEM@H>?5@#MEFC>JI@#GH4D#4CV@H#
FC>C@F#4H#I4LJCHE@F# *# .6.AN#
Other Considerations:# 12 66.67% # # # #
#
B#%HE?@#V>F#M@D4JFCH>C@M#H@TLEFEC@#J@@M# A --6--N# # # # #
B#UEC@#FCHEJK#4G#I4LHC#I>F@F#WVEIV#MEFILFF#CHE?@XF#
VEFC4HO# ( **6**N#
# # # #
B#'>JM#EF#WECVEJ#CV@#CHE?@XF#>?4HEKEJ>5#5>JM# (# **6**N#
B#'>JM#EF#I54F@#C4#@PEFCEJK#CHLFC#5>JM#Y#WE55#J4C#?@#
?LHM@JF4D@#G4H#CHE?@#C4#D>J>K@#4H#I4JFCECLC@#>#
?LHM@J#4J#Z;<# (# **6**N#
B#<?4HEKEJ>5#5>JM#W>F#4[@H#4J@#DE55E4J#>IH@F8#?LC#
CH@>CE@F#W@H@#J@[@H#H>CEGE@M#F4#CHE?@#W>F#J@[@H#>?5@#
C4#C>\@#CEC5@# *# .6.AN#
B#$4#>M[@HF@#I4DD@JCF#H@I@E[@M# *# .6.AN#
Total Considerations: 33 # # # # #
Errors:# A# #
#
B#<J>5O]@M#CVEF#G>IC4H8#?LC#MEM#J4C#J@@M#C4#?@I>LF@#
W>F#4J^H@F@H[>CE4J#>ITLEFECE4J# . (Q6QRN#
B#!EM#J4C#>J>5O]@#CVEF#G>IC4H8#?LC#FV4L5M#V>[@#
?@I>LF@#W>F#4GG^H@F@H[>CE4J#>ITLEFECE4J# *# J)>#
* Only the 14 off-reservation acquisitions required Factor 9 analysis, but 18 decisions included 
Factor 9 analysis.  #
#
#
%>?5@#*Q6##Factor 9 – Distance From Other Trust Land 
#
Miles From Current Reservation:* 
Average: A6A,#DE5@F#
Median:# *67,#DE5@F#
Low:# ,6,R#DE5@F#
High:  -,#DE5@F#
* Distances were noted in either miles or feet. All were converted to miles for analysis.   
** While 18 decisions included Factor 9 analysis, only the distances from the correctly analyzed 
decisions were included in this table.  The distances noted in decisions that included unnecessary 
Factor 9 analysis—because they were for on-reservation acquisitions—were not included since 
the correct distance on those acquisitions is 0 miles.#
#
!"#$"%#!&'&%&# # ()*+)(,*-##./(,#01#
#
--2#
%3456#*78##Factor 10 – Expected Economic Benefits#
 
# # # of Decisions Considered In#
% of 7 Decisions 
That Analyze 
Factor 10*#
Statement of Use:# 7 100.00% 
#
9#:635;<#=3>?5?;@#A>5?B?>C#DEFG#E6<34?5?;3;?HBI# -# 2(87JK#
9#LFM?B6MM#053B#3;;3><6D# (# (78.NK#
9#OHPP6E>?35#4F?5D?BGM# (# (78.NK#
9#Q;HE3G6#3BD#<3EDR3E6#M;HE6# *# *28(+K#
9#O6E6PHB?35#3BD#4FE?35#M?;6# *# *28(+K#
Expected Benefits:# 4 57.14% # # # #
#
9#'63M6#?B>HP6# ( (78.NK# # # # #
9#O5?B?>#<3M#2C-,,#>5?6B;MC#4?GG6M;#<635;<>3E6#
SEHT?D6E#?B#>HFB;@#U#46B6=?;M#3E6#?PP63MFE3456# * *28(+K#
# # # #
9#V556T?3;6#<HFM?BG#M<HE;3G6#AD6M>E?46#<HFM?BG#
M?;F3;?HBC#M6E?HFM#<HFM?BG#M<HE;3G6C#W#HB#R3?;#5?M;C#
P3B@#PF5;?S56#=3P?5?6M#M<3E?BG#<HFM6I# *# *28(+K#
9#X3>?5?;@#SEHT?D6M#M6ET?>6M#;H#P6P46EM#3BD#BHBY
P6P46EM# *# *28(+K#
Need for the Land:# 2 28.57%#
# # # #
 
9#$66D6D#=HE#M65=YD6;6EP?B3;?HB * *28(+K 
9#$66D6D#46>3FM6#>5?B?>#HS6E3;6M#HB#P?B?PFP#
4FDG6; * *28(+K 
9#$66D6D#MH#;E?46#>3B#6Z6E>?M6#3BD#SE6M6ET6#
>F5;FE35#P3B3G6P6B;#HT6E#<635;<#>3E6 * *28(+K 
Other Considerations: 2 28.57% 
#
9#%E?46#<3M#?BT6M;6D#HT6E#(,#@63EM#?B#?;M#S53B#;H#FM6#
3M#3B#?BDFM;E?35#S3E[# (# *28(+K# # # # #
9#\&#>HB>6EB#34HF;#SH;6B;?35#D6T65HSP6B;/#
OHHS6E3;?T6#VGE66P6B;#R?;<#>?;@#?M#?B#S53>6## (# *28(+K# # # # #
Total Considerations: 21 # # # # #
Errors:#
#
9#1?MM?BG#X3>;HE#*,#VB35@M?M#AM<HSS?BG#S53]3C#
>HPP6E>?35#4?MHB#E3B><I# ( B)3#
* There were fourteen off-reservation decisions.  Only seven analyzed factor ten.  Five were not 
required to analyze because the acquisition was not for a business purpose.  Two should of have 
analyzed the factor, but did not.#
#
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%>?5@#*+6##Total Considerations v. State and Local Interest Considerations#
 
Categories Considered in General 
Factor Table Considerations 
(#A#$@@B#C4D#EF@#'>GB .# H+(#
-#A#0IDJ4K@ L# 7*,#
7#A#"EF@D#%DIKE#'>GB#>GB#!@MD@@#4C#<KKNKE>GO@#$@@B@B +# (L#
.#A#%>P#'4KK **# 7*7#
H#A#QIDNKBNOEN4G#>GB#'>GB#RK@#S4GC5NOE *(# -H-#
L#A#<BBNEN4G>5#T;<#:@KJ4GKN?N5NEU *7# (77#
V#A#&GWND4GX@GE>5#S4XJ5N>GO@ *.# (-,#
+#A#'4O>EN4G#:@5>ENW@#E4#YE>E@#T4IGB>DN@K *H# --#
*,#A#&PJ@OE@B#&O4G4XNO#T@G@CNEK *V# (*#
                                   Total Considerations: 2,438#
#
Categories that Demonstrate Consideration of 
State and Local Interests
Factor Table Considerations 
=>UK#%DN?@#S4GEDN?IE@K#E4#EF@#S4XXIGNEU **# *.-#
!@MD@@#4C#S44J@D>EN4G#ZNEF#>GB#YIJJ4DE#CD4X#'4O>5#
&GENEN@K 
.8#L8#**8#*(8#*78#
*H# *,L#
'4O>5#S4GO@DG **# (V#
"EF@D *V# 7#
                                    State and Local Considerations: 292#
#
#
%>?5@#(,6##Acceptance Rate#
 
Accepted 100% 
Denied 0% 
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